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DUE PROCESS IN PRISON DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS t
WILLIAM BABCOCK *
When I was in prison, if a guard saw you do something wrong,
he'd say, "Go to the hole, boy," and he'd let you out when he
figured you'd learned your lesson.
One time they put me in the hole for swearing at a guard. He
told me I wouldn't get out until I apologized to him. I was in the hole
for nine months.'
Historically, one of the major concerns of prison administrators has been
the enforcement of discipline within the inmate population. To maintain
discipline, punishments have been employed which range from the denial of
television privileges to whipping.? Naturally, the types of punishments
employed have been of concern to inmates. As a result of this concern, some
forms of punishment, such as whipping, have been held to be cruel and
unusual.' Of equal concern to inmates has been the process by which such
punishment is imposed. On this front also progress has been made. The above
quote was made by an ex-inmate who served time in a state prison from 1967 to
1971. 4
 At the time that the incident occurred, the guard had full authority to
act as he did.' As the example illustrates, the implementation of discipline
could be very arbitrary with no guarantee of notice and a hearing. The
response of many inmates has been to challenge the prison officials' absolute
discretion on the grounds of denial of procedural due process.
The judiciary long ago adopted a hands-off policy with regard to most
aspects of prison administration, 6
 including, of course, discipline. Beginning in
the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, the courts began to do away with the
hands-off policy and to grant remedies to inmates.' Between 1970 and 1973,
-t Copyright © 198] by Boston College Law School.
• B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1973; J.D., Boston University, 1976; M.A.T., An-
tioch School of Law, 1980; presently working for the Center for Community Justice,
Washington, D.C., Mr. Babcock is now monitoring compliance with the court orders issued in
Ruiz v. Estelle, a case involving the Texas Department of Corrections. The author expresses his
appreciation to Professor William Statsky, Antioch School of Law, for his assistance in the con-
ceptualization of this article.
' Statement made to the writer by an ex-inmate describing his state prison experience
from 1967 to 1971.
2 See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), in which the whipping of
prisoners was held to be unconstitutional.
3 Id.
See note 1 supra.
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, note
13 infra, most prisons had complete discretion in the imposition of disciplinary punishment.
6 See, e.g., Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 966, 999 (N.D. 111. 1949).
7 See, e.g., Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Holt v. Sarver,
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the United States Supreme Court decided three cases involving due process in
administrative proceedings: Goldberg v. Kelly, 8 Morrissey v. Brewer, 9 and Gagnon
v. Scarpelli. i° The latter two decisions were corrections cases involving parole
and probation revocation hearings. In each case, the Court held that some
degree of due process was required." Following the Supreme Court's lead,
lower courts began to impose due process standards on prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings. The amount of due process required varied significantly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.' 2 In 1974, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Wolff
v. McDonnell" to determine first, whether due process requirements applied to
disciplinary proceedings, and if so, to determine how much process was due.
Wolff was a class action filed by inmates of the Nebraska Prison Complex
in which they alleged, inter alio, that the prison's disciplinary procedures
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." The applicable
Nebraska statute provided that serious misconduct could be punished by
forfeiture of good-time credits or confinement in a disciplinary cell.' 5 Minor
violations were punishable only by deprivation of privileges.'' The prison
regulations established the following procedures for handling acts of serious
misconduct:
(a) the chief correction supervisor reviews the "write-ups" on the in-
mate by the officers of the Complex daily;
309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark, 1970); and Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I.
1970).
g 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
9 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
" 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
" Goldberg required the following procedures prior to termination of public assistance
payments: (1) timely and adequate notice of the charge; (2) an opportunity to be heard; (3) a
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (4) the right to retain an attorney; (5) an
impartial decisionmaker; and (6) a statement of reasons for the determination and an indication
of evidence relied upon. 397 U.S. at 267-71.
Morrissey required these standards at a parole revocation hearing: (1) written notice of the
claimed violations of parole; (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (3) opportunity
to be heard and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing examiner specifically finds good cause for
disallowing it); (5) a "neutral and detached" hearing body; and (6) a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and reasons for revoking parole. 408 U.S. at 489.
Gagnon extended the Morrissey standards to probation revocation hearings and added the
requirement of the appointment of counsel when fundamental fairness so requires. 411 U.S. at
790.
12 See, e.g., Banks v. Norton, 346 F. Supp. 971, 919 (D. Conn. 1972), in which the
court held that an inmate must receive only notice of the charge and be given a reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard by an impartial board; and Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 782-84
(N.D. Cal. 1971), which required timely and adequate notice of the charge and the hearing, an
opportunity to be heard, an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, an opportunity
to retain counsel or counsel-substitute or to have counsel appointed, an impartial decision maker,
and a written statement of the reasons for the decision and the evidence relied upon.
" 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
14 418 U.S. 539, 543 (1974).
15 Id. at 546-47.
16 Id. at 546.
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(b) the convict is called to a conference with the chief correction
supervisor and the charging party;
(c) following the conference, a conduct report is sent to the Adjust-
ment Committee;
(d) there follows a hearing before the Adjustment Committee and
the report is read to the inmate and discussed;
(e) if the inmate denies the charge he may ask questions of the party
writing him up;
(f) the Adjustment Committee can conduct additional investigations
if it desires;
(g) punishment is imposed.' 7
Acts of minor misconduct were either resolved informally by the inmate's
supervisor or formally reported to the Adjustment Committee."' The district
court rejected the due process claim,' 9 but the court of appeals reversed and
held that the requirements outlined in Morrissey and Gagnon should be
followed. 2°
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that inmates have a liberty in-
terest in statutory good-time credits, 2 ' and that some form of due process must
be applied before an inmate can be deprived of those credits." In a footnote,
these procedural protections were extended to cases involving possible punitive
segregation, but the Court did not reach the issue whether these safeguards
would be required for the imposition of less severe penalties:
Here, as in the case of good time, there should be minimum pro-
cedural safeguards as a hedge against arbitrary determination of the
factual predicate for imposition of the sanction. We do not suggest,
however, that the procedures required by today's decision for the
deprivation of good time would also be required for the imposition of
lesser penalties such as the loss of privileges. 23
Having held that inmates do possess a liberty interest, the Court next
addressed the issue of what standards should be applied before that interest can
be deprived. 24 In determining how much due process is required, the Court used
a balancing test, weighing the inmate's liberty interest against the interests of
the state prison system:
17 Id. at 552-53.
'a Id. at 551-52.
19 Id. at 543; 342 F. Supp. 616 (D. Neb. 1972).
20 Id. at 544; 483 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1973).
21 Good time is time subtracted from an inmate's sentence for good behavior. It is a
statutory creation, and in most jurisdictions it is computed on an escalating scale. For example,
an inmate can earn five days of good time per month during the first year of incarceration, seven
days per month the second year, etc.
22 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).•
23 Id. at 571 n.19.
24 418 U.S. at 558-72.
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The deprivation of good time is unquestionably a matter of con-
siderable importance. The State reserves it as a sanction for serious
misconduct, and we should not unrealistically discount its
significance.
In striking the balance that the Due Process Clause demands,
however, we think the major consideration militating against adopt-
ing the full range of procedures suggested by Morrissey for alleged
parole violators is the very different stake the State has in the struc-
ture and content of the prison disciplinary hearing.
. . . The reality is that disciplinary hearings and the imposi-
tion of disagreeable sanctions necessarily involve confrontations be-
tween inmates and authority and between inmates who are being
disciplined and those who would charge or furnish evidence against
them. Retaliation is much more than a theoretical possibility; and
the basic and unavoidable task of providing reasonable safety for
guards and inmates may be at stake, to say nothing of the impact of
disciplinary confrontations and the resulting escalation of personal
antagonism on the important aims of the correctional process."
The result of this balancing of interests was a grant of minimum due proc-
ess rights to inmates charged with disciplinary violations. Thus, while Wolff did
not go as far as Morrissey and Gagnon did in the areas of parole and probation, it
did create a starting point. The Wolff Court established three rights which are
mandatory in all cases. First, the Court held that there is a right to a fair hear-
ing. 26 Second, it required that the prisoner receive written notice of the charges
at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing. 27 Third, the Court mandated
that following the hearing, the inmate must receive a "written statement of the
factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary
action taken. '28
Wolff also established qualified, or limited, rights. The Court granted in-
mates the right during the hearing to present evidence in their defense in the
form of witnesses and documentary evidence, "when permitting [them] to do
so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." 29
Similarly, the Court provided the right to representation by another inmate or
a member of the staff, "[w]here an illiterate inmate is involved . . , or where
the complexity of the issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to col-
lect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the
case. . . " 3 ° In balancing the interests of the two parties, however, the Court
25 Id. at 561-62.
" Id. at 558.
27 Id. at 564.
28 Id. at 563.
29 Id. at 566. Although leaving an interpretation of that test to later decisions, the Court
recommended, without requiring, that the disciplinary committee "state its reasons for refusing
to call a witness  " Id.
3° Id. at 570.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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found that the state's interest in maintaining security militated against grant-
ing the right to retained or appointed counsel, 31 and the right to confrontation
and cross-examination of adverse witnesses.'" In the Court's view, if inmates
were allowed to exercise these rights, "there would be considerable potential
for havoc inside the prison walls. "33
Finally, the Court addressed the question of an impartial factfinder. Even
though the panel used by the Nebraska Prison Complex was composed of
prison employees, the Court found that it was "sufficiently impartial to satisfy
the due process clause." 31 Thus, while implying that some degree of impar-
tiality must be met, the Court left the establishment of that standard for later
decisions.
Wolff, thus, laid the groundwork for the implementation of due process in
prison disciplinary hearings. The decision, however, left many questions
unanswered. The Court's standards for when an inmate may present witnesses
and what constitutes an impartial factfinder are vague. Also open to interpreta-
tion is when a prisoner may obtain the assistance of an inmate or staff repre-
sentative. Finally, the issue of whether due process applies at all to the imposi-
tion of lesser penalties was not reached.
Other questions have been raised which Wolff failed to address either ex-
pressly or by implication. 35 These questions, and others, have been considered
by both state and federal courts subsequent to the Wolff decision. Prison rules
and regulations also have addressed these questions. Although Wolff established
the minimum due process standards that the institutions must follow, the
Court made it clear that the individual agencies have the discretion to go
beyond these standards. 36 With regard to confrontation and cross-examina-
tion, for example, the Court did not make them mandatory, but instead stated
that "Hite better course at this time, . . . is to leave these matters to the
31 Id.
32 Id. at 567-69.
" Id. at 567.
3+ Id, at 571.
" Some of those questions include:
Do inmates have a right to be notified of what the institution's rules of conduct are?
Does an inmate or his/her representative have the opportunity to investigate the charges
and interview witnesses prior to the hearing?
Does an inmate have the right to request the continuance of a hearing in order to prepare a
defense?
If the rule violation also constitutes a criminal violation, will the disciplinary hearing be
stayed pending the outcome of the criminal prosecution and possible trial?
If the hearing is not stayed pending the criminal investigation, does an inmate have a right
to remain silent at the hearing?
When and where does a disciplinary hearing take place?
What is the standard of guilt?
How soon after a hearing must an inmate receive a copy of the written staientent?
Does an inmate have the right to an administrative appeal?
If an appeal is available, is an inmate's penalty stayed pending the outcome of the appeal?
Do prisons provide the same procedural safeguards in cases involving lesser penalties?
36 418 U.S. at 569, 571-72.
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sound discretion of the officials of state prisons."" The decision, thus, was left
to prison administrators.
This article will explore the questions left unanswered by Wolff and how
both the courts and the corrections agencies have responded to them. This will
be done primarily through a review of both case law and established prison
rules. To facilitate this examination, in 1980 a survey was made of prison
disciplinary regulations in forty states, the District of Columbia and the
Federal Bureau of Prisons." Reference to the survey will be made throughout
the article. 39 To avoid confusion, the forty-two regulations will be referred to as
the "handbooks," with separate provisions within the handbooks referred to as
rules or regulations.
The article first will discuss what constitutes prohibited conduct in prison
and whether inmates have a right to notice of those prohibitions. Section two
will explore the issue of when due process is required, with special emphasis on
those cases which involve lesser penalties. The third section will discuss the im-
pact of formal waivers and criminal convictions on disciplinary proceedings. In
the fourth section, the stages of the disciplinary process which take place be-
tween the time that a violation occurs and a hearing is convened will be
presented. To give a picture of what takes place at a disciplinary hearing, a
typical hearing at the Lorton Correctional Complex will be described in the
fifth section. The following section then will explore the due process issues
which relate specifically to the hearings. Section VII will discuss the limits on
the penalties which may be imposed on an inmate who is found guilty, and sec-
tion VIII will explore the availability of administrative and judicial review of
the hearings. The ninth section will discuss briefly the ability of the prison of-
ficials to avoid the Wolff standards by labelling the punishment as either a
transfer or administrative segregation.
The final section will explore how Woo; subsequent case law and the pro-
mulgation of administrative regulations have affected the imposition of punish-
ment on prison inmates. It will be submitted that Wolff and the succeeding case
law and prison regulations have gone a long way in restricting the discretion of
prison guards to discipline inmates, and that both the courts and the correc-
tions agencies have expanded the due process safeguards established by Wolff.
It also will be submitted, however, that much of the change has been in form
and not in substance, and that, although some of the discretion has been
restricted, a great deal of arbitrariness and discretion still exists at the various
levels of the disciplinary process.
" Id. at 569.
38 The forty-two handbooks are on file with the author. Delaware, Kansas, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming are not included in
the survey because their regulations were not obtained.
39 Some of the handbooks contain only the rules of disciplinary procedure and do not
include a list of offenses or possible penalties. The discussion of offenses and penalties, therefore,
will not reflect the practice in all forty-two jurisdictions included in the study.
To avoid confusion, the forty-two regulations will be referred to as the "handbooks,"
with separate provisions within the handbooks referred to as rules or regulations.
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I. NOTICE AND DEFINITIONS OF PROHIBITED CONDUCT
As pointed out in the introduction, Wolff requires that an inmate receive
twenty-four hours before a hearing written notice of any disciplinary charges
brought against him." There is a more fundamental notice issue, however, not
addressed in the Wolff decision" which involves whether inmates have a right
to be informed of the prison's rules of conduct before a violation ever is charged.
The issue breaks down into two considerations: (1) whether the institution
must promulgate written rules of conduct that must be made known to the
prisoners; and (2) whether the language of the rules must be sufficiently
specific as to warn inmates of what conduct is prohibited. The weight of
authority indicates that both of these considerations must be met.
The issue whether inmates must have written notice of the institution's
rules has its analogy in criminal law which prefers statutory as opposed to com-
mon law crimes. The leading case on the issue of providing notice to the public
of what constitutes a crime is McBoyle v. United States" in which the Supreme
Court held that "it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law in-
tends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possi-
ble the line should be clear."'" While the majority of jurisdictions still
recognize common law crimes, the trend is toward their abolition and the re-
quirement that all criminal laws be codified in statutes." Even where common
law crimes are recognized, furthermore, the laws are not "unwritten" but
found in prior case law.'"
Because of the emphasis on maintaining order, discipline and security,
and because of the unequal relationship between the incarcerated and those
employed to guard them, a stronger argument can be made for requiring
prisons to promulgate written rules. These rules are necessary not only to pro-
mote discipline, but to prevent arbitrariness in punishment. By establishing a
pre-existing standard of behavior, the question of what conduct is prohibited is
not left to the total discretion of correctional officers.
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on this issue, several lower
courts have recognized the logic of this argument. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Newkirk v. Butler" held that inmates have a
right to be informed of the institution's rules and the sanctions for violating
those rules.'" Another case which addressed the question was Landman v.
418 U.S. at 564.
4 ' The Court in Wolff did not address the question of written rules of conduct because
the state of Nebraska already had adopted rules regarding inmate behavior. Id. at 548 n.8.
42 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
43 Id. at 27.
4 * W. LAFAVE AND A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 57 (1972).
4 ' Id. at 57 n.3.
46 364 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Although the majority of cases in the article are
post- Wolff, this section contains some pre- Wolff case law. Because Wolff did not address the issues
raised in this section, these cases are still good law.
47 364 F. Supp. at 502-03.
.	 . [t]he touchstone is fundamental fairness: if the most elemental rules of
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Royster48
 in which the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that the rules "must . . . be distributed, posted, or otherwise made available
in writing to inmates. "49 Additionally, in Haller v. Oregon State Penitentiary, Cor-
rections Division," the prisoner pled guilty to a charge of "attempting to use a
telephone without authority. " 51
 Haller appealed to the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals and argued that, even though the penitentiary had adopted written rules,
there was no rule prohibiting use of a telephone without authority and that,
therefore, he could not plead guilty to such a charge." The court agreed,
holding that the prisoner could not plead guilty to a non-existent rule."
In Barnes u. Government of the Virgin Islands , 54
 the District Court for the
Virgin Islands went further than the holding in Haller and required that the
prison must not only adopt written rules of conduct for the inmates, but must
also inform each inmate of the content of those rules." The Hearings Hand-
book of the Michigan Department of Corrections 56
 agrees with this position. In
section II, it lists three fundamental elements of due process, the first of which
is "the right to know what behavior is expected and what will be punished, i.e.,
fairness are violated, unwarranted by the exigencies of the situation, then the req-
uisite due process has not been accorded. This assessment of fundamental fairness
begins at the most basic level. Prisoners are entitled to know what the rules are,
what actions will be met with sanctions.
Id.
" 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
" Id. at 656.
50 31 Or. App. 461, 570 P.2d 983 (1977).
" Id. at 464, 570 P.2d at 985.
" M. at 464, 570 P.2d at 984-85.
55
 Id. at 464-65, 570 P.2d at 985.
If, as petitioner contends, there is no rule prohibiting using a telephone without
proper authority, we would agree that there is substance to his argument that he
could not plead guilty to violating a nonexistent rule. By analogy to the rule in
criminal cases, this defect would not be waived by a plea of guilty and could be
raised for the first time on appeal.
While "using a telephone without authority" may well be prohibited by some
standing order of the penitentiary, there is nothing in the record to indicate or
establish that any such standing order exists. Accordingly, . . in the absence of
proof of any such standing order we must reverse on the first charge.
Id.
" 415 F. Supp. 1218 (D.V.I. 1976).
" Id. at 1232. In its order, the court stated that:
The problem of prison discipline and internal security frequently becomes an
area of constitutional concern. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses pro-
tect prisoners against arbitrary, capricious, and unequal treatment. I find consti-
tutional deficiencies in these areas as well.
The most serious of these arises from the simple fact that the prisoners are not
given a copy of the institution's rules and regulations upon the admittance to the
facility. They are dependent upon veteran prisoners and isolated posted notices if
they wish to have any advance determination of their rights and responsibilities.
Otherwise, they must wait until they have committed a violation before they are
informed.
Id. at 1229.
" Penelope D. Clute, Hearings Administrator, Revised June, 1977. The Handbook
currently is under revision and a new edition should be published in 1981.
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the necessity of written rules." 57 Furthermore, the survey of prison regula-
tions, as compiled in each jurisdiction's prison handbook, shows that thirty-
three jurisdictions specifically require that the inmates be informed of the rules
of conduct. 55 Some of the handbooks in the survey contain only the rules of
procedure and do not include a list of offenses or penalties. It is possible that in
those jurisdictions the prisons provide separate handbooks which inform the in-
mates of the rules of conduct, and that, therefore, the figure is higher than thir-
ty-three.
Of interest, also, are the methods of notification adopted. Many of the
regulations are vague as to exactly how the inmates are notified. At least thirty
regulations call for written notice, either by providing copies to each inmate or
by posting the rules within the prison. 59 Other regulations provide for oral
notice, using language such as "[i]nmates will be clearly informed of the rules
and regulations which govern their activities. . . . " 60 At least four states give
both written and oral notice. 6 ' Furthermore, seven states have specific provi-
sions for assisting those inmates who are either illiterate or speak a language
other than English. 62
57
 Id. at 2. In explaining the importance of written rules, the handbook states that:
By defining the kinds of behavior which will be punished as misconduct we fulfill
the first element of basic fairness: providing notice of what the rules are, what is
expected.
The existence of a uniform list also assists staff in consistently identifying
misconduct violations and properly charging them.
For these reasons, rules should be written for and posted in specific work
areas, school assignments, housing units, and any other areas having specialized
requirements which entail punishment if not followed.
Id.
58 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, the
District of Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. See also note 39 supra.
59 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, In-
diana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, District of Columbia, and the Federal Bureau
of Prisons.
60
 Iowa State Penitentiary, Policy and Procedure Guidelines III-A-2, Discipline and
Control of Inmates 1 (1977).
61 Alaska, Florida, Nebraska and Pennsylvania.
" Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin.
On the federal level, inmates now have an opportunity to read the rules of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, but only if they have access to the Code of Federal Regulations. This limited right was
established in Ramer v. Saxbe, 522 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1975), where federal inmates alleged that
the disciplinary rules of the Federal Bureau of Prisons were not disclosed to them and that the
Bureau had not published the rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. 5 551 (1976). The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia held that "the Bureau of
Prisons is, indeed, an 'agency' within the definition of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 5 551, and that its rule
making is subject to applicable requirements of that Act." 522 F.2d at 697. One of the re-
quirements of the APA is that each agency "publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of
the public . . . substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and
statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by
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Assuming a prison must adopt written rules of conduct and the inmates
must be informed of those rules, a problem still exists where the rules are
drafted so vaguely that the inmates cannot reasonably be expected to know
what behavior is being prohibited. In such a case, the inmates are at the same
disadvantage as where there either are no rules or the inmates are not informed
of their content. It is useful, again, to draw an analogy between prison
disciplinary rules and criminal statutes. The due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment requires a minimum degree of definiteness in the statutory
prescription of criminal standards. 63
 A statute which lacks such definiteness is
said to be "void for vagueness" 64 in violation of what some courts refer to as
"substantive due process." 65
 A major problem in this area is trying to deter-
mine how much definiteness due process requires. In Jordon u. DeGeorge, 66 the
Supreme Court stated that, "Nmpossible standards of specificity are not re-
quired. . . . The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understand-
ing and practices." 67 Given this test for criminal statutes and agency regula-
tions outside the prison world, the question becomes whether prison regula-
tions defining institutional offenses must comply with the same standard.
Landman v, Royster68 was the first case that attempted to resolve the issue.
In Landman the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia stated that
the purposes of fair warning and restraint on arbitrariness underlying the
vagueness doctrine had been "ill-served" by the rules adopted by the Virginia
prison authorities. 69 The inmates were not given fair warning of prohibited
conduct by "such ill-defined offenses as 'misbehavior' and `agitation'."" Such
vague definitions can incorporate almost any type of behavior, thus allowing
unfettered discretion in imposing punishment. Then the court listed eight
reasons why the doctrine should apply in the prison context" and four reasons
why it should not. 72
 For example, the court found that application of the
the agency; .
	 . ." 5 U.S.C. § 552(1)(D) (1976). As a result, the Ramer court held that the
disciplinary rules of the Federal Bureau of Prisons must be published in the Code of Federal
Regulations. Furthermore, 541-11 of the Regulations provides that staff "shall advise each in-
mate in writing promptly after arrival at an institution of: . . . (d) Prohibited acts and
disciplinary severity scale." 28 C.P.A. S 541-11 (1979).
65 See, e.g., Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARV. L. REV. 77
(1948); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., United States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974).
66 341 U.S. 223, reh, denied, 341 U.S. 956 (1951).
67 Id. at 231-32.
68 333 F. Supp: 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
69 Id. at 654.
7° Id. at 655.
" Id. The eight reasons were: to establish the limits of administrators' power; to con-
tribute to rehabilitation; to promote equal treatment; to prevent delegation of legislative-type
powers to lower officials; to decrease the need for judicial review; to easily establish clear rules as
to expected behavior; to supply specificity from the academic sphere; and to satisfy due process
requirements.
72 Id. at 655-56. The four countervailing reasons were: all forms of misbehavior cannot
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vagueness doctrine would have the beneficial effect of limiting administrators'
power and preventing delegation of legislative-type powers to lower officials."
On the other hand, its application could undermine administrators' need for
flexibility, and total authority. 74 From the inmates' vantage, the court pointed
out that application of the doctrine would promote equal treatment and
rehabilitation, without listing any disadvantages in applying the doctrine." It
settled the question by applying the doctrine but "relaxing the standard
somewhat in deference to the state's legitimate needs. " 76 The standard
adopted by the court was that a rule must be "reasonably definite."" The
court elaborated on the test by requiring that the regulations must offer
"reasonable guidance to an inmate" and they must not leave "the ad-
ministrator irresponsible to any standard." 78 Using that test, Landman held
that rules which banned "misbehavior," "misconduct," and "agitation"
were impermissibly vague." "Insolence," "harassment" and "insubordina-
tion," however, satisfied the test. 8 °
Several courts have followed the Landman decision. In Meyers v. Alldredge,"
for example, the Third Circuit specifically adopted the Landman approach. 82
The inmates in Meyers were charged with "attempting to incite a work stop-
page," and the court held that they had received sufficiently specific notice of
what constituted a violation." Similarly, in Tate v. Kassulke," the District
Court for the Middle District of Kentucky applied the Landman test in holding
that a regulation forbidding "disturbances" "leaves the administrator irre-
sponsible to a fair standard, and offers no reasonable guidance to an
inmate."" In the same case, however, the court upheld bans on "possession or
passing of contraband," "disrespect," "fighting" and "destruction of per-
sonal property. '86
be anticipated; flexibility is needed; total authority might be undermined; and inmates must ask
permission before acting.
" Id. at 655.
73 Id. at 656.
" Id. at 655.
76 Id. at 656.
n Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
86 Id.
a' 492 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 311.
83 Id. at 310.
" 409 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Ky. 1976).
83 Id. at 659.
86 Id. In Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1973), the district court
found that the regulations used by the California Department of Corrections for censorship of
outgoing mail were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because they infringed upon the first
amendment right of free speech. Id. at 1095-96. The court also found that the regulations were
unconstitutional because they authorized punishment "without giving 'fair notice' of what is
prohibited." Id. at 1097. The Martinez decision cited to Landman, id., although "fair notice" is
not the test used in that case, but rather is stated as one of the purposes behind the vagueness doc-
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Unlike the courts adopting a relaxed standard of specificity, the New
Hampshire District Court appears to have applied the strict standard used for
criminal statutes. In Laamon v. Helgemoe," the issue before the district court in-
volved the prison policy of withdrawing or restricting inmates' visitation privi-
leges for disciplinary purposes. The regulations stated in part that, "[tjhe visit-
ing privileges of an inmate may be suspended or revoked by the Warden
because of the inmate's poor conduct or for other good reason. " 68 Poor con-
duct, however, was not defined in the regulations." In determining whether
the regulation was subject to attack as being insufficiently specific, the court
first established the standard to be applied. Drawing on criminal law cases, the
court held that an inmate should not be held responsible for conduct that he did
not reasonably understand to be prohibited." Using this standard, the court
struck down the regulation, noting that beyond the written rules of the prison
or the criminal laws, it is impossible to determine what is meant by poor con-
duct. 91
Under the Landman standard, the regulation need only be "reasonably
definite," while Laamon requires that a "person of ordinary intelligence could
reasonably understand exactly what behavior is proscribed." The Landman test
seemingly is relatively easy for prison administrators to meet since it can be
satisfied by regulations which ban such amorphous behavior as "insolence,"
"harassment" and "insubordination." The Laamon standard is apparently
much stricter although the rule that the Laamon court struck down would have
been overly vague even under the Landman test. 92 Furthermore, the regulation
in Laamon was under attack because it involved the withdrawal or restriction of
visitation privileges, which involve first amendment rights." It is not known,
trine. Martinez was affirmed by the Supreme Court but on other grounds. Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396 (1974).
" 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977).
88 Id. at 298.
89 Id. at 322.
9° Id. at 321-22.
A rule or regulation, the violation of which can result in disciplinary proceedings,
must apprise inmates of the proscribed conduct. The usual rule is that a statute or
regulation must "give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his con-
templated conduct is forbidden." The underlying principle is that no man shall be
held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand
to be proscribed.
Id.
" Id. at 322.
No inmate could have a reasonable doubt that the violation of any written rule or
regulation of the prison or of the criminal laws is "poor conduct." Beyond that,
the rule is vague; no person of ordinary intelligence could reasonably understand
exactly what behavior is proscribed as each enforcer will have his own idea as to
exactly what conduct is "poor."
Id.
97 The regulation struck down in Laamon was "poor conduct," 333 F. Supp. at 656,
while in Landman the court found "misconduct" to be overly vague. 437 F. Supp. at 321-22.
91 437 F. Supp. at 321-22. The Court was aware of the First Amendment problems
when it stated that:
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therefore, whether the Laamon court, given a rule such as "insubordination"
that is unconnected with a first amendment freedom, would come to a different
result than the Landman court.
In sum, it is clear that in order to comply with the dictates of procedural
due process prisons must meet two requirements before an inmate can be
charged with a prison violation. First, the prison must establish written rules
and it must notify the inmates of those rules. The regulations are not uniform,
however, as to the methods of notification. Second, the rules must be sufficient-
ly specific to warn the inmates of what conduct is prohibited, with the courts
having adopted at least two tests for determining whether a rule is overly
vague.
II. WHEN DOES WOLFF APPIX
As earlier discussed the Wolff decision held that due process is required
before an inmate can either be deprived of good-time credits or be placed in
solitary confinement." With regard to good-time, the Court found that the in-
mate had a liberty interest in the right to a shortened sentence sufficient to im-
pose minimum due process because "the State itself has not only provided a
statutory right to good-time but also specified that it is to be forfeited only for
serious misbehavior."" The Court also found a liberty interest when
disciplinary confinement is at issue because the segregation "represents a ma-
jor change in the conditions of confinement . . . normally imposed only when
it is claimed and proved that there has been a major act of misconduct. " "6
The Wolff Court left undecided, however, whether these due process stand-
ards apply in a case in which the disciplinary pane! may impose penalties less
severe than the deprivation of good-time." Similarly, the Wolff decision failed
to specify whether its procedural protections extend to inmates who are placed
in a form of punitive confinement less harsh than solitary isolation. This sec-
tion will examine both the lower courts' and the prison systems' treatment of
these questions.
A. Minor Violations and Minor Penalties
Most institutions establish separate classes of violations, with those
characterized as minor violations punishable only by minor or lesser penalties.
[T]he very presence of the regulation chills the exercise of plaintiff's constitutional
rights of communication and association which . . , aggravates the vice of
vagueness. . . .
Visitation privileges may be curtailed as punishment for disciplinary infrac-
tions, but such restrictions may not be so great as to infringe upon the inmates'
First Amendment rights to familial association and communication and Eighth
Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment.
Id.
" See text and notes at notes 21-25 supra.
95 418 U.S. at 557.
96 Id. at 571 n.19.
97 Id.
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The term "lesser penalty" refers to such minor punishments as oral or written
reprimands, extra work duty and suspension of privileges. The type of
privileges which may be suspended include watching television, use of athletic
facilities and use of the library. The question unresolved by the Wolff Court is
whether an inmate who has been charged with a minor violation for which he
could receive only a minor penalty has the right to due process protection.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the lesser penalties
question subsequent to Wolff In 1975, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Clutchette v. Procunier98 held that minimum notice and a right to respond are re-
quired even when the maximum penalty is a temporary suspension of
privileges. 99 In Baxter v. Palmigiano,'°° the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit, holding that the issue should not have been reached in that case. All of
the named plaintiffs in Baxter had been charged with violations which were
punishable by forfeiture of good-time, confinement in segregation, or any lesser
penalty. 1 °' All of the inmates had received penalties consisting of suspension of
privileges.'" The Court held, however, that the issue of whether due process
applies to lesser penalties could not be addressed unless the plaintiffs had been
charged with violations for which punishment was restricted solely to minor
penalties.'" Therefore, although Baxter left the question of whether due process
is required for the imposition of lesser penalties unanswered, it did establish
that the Wolff standards are required wherever a major penalty potentially
could be imposed.' 94
Thus, it is clear that the due process standards of Wolff refer only to those
instances in which an inmate has been charged with a violation for which the
penalty may be either loss of good-time or disciplinary confinement, or both. If
the regulations distinguish between major and minor violations, and only
minor penalties may be imposed for minor violations, the question whether an
inmate has constitutional due process rights regarding those violations is an
open question. At the present time, he has only those rights provided by the
prison's regulations. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the handbooks in the
Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1975).
99 510 F.2d at 615.
'°° 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
'" Id. at 323.
1 ° 2 Id.
'° Id.
104 Id. The Fifth Circuit earlier had come to a similar conclusion by holding that where
the prison regulations have not limited application of major penalties to major violations, the
Wolff standards apply to all alleged acts of misconduct. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1318 (5th
Cir. 1974). The court, in Gates u. Collier, stated that:
[U]nder the new . .	 regulations, prisoners can lose their statutory good-time
credits and be subjected to solitary confinement for all misconduct violations . .
Therefore, we easily conclude that in the instant case since the disciplinary action
always potentially involved some degree of loss of good time and/or solitary confine-
ment, the minimum procedural requisites discussed in Wolff are required. (em-
phasis added)
Id. at 1318.
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survey to see how the prison systems handle minor violations.
From the handbooks surveyed, there have been two general methods for
dealing with minor violations. One of the responses has been to create a
separate process, with fewer procedural safeguards, similar to that suggested
by the Ninth Circuit.'" The other method has been to allow the option of
either informal imposition of minor penalties or referral of the matter to the for-
mal disciplinary process.
Over half, or twenty-five, of the departments come within the first model
and use a separate procedure for handling minor violations.'" Typically, a dif-
ferent hearing body from that hearing major violations is established. Often a
single hearing officer, rather than a panel, is used to hear minor violations.' 87
In these proceedings an inmate, generally, is given the right only to notice of
the charges and an opportunity to respond.' 88
 Some jurisdictions provide for a
written decision with a copy to the inmate.' 89
 A typical example of the above
model is that found in Hawaii:
A minor rule violation . . . may be punished by a staff member
designated by the facility administrator who did not make the charge
against the inmate/ward. The staff member shall inform the inmate/
ward that he is accused of committing a minor infraction, to which
the individual must be given a brief opportunity to respond. . . "°
Some of the states in this category vary the standard approach by allowing
an inmate to request a formal hearing either in lieu of or following an informal
hearing. Connecticut and Nebraska are somewhat unique among the jurisdic-
tions in the first category in that they provide a separate procedure for minor
violations, but the inmate must consent to that procedure."' He is given the
choice of either an informal hearing with the investigating officer and the
charging officer or a formal disciplinary proceeding. 12
 Arkansas,
Massachusetts, Montana, Louisiana and Mississippi also allow the inmate to
request a formal hearing, but only if he has been found guilty in the initial pro-
ceedings. This process is different from that in Nebraska in that an inmate ac-
105
 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Il-
linois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and the
Federal Bureau of Prisons have adopted some form of informal proceedings for handling minor
violations.
106 Id.
1 " See, e.g., Virginia Department of Corrections, Division of Adult Services Guideline,
Inmate Discipline, 5 VI.B.2.a.i. (1977).
108 See, e.g., Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Correc-
tions, Discipline, 5 303.75(2) (1980).
'°9 See, e.g., Nevada Department of Prisons, Code of Penal Discipline, at 9 (1978).
110
 Department of Social Services and Housing State of Hawaii, Rules and Regulations
of the Corrections Division, 200.210.004.
"' Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, Disciplinary Rules, Rule 6(7)
(1978), and Connecticut Department of Correction, Administrative Directives, 5 41 (1979).
"2 Id.
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cused of committing a minor violation does not have the option to request a for-
mal disciplinary proceeding."' If he is found guilty, however, a rehearing
before the major disciplinary panel is available."' Both of these procedures of-
fer more protection to the inmates than does a single informal hearing, which is
often pro forma in nature. 115 The procedure provided by the second group of
states is even more advantageous because it provides inmates with two hearing
opportunities, and because a hearing officer who knows that his findings of
guilt may be reheard by another body may tend to be more fair and to impose
lighter penalties to avoid rehearings. By not forcing inmates to select between
an informal hearing and the more formal process, the procedure afforded by
the second group of states also avoids the possibility of inmates being pressured
to select the less advantageous option.
Nine of the handbooks surveyed do not offer the inmate a separate process
for disposing of minor violations, but rather provide an option of choosing be-
tween an informal imposition of minor penalties without a hearing of any kind
or a referral to a formal disciplinary process. "s In four of these nine jurisdic-
tions, the option whether to settle the matter informally or to request a formal
hearing is left to the inmate."' In these states, when officers witness an infrac-
tion of the rules, they are empowered to notify the offending inmate and to pro-
pose a penalty. The inmate, however, may refuse to admit guilt, reject the pro-
posed penalty, and request a formal disciplinary hearing. 18 Thus, in these
states, the choice is between admitting guilt or having a formal hearing. This
choice is preferable to the first method of merely providing an informal hearing
for all minor violations. Because of their pro forma nature, informal hearings
may offer little protection to inmates. Whereas under the option method,
prisoners have the choice of a formal hearing, if they feel that more procedural
protection is necessary.
In the other five jurisdictions," 9 either the charging officer or the supervis-
ing official who investigates the incident is given the option of imposing a
minor penalty or of referring the matter to the formal disciplinary process. 12 °
1 " See, e.g., Massachusetts Department of Correction, Code of Human Services
Regulations, tit. 3, ch. IV, 	 430-10(a).
114 Id. at 5 430-10(c).
'" Even in the "formal" hearings which the author has observed where the accused has
had the benefit of a student representative and witnesses, there is a tendency by the board to find
the inmate guilty despite convincing evidence to the contrary because it is felt by the board
members that the officer would not have written the report unless the inmate had done something
wrong.
"6 Alaska, Colorado, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee and the District of Columbia.
117 Colorado, Maryland, Missouri and Rhode Island.
18 See, e.g., Colorado Department of Corrections, Code of Penal Discipline, 5 V.C.
(1979).
19 Alaska, Maine, South Carolina, Tennessee and the District of Columbia.
u° See, e.g., District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Prison Disciplinary Pro-
cedures and Code of Prison Offenses, $ 6(a) (1973).
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Giving the guards this much discretion can make this procedure the least ad-
vantageous to prisoners. The District of Columbia regulation,"' however, pro-
vides a safeguard for inmates. The regulation gives officers the authority to im-
pose minor penalties for "petty" offenses, but it also states that there will be no
written record. 122 The inmate does not have a report of the incident in his file
and, thus, is not prejudiced by mistaken actions when his record is reviewed by
the parole board or classification team. In those jurisdictions which do not for-
bid a written record, an inmate is at a severe disadvantage because not only do
guards have the authority to summarily impose minor penalties, but the files
will contain a record of the actions, and these records later will be reviewed by
the parole board and the classification team.
It also is of interest to note that, in at least three of the five jurisdictions in
which the officer has the option of formal or informal disposition of the viola-
tion, the regulations make no distinction between major or minor offenses.' 23
The officer, therefore, may impose a minor penalty for a major act of miscon-
duct. While inmates may benefit by avoiding the possibility of loss of good time
or placement in segregation, this advantage is offset by the inclusion in their
files of incidents of major misconduct against which they have been unable to
defend.
Finally, one state appears to have adopted a hybrid of the methods already
discussed. In Washington, the charging official has the authority to informally
reprimand an inmate for a minor violation. 124 Alternatively, he may choose to
file a disciplinary report. If a report is filed, the supervising official then has the
option of informally imposing a minor penalty or of referring the matter to a
formal hearing. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the decision of the supervising
official, however, he can request a formal hearing. The Washington procedure
offers inmates a number of safeguards and appears to be the most favorable
method of dealing with minor violations. Its main disadvantage is that the
charging officer has the authority to informally punish an inmate with no ap-
peal from that decision. That disadvantage is slight, however, because the only
punishment the officer can impose is a reprimand.
Thus, still unresolved seven years after Wolff is the question whether in-
mates have the right to constitutional due process with regard to alleged viola-
tions which carry only minor penalties. As a result, prison systems have been
given complete discretion in dealing with such violations. They have responded
with two general methods for handling minor offenses. One response has been
to establish a separate process with fewer procedural safeguards. The other
method has been to allow the option of either informal imposition of minor
penalties or referral to the formal disciplinary process. As the discussion indi-
121 Id.
122 Id.
23 Maine, South Carolina and Tennessee.
124 Washington Administrative Code, SS 275.88-040 to 275-88-055 (1977),
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cates, neither method is entirely satisfactory. Having examined the state of the
law on lesser penalties, the following section will discuss the issues raised by the
Wolff Court's holding that due process is required before the prison can place
an inmate in solitary confinement.
B. Punitive Segregation
The Wolff decision required full due process before an inmate could be
relegated to solitary confinement, but it left unresolved whether the due process
required prior to the imposition of solitary confinement extends to all other
forms of punitive segregation.'" Several prisons have more than one form or
degree of punitive confinement. For example, a prison may have an entire
cellblock set aside just for inmates assigned to disciplinary segregation for the
most serious violations. These cells typically contain only the bare necessities,
such as a bunk and a toilet. For less serious violations, the prison may confine
the inmate to his own cell and allow him to retain whatever personal effects are
in the cell. Since the Wolff Court originally required due process protections
because the imposition of solitary isolation represented a "major change in the
conditions of confinement" the question remains whether less drastic forms of
punitive segregation deserve the same procedural protections.
A 1977 Second Circuit decision, McKinnon v. Patterson offers one answer to
this question. 126 McKinnon involved the New York prison system, which had
three forms of punitive segregation. The inmate in that case had been confined
to his own cell, which the prison referred to as "keeplock." 127 The state argued
that, because keeplock was a less severe form of confinement than the other two
types of punitive segregation, Wolff did not apply.' 28
 The Second Circuit re-
jected this contention and held that all three forms of punitive segregation in
New York State prisons come within the Wolff language.'" The court conclud-
ed that keeplock was "not significantly different from the other forms of
punishment which we have held to constitute substantial deprivation." ' 3 °
In accord with McKinnon is Kelly v. Brewer,' 31
 an Iowa case, where the ac-
cused was placed in segregation without any due process.' 32 Prison officials
argued that this confinement equalled administrative segregation, not punitive
isolation, and that due process was not required.'" The inmate contended,
however, that the segregation came within the meaning of solitary confinement
15
 418 U.S. at 571 n.19.
126 568 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1977).
127 Id. at 936.
128 Id. at 935-36.
129 Id. at 937.
130
 Id. (emphasis added).
"' 239 N.W.2d 109 (Iowa 1976).
192 Id. at 111-12.
193 Id. at 111-13, 116.
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and that due process should therefore apply. 134 The Iowa court reasoned that
the inmate had misstated the issue and that the real question was whether the
segregation, whether or not solitary, had been for disciplinary purposes.'"
Finding that it had been punitive in nature, the court determined that it was
"unnecessary for us to decide whether confinement was 'solitary imprison-
ment' within the meaning of the provision."'"
Gates v. Collieri" also used language that comports with McKinnon, in-
dicating that all forms of punitive confinement come within the language of
Wolff Citing Wolff, the court stated that:
It goes without saying that minimum procedural safeguards are an
absolute necessity against arbitrary determination of any factual
predicate for serious deprivation to an inmate, such as loss of good
time credit, solitary confinement or other significant changes of confine-
ment detrimental to the inmate, as distinguished from the imposition of
lesser penalties like the loss of privileges.'"
The holdings and the reasoning in McKinnon, Kelly and Gates appear cor-
rect. The analysis used by the Court was that due process must be followed
where there is a "major change in the conditions of confinement." 139 Confine-
ment to a cell twenty-four hours a day with no privileges, whether alone or with
another inmate, is a major change in the conditions of confinement.
A related issue is whether the duration of confinement is relevant to when
the Wolff standards must be followed. A brief period of disciplinary confine-
ment arguably is not a major change in conditions requiring full due process.
There is no indication in the Wolff opinion, however, that the duration of
segregation is at all relevant.'" As the Second Circuit stated in McKinnon v.
Patterson, 14 ' "neither Wolff nor our own cases carve out exceptions depending
on the duration of confinement. „142 Despite the absence of supporting
language in Woo; there are prison regulations which take the position that
brief periods of confinement can be imposed without due process.'”
134 Id. at 113.
135 Id.
196 Id. at 116.
137 454 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
114 Id. at 584 (emphasis added).
139 418 U.S. at 571 n.19.
140 Footnote 19 does not distinguish between long and short periods of disciplinary con-
finement.
141 568 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1977).
' 42 Id. at 938.
' 43 New Hampshire (The only Wolff standard not provided for in minor hearings is the
limited right to a representative. Up to seven days in segregation is permitted.), Oregon
(Thomas Toombs, Deputy Administrator, Oregon Corrections Division, stated that a sanction of
up to five days in segregation is not a major penalty in the judgment of the Corrections Division,
and that the accused has the option to request a formal hearing. Letter of September 16, 1980.
However, the accused is not provided with a waiver form which would guarantee a knowing and
voluntary waiver. See S VI.G.2.a.), and South Carolina (up to three days in segregation).
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In sum, the due process standards created by the Court in Wolff have not
been extended to lesser penalties, although Baxter makes it clear that it is an
issue yet to be reached. The prison systems have adopted two basic methods for
handling minor penalties. Some have created less formal hearing procedures,
while others allow the option of summary punishment or referral to the formal
hearing process. The latter category is divided into those jurisdictions which
give the option to the inmate and those which give it to the charging officer.
Although the issue has been raised whether the form of segregation determines
the need to comply with Woff, the clear weight of authority is that all forms of
disciplinary confinement require due process. Finally, despite the lack of clear
authority, some jurisdictions have adopted the position that the duration of
confinement determines whether it is a major or minor penalty.'"
III. WAIVERS AND CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Having discussed the options available to correctional officials with regard
to minor violations, the remainder of the article will be concerned with due
process for major acts of misconduct. The introduction explained that the due
process standards required by Wolff v. McDonnell"' include advance written
notice of the charges, a hearing, and a written statement of the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken.'" The separate stages
in that process will be discussed later in this article. This section, however, is
concerned with the effect of two different, or alternate, forms of due process for
the imposition of major penalties — formal waivers and criminal convictions.
Some prison systems have provisions that give inmates charged with ma-
jor disciplinary violations the option of a formal hearing or of proceeding by
waiver."' An example is a former Wisconsin regulation which stated:
The case law in support of this position, however, is not dispositive of the issue. In Jones
v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979), the statement is merely dictum. A Mississippi county
jail had used confinement in a padded cell for up to twenty-four hours as a form of punishment.
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that an issue existed "whether the use of solitary confinement for such
brief periods is such a deprivation of liberty that it must be preceded by the panoply of procedures
mandated by Wolff" Id. at 1022. Because the cell had not been used in three years, however, the
court held that the issue was moot. Id. The District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania, in Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368 (ED. Pa. 1978), found that a fourteen day
lockup did not come within Wolff Id. It is unclear from the opinion, however, whether the court
was distinguishing Wolff on the basis of the conditions of segregation, the duration, or both. It
stated that "(w)hile the disciplinary hearings do not result in serious punishment such as loss of
`good time' credits or solitary confinement for a substantial period of time, they can result in depriv-
ing inmates of certain privileges or in segregating them from the general population for up to
fourteen days (emphasis added)." Id. The court held that only notice and an opportunity to be
heard were required. Id.
14 Wolff also is clear in requiring due process before an inmate may lose good time. 418
U.S. at 557-58. Despite the Court's holding, two states in the survey allow loss of good time for
minor violations: Mississippi (Mississippi permits the loss of up to five days); however, the state's
disciplinary rules were drafted pursuant to a consent decree arrived at subsequent to Wolff.) and
New Hampshire (it allows up to ten days).
15 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
1S6 Id. at 558-64.
177
 Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, New
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If the accused resident elects to proceed by waiver, the waiver form
shall be completed and returned to the security office. In electing to
proceed by waiver, the resident relinquishes rights to the assistance
of an advocate, to cross examine through the hearing tribunal his ac-
cuser, and to call witnesses on his behalf. . . . The staff member
who wrote the repOrt need not be present.'"
Thus, where a waiver is involved the inmate is still entitled to a hearing, but his
rights at that hearing are sharply curtailed.
There is some concern that such a regulation could be abused by the
prison system. Indeed, in State ex rel. Klinke v. Wisconsin Department of Health and
Social Services, "9 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the quoted Wisconsin
regulation had been abused and that the waiver was not knowing or volun-
tary' 5° because the waiver form in use indicated only that the accused inmate
was waiving his right to a formal hearing.t 5 ' It did not stipulate the procedural
rights associated with such a hearing that were being relinquished. The court
also was concerned that the accused was not aware that a finding of guilt would
result in a rescission of his parole date.'" In a footnote, the court held that it
was:
a clearly inadequate waiver. No waiver can be knowing or voluntary
where the accused is not informed or is misled as to the full range of
consequences a finding of guilt entails. In addition, the waiver
should have been clearer in explaining that Klinke was waiving all
the rights listed on his notice of the charge, not solely the right to
"demand a Formal Hearing."'"
Where such waiver provisions are used, therefore, the prison officials must
make sure that the accused's waiver is knowing and voluntary. This require-
ment means that the inmates must know exactly what rights they are waiving,
and they must not be coerced into doing so. 254
In addition to waivers, a second exception to Wolff exists. There are times
when an inmate's conduct may result in his being charged with violating both a
prison rule and a criminal statute. Some jurisdictions provide, either by statute
or by regulation, that prison officials may impose punishment for violating the
prison rule, without following the Wolff procedures, where the inmate already
has been found guilty of the criminal violation.' 55 In Florida, for example, the
Hampshire, Minnesota, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and the
Federal Bureau of Prisons have waiver provisions.
"a
 Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Corrections, Ad-
ministrative Policies, Administration of Discipline,
	 3.021(B)(3) (1977).
149 87 Wis. 2d 110, 273 N.W.2d 379 (1978).
1 " Id, at 120 n.6, 273 N.W.2d 384 n.6.
"' Id. at 112, 273 N.W.2d at 384 n.6.
152 Id.
1 " Id. at 120 n.6., 273 N.W.2d at 384 n.6 (emphasis added).
1 " Of the fifteen jurisdictions in the survey which have waiver provisions, only
Nebraska and Wisconsin state that the waiver must be knowing and voluntary.
155 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 944.28(1) (West Supp. 1981).
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legislature has provided that the Department of Corrections may forfeit all of
an inmate's good time, without notice or hearing, after a conviction for
escape.' 56
 The primary purpose of such rules is to avoid redundant pro-
ceedings. The standard of guilt in a criminal prosecution is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Since that standard is generally higher than the one used by
prison disciplinary committees, 157
 the prison officials, therefore, do not need to
conduct a disciplinary hearing to determine whether the inmate is guilty of
escape within the definition of the institution's rules because the court already
has found the inmate guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
A different situation results, however, when the court finds the defendant
not guilty. Because of the different burdens of proof at a criminal trial and a
prison disciplinary proceeding, it would be consistent for an inmate to be found
not guilty at trial and then guilty of the same offense at a hearing. To prevent
such a seemingly anomalous situation, California promulgated a regulation
binding prison disciplinary boards to verdicts of the courts. The applicable
regulation provided:
A finding of guilty or not guilty by a court will be accepted at a
disciplinary hearing on the same charge as proof that the inmate did
or did not commit the specific act of the criminal charge. The court's
finding and disposition will be entered . . . as the finding and
disposition on the disciplinary charge. 158
Pursuant to the regulation, the California prison system accepted a court's find-
ing, whether guilty or not guilty, and did not bring disciplinary charges after a
finding of not guilty. California recently amended its regulations, however,
and disciplinary hearings no longer are suspended pending the trial outcome.
Absent a statute or regulation like that formerly used in California, an inmate
found not guilty by a court of law still may have to face prison disciplinary
charges for the same incident.
The same reasoning applies to cases in which the inmate is found guilty at
a disciplinary hearing and later is acquitted by a trial court. In Rusher v.
Arnold, 159
 the inmate, incarcerated at the federal penitentiary at Lewisburg,
received a disciplinary hearing and was found guilty. The penalty was loss of
good time.'" Subsequent to the disciplinary hearing, the prisoner was pros-
ecuted for a criminal violation arising out of the same incident."' He was
found not guilty of the criminal offense, and, on the basis of the acquittal, he
petitioned the federal court for reinstatement of his good time.' 62
 The petition
was denied and on appeal the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that "there is no
"6 Id.
'" See, e.g., Rusher v. Arnold, 550 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1977).
358
 California Department of Corrections, Rules of the Director, tit. 15, S 3316(d)
(1978).
158
 550 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1977).
160 Id. at 897.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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fundamental unfairness in a procedure whereby a prisoner is punished ad-
ministratively for the same conduct that resulted in an acquittal on criminal
charges."'" The basis for the court's holding was the different standards of
guilt required in a criminal trial and an administrative hearing. 164
Where an inmate's conduct constitutes both a prison violation and a
criminal offense, therefore, he may be tried both administratively and judi-,
cially. Furthermore, the administrative punishment may be imposed without
conducting a disciplinary hearing where the inmate already has been found
guilty by the court. If the prison officials do not want to wait until the court
decides the case or if the trial ends with an acquittal, however, punishment
may be imposed only after a full hearing or a knowing and voluntary waiver. 165
Having described the procedures applicable to formal waivers and
criminal convictions, it is important to evaluate whether they provide inmates
with a favorable alternative to the Wolff procedures. On balance, there is little
to recommend formal waivers. The standard is that the waiver must be both
knowing and voluntary. In most cases, it would be difficult to show that either
standard had been met. The educational level in all prisons is exceptionally
low, and Wolff provides for either a staff or inmate representative where the ac-
cused is illiterate or the issues complex.'" Yet by signing a waiver, an inmate
who may need representation is relinquishing the right to the very person who
is supposed to help protect his rights and defend him. In these cases, it is
arguable that a waiver is never knowing.
As to the voluntariness standard, because of the very nature of a prison, it
would not be difficult for prison officials to coerce an inmate into waiving his
due process rights. The only advantage to a prisoner in proceeding by waiver is
a speedier disposition of the charges. However, the only time that that would
be an important consideration to an inmate is when he is being held in ad-
ministrative segregation pending the hearing. It certainly would be difficult to
argue, therefore, that an accused's waiver is voluntary when his choice is to
proceed by waiver or remain in segregation until the hearing. Thus, for an in-
mate who intends to plead not guilty, there would seem to be very few occa-
sions when a waiver is either knowing or voluntary.
" 3 Id. at 898.
"4 Id. at 899.
The . . . Board is constitutionally entitled to conclude by less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that prison rules have been violated. Thus Rusher's acquittal
means no more than that the Government failed to persuade the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that Rusher has escaped from federal custody. The acquittal is
not conclusive of the factual dispute before the Board on the issue of whether
Rusher had escaped within the meaning of prison rules.
Id.
"S
 Of the jurisdictions in the survey, eight make no mention of what action should be
taken; six establish that alleged criminal violations should be reported to the proper authorities
but do not include when, or if, a disciplinary hearing is to be held; nine indicate that the disci-
plinary hearing is to be suspended pending the outcome of the criminal charges; sixteen state that
the disciplinary hearing is not to be suspended; and in three states the prison authorities have the
discretion to suspend the hearing or to hold it immediately.
"° 418 U.S. at 570.
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Proceeding by criminal conviction, on the other hand, offers no real disad-
vantages to an inmate in those jurisdictions where the disciplinary hearing is
suspended pending the disposition of the criminal charges. Although he may
have to appear before the disciplinary board even if found not guilty by the
court, he at least is guaranteed all of the due process protections of the criminal
justice system, including the requirement that he must be found guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, if he is found guilty, there is the possibility
that the prison will exercise its discretion and drop the internal charges.
In those jurisdictions where the hearing is not suspended, however, the in-
mate is at a severe disadvantage. First, the possibility of the prison dropping
the charges after a finding of not guilty by the court is no longer available. Sec-
ond, as will be discussed in Section IV-D, whatever the inmate says at the
disciplinary hearing can be used against him at trial. While the Supreme Court
has established that the inmate has a right to remain silent at the hearing when
criminal charges are pending, the board may draw an adverse inference from
such silence.' 67 Furthermore, case law indicates that the board does not have
the duty to inform the accused of his right to remain silent.'" Sixteen jurisdic-
tions in the survey have regulations requiring the board to give such a
warning, 169 but of the sixteen prison systems which do not suspend the hearing
pending the trial outcome,"° only eight require a warning of the right to re-
main silent."' Compounding the problem is the fact that only Alaska requires
that counsel be appointed in those cases where criminal charges are pending. 12
Thus, even though an inmate has the right to remain silent, most states do not
provide a mechanism for informing him of his right. Even if he exercises his
right, furthermore, the board may draw an adverse inference from his silence.
Thus, proceeding by waiver offers far less procedural protection to in-
mates than a disciplinary hearing pursuant to the Wolff standards. Also, in
cases where criminal charges are pending, the better procedure from the in-
mate's point of view is to suspend the disciplinary hearing pending the disposi-
tion of the charges. The next section will focus on the pre-hearing procedures in
cases where the inmate and the prison are proceeding pursuant to Wolff:
'" Baxter v. Palmiagiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320 (1976). See text and notes at section
IV.D., infra.
199 See text and notes at section IV.D., infra.
169 Louisiana, Mississippi, Washington, the District of Columbia and the Federal
Bureau of Prisons require the warning in all cases at all stages of the proceedings. Colorado,
Hawaii and Massachusetts require the warning at the hearing in all cases. Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Missouri, Nevada, Rhode Island, West Virginia and Vermont require the warning only in cases
where criminal charges may be brought.
10 Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland,
Nebraska, Nevada, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Ver-
mont.
171 Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia
and Vermont.
172 ALASKA AD. CODE, art. 6, 5 440(d).
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IV. PRE-HEARING PROCEDURES
While a disciplinary hearing is where an accused prisoner's guilt or in-
nocence is officially determined, many events occur before the hearing which
may be determinative of the outcome. Because of the potential importance of
these events, inmates must be afforded basic due process protections at the pre-
hearing stage. This section will discuss an inmate's pre-hearing rights, in-
cluding the inmate's right to notice of the charges; his right to the assistance of
a representative in preparing a defense; and his right to remain silent. In addi-
tion, when an inmate is charged with an infraction, the inmate often will be
placed in pre-hearing segregation. The section will begin, therefore, with a
discussion of the pre-hearing segregation process.
A. Pre-Hearing Segregation
There are situations in which an inmate suspected of committing a prison
violation may be placed in segregation immediately, even before receiving
written notice of the charges.'" The reasons given by the prisons for using
segregation before a hearing come under the general categories of security of
the institution and the safety of inmates and staff.' 74
 Isolated incidents of
violence'" and prison-wide disturbances,'" such as riots or strikes, are the
most typical incidents which are classified as threats to security or safety.'"
There are very few guidelines, however, for what procedures must be followed
before placing a prisoner in pre-hearing segregation.
One court which has addressed the problem is the Supreme Court of West
Virginia. In Tasker v. Grffith,'" the court provided that an inmate may be placed
in pre-hearing segregation only if prison officials have specific reasons for
determining that effective investigation of an alleged incident requires isola-
tion.' 79
 Before placing an inmate in segregation, however, the institution must
inform the inmate that he is under investigation for misconduct. In addition,
the prisoner must be advised of the specific offense alleged against him unless
' 73 This type of segregation is classified as administrative rather than disciplinary and is
analogous to placing a criminal defendant in jail pending trial.
174 See, e.g. , McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 939 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977). Thirty-one
jurisdictions in the survey have reasons for using prehearing segregation and twenty-eight of
them use language regarding security and safety. They are Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, the District of Co-
lumbia and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
"s See, e.g., LeGrande v. Redman, 432 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Del. 1977).
"6
 Id.
17 Naturally, acts of violence pose the greatest threat to the security of an institution
and the safety of both the staff and the inmates. Segregating the combatants is one method of ter-
minating the violence.
18 238 S.E.2d 229 (W. Va. 1977).
174 Id. at 234.
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this information would adversely affect the integrity of the investigation."°
Finally, after the investigation, the inmate must be informed whether he has
been exonerated)." If he has not been exonerated, the inmate must receive an
explanation of the charges to be brought against him.•'
The surveyed handbooks are less detailed regarding procedures for pre-
hearing segregation. Twenty-one jurisdictions require nothing more than the
approval of an official with a rank superior to that of the charging officer before
an inmate may be confined, t83 Nine others require only that the inmate receive
a written statement of the reasons for confinement within forty-eight hours or
less.•' With respect to the duration of confinement, twenty-nine jurisdictions
establish limits on the length of confinement by providing for a disciplinary
hearing or periodic review of the inmate's status within a specific period. 185
New Hampshire, for example, allows an inmate to request release in writing to
the director of the department)"
Thus, although most jurisdictions allow pre-hearing segregation, few have
developed detailed due process standards which must accompany this form of
confinement. This lack of procedural protections is of secondary importance,
however, when weighed against the effect of this early segregation on other pre-
hearing events. As discussed in the following sections, segregation before the
hearing raises issues related to notification of the charges and preparation of
the inmate's defense.
B. Written Notice of the Charges
Wolff requires that an inmate receive advance written notice of the
disciplinary charges)• The purpose of written notice is "to inform [the in-
mate] of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a
defense.""8 The only time limitation imposed by the Wolff Court is the re-
' 3° Id.
lai Id.
1" Id.
185 Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, Washington and the District of
Columbia.
' 84 California, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Wisconsin and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. In addition, Florida requires oral notice of the
reasons for segregation.
"3 Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, In-
diana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska
(reviewed after fifteen days), Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin (a maximum of twenty days), Vermont, the District of
Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Nebraska and Wisconsin fall within the outer
limits of those jurisdictions which have some form of time limit.
188 New Hampshire State Prison, Manual for the Guidance of Inmates, Disciplinary
Procedures, 5 (1978).
'" 418 U.S. at 564.
"8 Id.
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quirement that notice be received at least twenty-four hours before the hearing in
order to allow time for preparation of the inmate's case. 189
 A delay in providing
notice after the alleged misconduct may also impair the preparation of a
defense, however, in that the incident might have occurred so far in the past
that the inmate does not clearly recall what took place. Thus, while providing a
sufficient time prior to the hearing to prepare a defense is crucial, an equally
important question unanswered in the Wolff decision is how soon after the inci-
dent must the inmate be notified of the charges to be brought against him.
The survey indicates that there is not one uniform period of time used by
every prison system. Only six states, in fact, have regulations which use the
date of the offense as the point of reference for when notice must be received.'"
Of those six states, five require notice within one to five days of the offense,'"
and California allows thirty days. 192
The most common point of reference for when notice of the charges must
be received is the date of the hearing.'" Because the hearing comes after
receipt of the notice, however, the date of the hearing does not help to establish
how soon after the offense the notice must be received.
Other points of reference used by the prisons include the date of the
discovery of the offense,'" the date of the completion of the prison's investiga-
tion into the incident, 195 and the date of the completion of the incident
report. 196 To say that notice must be received after any one of those three
events, however, is not very helpful unless time limits have been placed on
when those events must occur. For example, if a regulation states that notice
must be received two days after the completion of the investigation, but there is
no time limit as to how soon after the incident the investigation must be com-
pleted, then there is no time limit as to how soon after the incident the notice
must be received. Sixteen prison systems in the survey use one of these three
dates to determine when notice must be received.
There has been very little case law on the issue of how soon notice must be
received. Furthermore, those courts that have taken up the issue have only ad-
dressed situations involving segregated detention. In this regard, two federal
district courts have held that an inmate placed in pre-hearing segregation must
"9 Id.
19° Arizona, California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi and North Dakota.
19 ' Arizona, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi and North Dakota.
192 California Department of Corrections, Rules of the Director, tit. 15,	 3320(a)
(1978).
193 Wolff requires at least twenty-four hours before the hearing and only seven jurisdic-
tions in the survey require more than that. Alaska, Arizona, Montana, South Carolina and
Wisconsin provide for forty-eight hours. North Carolina requires seventy-two hours and Min-
nesota provides for notice four days prior to the hearing.
194 California, Colorado, Nevada, Tennessee, Virginia and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. Note that some jurisdictions use more than one point of reference.
193 Alaska, Indiana and the District of Columbia.
196 Alabama, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon
and Wisconsin.
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receive notice as soon as the threat to security subsides.'" In Tawney v.
McCoy,'" the District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia held
that a delay of nine days between the offense and receipt of the notice was not
too long. 199
 That case, however, involved a large-scale disturbance or riot, and
the court determined that nine days was rapid under the circumstances, 20°
leaving the question open as to whether nine days would be too long a period of
time under non-emergency circumstances. 201
Aside from timing, one further issue is raised by the requirement of ade-
quate notice. If notice is meant to inform the inmate of the charges, it should be
sufficiently specific to do just that. In Tawney v. McCoy, the District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia addressed the question how specific
notice must be for the accused to be adequately informed of the charges. The
inmate alleged that he had been prevented from preparing a defense due to the
inadequacy of the notice. 202
 The notice stated that "fait approximately 1:30
p.m. you did resist Correctional Officers attempting to quell a riot on your
floor, refuse to obey orders by said officers to cease rioting and attempted to aid
another inmate who had attack [sic] a Correctional Officer."'" The district
court held that it was adequate notice, being "a complete account of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident. " 204 The language of the court indicates
that it found the notice to be clearly adequate, although there was no attempt to
suggest what would constitute inadequate notice. In view of the conclusory
nature of the notice in Tawney, the standard established for determining its ade-
quacy must be considered vague.
Although no case law was found wherein notice was held insufficient for
failure to inform the inmate of the charges, Stewart v. Jozwiak205 found a
Wisconsin regulation to be ambiguous and ordered that it be amended to con-
tain language to the effect that "notice must inform the prisoner of the charges
against him with specificity to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a
defense. " 206
 The "specificity" standard, however, goes no further than the
Tawney standard. Most of the handbooks in the survey contain regulations
which comply with the Tawney and Stewart standards by providing that notice
include a description of the facts surrounding the incidents.'" Only two of the
regulations have adopted a more stringent standard. Both Iowa and Virginia
'" LeGrande v. Redman, 432 F. Supp. 1307, 1309 (D. Del. 1977) and Rompilla v.
Nero, 448 F. Supp. 182, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
198 462 F. Supp. 752 (N.D. W. Va. 1978).
199 Id, at 755.
2" Id.
ROI Id .
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
2" 399 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
206 Id. at 578.
207 Connecticut, Florida and South Carolina require that notice be read to the accused if
he is illiterate.
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require a statement of the facts which includes answers to the questions "who,
what, when, where, why and how." Such a formula, if followed, would pro-
vide adequate notice.
Wolffestablished that notice of charges must be given to the inmate at least
twenty-four hours before a hearing, but it did not decide how soon notice must
be provided or how detailed it must be. Additionally, lower courts and prison
regulations provide little guidance on these matters. It is not clear, therefore,
how soon after an alleged offense the accused inmate must receive notice of the
charges. Only eight jurisdictions in the survey have a regulation which specifies
the maximum period of time. With regard to the degree of specificity required
in the notice, the standard adopted by most jurisdictions is that it must contain
a complete description of the facts surrounding the incident. Where little ad-
vance notice is given, the ability of the inmate to prepare a defense can be
seriously impaired.
C. Preparation of a Defense and Assistance of a Representative
Perhaps the most significant event which occurs prior to the disciplinary
hearing is the preparation of the inmate's defense. Several issues are raised
regarding the inmate's ability to prepare a defense to the disciplinary charges.
The first question that must be asked is how much time an accused has between
receipt of notice and the hearing. A related question is whether an accused may
request a continuance of the hearing to allow further preparation. Because of
the restraints on movement within a prison, another issue is whether an inmate
may be assisted by a representative. Some prisons provide for an investigation
of disciplinary charges. This raises the question whether the accused has a right
to receive a copy of the-report, or whether he may conduct his own pre-hearing
investigation.
Wolff established twenty-four hours as the minimum period of time be-
tween notice and hearing. The Supreme Court recognized that it is a "brief
period," 208 but only seven states in the survey specifically provide for a longer
period of time. 209 Five states allow the inmate forty-eight hours,"° one state
provides for seventy-two hours advance notice, 2 " and Minnesota provides for
notice four days prior to the hearing. Virginia has adopted the twenty-four
hour standard for most cases but will not schedule a hearing less than four days
after notice is received where the inmate has retained an attorney. 212 Other
208 418 U.S. at 564.
2" Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina and
Wisconsin.
210 Alaska, Arizona, Montana, South Carolina and Wisconsin.
2 " North Carolina.
212 Virginia Department of Corrections, Division of Adult Services Guideline, Inmate
Discipline, VI.B.3.b. (1977). The Rhode Island regulation states that notice must be received a
"sufficient period of time prior to the hearing to give the inmate an opportunity to prepare a
defense." Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Adult Correctional Institution, Disciplinary
Procedures, $ II.F. That regulation can be read to require more than twenty-four hours when
needed by the inmate.
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states in the survey made no specific provision for notice more than twenty-four
hours in advance.
At least one court, however, has indicated that twenty-four hours may not
be sufficient in every case. In Fowler v. Oregon, 2 ' 3 an inmate alleged that notice
was inadequate because he had received it only twenty-six hours prior to hear-
ing. 214 Although the Oregon court held that notice was adequate, it did in-
dicate that if Fowler had shown that "he was in some way prejudiced in his
defense by the fact that only twenty-six hours elapsed between notice and hear-
ing," it might find notice to be inadequate. 215
In those instances in which the accused does not have sufficient time to
prepare a defense, one remedy might be to have the hearing postponed.
Twenty-six jurisdictions in the survey permit an inmate the opportunity to
have the hearing continued to a later date. 216 Most of these regulations do not
appear to require the prisoner to state a specific reason for the request,
although fourteen state that there must be "good cause, "217 and one allows a
continuance only where a representative has been appointed. 218 The mode of
making a request for a continuance is informal, with only four states requiring
that it be written and one other specifying that it be made twenty-four hours in
advance. 219 Finally, only twelve of the regulations indicate the maximum
length of a continuance. 226 California"' and South Carolina222 allow up to thir-
ty days. The District of Columbia permits only a three day continuance, but
the initial request is automatically granted. 223
An important question both in the preparation of a defense and in present-
ing the inmate's case to the hearing board is whether the prisoner can be
assisted by a representative or advocate. It already has been pointed out that
the amount of time available is short, and some inmates are placed in segrega-
tion before the hearing. Even for those prisoners not in segregation, freedom of
movement within a prison is limited. It would seem difficult, therefore, for an
212 18 Or. App. 280, 525 P.2d 191 (1974).
214 Id. at 283; 525 P.2d at 192.
213
216 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Il-
linois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, the District of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
217
	
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons.
219 Alabama.
219 California, Indiana, Minnesota and North Carolina require that the request be in
writing. Massachusetts requires that it be made at least twenty-four hours before the hearing.
220 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, South Carolina,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia.
221 California Department of Corrections, Rules of the Director, tit. 15, S 3320(e)
(1978).
222 South Carolina Department of Corrections, Inmate Guide, 3.4(D) (1979).
223 District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Prison Disciplinary Procedures
and Code of Offenses, Rule 5(g) (1973).
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inmate to investigate the charges and prepare a defense without some form of
assistance. Wolff held that there is not a right to either retained or appointed
counsel, but it did allow that an inmate has the right to the assistance of a
fellow inmate or a staff member where the accused is illiterate or the issue is
complex. 224 In either of these situations, the inmate has the right to assistance
before the hearing to help "collect" evidence and at the hearing to "present"
the evidence. 225
One of the tests used in Wolff, whether the inmate is illiterate, is relatively
easy to determine. The other test, whether the issue is complex, is open to in-
terpretation. Nevertheless, to date very little case law exists on this issue. In
Aikens v. Lash, 226 however, the Seventh Circuit offered some guidance when it
held that the complexity of the issue must be evaluated relative to the ability of
the inmate to gather necessary information and that an inmate's segregation is
one of the factors to be considered."' Thus, the Aikens approach appears to give
the test described in Wolff some flexibility. Nevertheless, Wolff remains a very
narrow rule.
The response of the prison systems has been to offer a more liberal right to
representation than that provided by Wolff. Only nine of the handbooks
surveyed exclusively use the Wolff criteria of illiteracy and complexity of the
issue. 228 Three other states rely primarily on the Wolff tests, but have expanded
224 418 U.S. at 570.
Where an illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the complexity of the issue
makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence
necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the
aid of a fellow inmate, or if that is forbidden, to have adequate substitute aid in the
form of help from the staff or from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by
the staff. (emphasis added)
Id.
225
	 Two years after Wolff, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of representation
again in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). The Court affirmed the holding in Wolff but
refused to extend the right to representation to all cases in which the disciplinary charges "in-
volve conduct punishable as a crime under state law." Id. at 315.
226 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975).
227 Id. at 59.
The Court's decision [in Wo .1[J] did not define what factors were to be considered
in determining "the complexity of the issue. . . " We note only that the com-
plexity of an issue is often dependent on the amount of information available to a
prisoner. It is conceivable that in many disciplinary transfer situations an inmate
will already be confined in segregation, and thus unable to collect information.
This will make his task of explaining his actions and defending himself all the more
difficult. In these situations the inmate should be entitled to assistance in prepar-
ing and presenting his case.
Id.; see also Stewart v. Jozwiak, 399 F. Supp. 574, 577 (BID. Wis. 1975).
Despite the limits imposed by Wolff and Baxter, at least one state court has expanded the
right to representation. The Alaska Supreme Court, in McGinnes v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221
(Alaska 1975), stating that its decision was based on the Alaska Constitution and not the United
States Constitution, held that inmates have a right to counsel at disciplinary hearings where
felony charges are pending. Id. at 1235.
"6 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, and
Oregon.
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them slightly. Nevada uses the same tests but also allows retained counsel
where criminal charges may be brought,'" Massachusetts extends the Wolff
rights to cases where the accused does not speak English,'" and Indiana in-
cludes all cases in which the accused is held in pre-hearing segregation."'
Twenty-seven jurisdictions permit a representative at any hearing. 232 Seven of
those twenty-seven allow retained counsel.'" In Alaska, the accused may even
obtain appointed counsel where a felony may result, 234 and Washington allows
a representative for the investigative stage of every case but limits appearances
at the hearing to the Wolff criteria. 235
A further question relates to the investigation of charges by the prison of-
ficials and whether the accused has access to the disciplinary report. In Cov-
ington v. Sielaff, 236 the accused received a copy of the disciplinary report.'" Prior
to the hearing, the charging officer also sent the disciplinary board an unofficial
"cover letter" regarding the charges.'" The accused did not receive a copy of
that letter, and the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that
he did not have a right to one:
Although the prisoner must receive advance written notice of
the charges against him and an explanation of the evidence forming
the basis of the decision, he is not also entitled to discover evidence
supporting the charge . . courts should defer to the expertise of
state officials and let them specify the extent to which evidence of a
disciplinary violation must be disclosed to the prisoner. The purpose
of notice is only to give the prisoner an opportunity to prepare his
response. 2"
Despite the language in Covington, eleven of the handbooks in the survey pro-
vide that a copy of the investigative report be given to the accused or his
representative. 240 Additionally, in three jurisdictions the inmate has the right to
229 In Nevada the attorney general's office is also represented at the hearing.
23° Massachusetts Code of Human Services Regulations, tit. 3, ch. IV, 5 430.12(b).
Massachusetts also allows the use of retained counsel and law students. Id. at 5 430.12(a).
231 Indiana Department of Correction, Administrative Procedures, 5 14 (1980).
232 Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Georgia, Missouri, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, the District of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Ten-
nessee (inmate advocates are paid twenty dollars a month.)
299
	
Louisiana, Minnesota, Virginia and the District of Columbia allow retained
counsel in all cases. Hawaii and Rhode Island allow retained counsel only where criminal
charges are involved. It should be mentioned, however, that allowing inmates the right to retained
counsel generally is a hollow concession because of the inmates' indigency. See text at V infra.
"4 ALASKA AD. CODE, art. 6, 5 440(d).
239
	
275-88-080(2) and 275-88-097 (1977).
236 430 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
"7 Id. at 563.
"8 Id. at 564.
239 Id.
240 California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii (includes review only of nonconfidential
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request an investigation, 241 and in Michigan the inmate is permitted to submit
to the investigator questions which the accused desires to be asked of the
witnesses. 242
One final question involves whether an inmate or his advocate may con-
duct an investigation. Twenty-seven jurisdictions in the survey have regula-
tions which specifically provide that an investigation of a disciplinary charge is
to be performed by a prison officia1. 2" Only six of the handbooks in the survey
provide for either an investigation by the prisoner or his representative. 244 In
Tawney v. McCoy, 245 the inmate, represented by another prisoner, claimed that
he was denied due process because he could not prepare for his hearing because
he had been in segregation and was denied legal materials. 246 The district court
held that any prejudice caused by his pre-hearing confinement was offset
because he was represented by another inmate who was available to assist in
the preparation of the defense. 247 If, however, a representative materially fails
in his duties, prejudice may be held to result. In Romano v. Ward,'" a New
York court found the investigation performed by an inmate's staff represent-
ative to be insufficient. 249 The inmate had been given one staff representative
and later that person was replaced by another staff member. 25 ° The accused
asked each of them to interview specific witnesses but neither of them did so. 25 '
The court held that the prisoner "was not given the necessary assistance by
either the original or substitute counselor in securing witnesses" and ordered a
rehearing. 252
In sum, although an accused inmate's opportunity and ability to prepare a
defense is vital to the outcome of the disciplinary hearing, neither Wolff nor
subsequent case law has given the issue much consideration. The minimum
amount of time available between notice and hearing is twenty-four hours, and
very few jurisdictions go beyond that minimum. Approximately half of the
prisons in the survey, however, do provide some procedure for postponing the
hearing to allow more time for preparation. Wolff does provide for the
reports or a summary), Indiana, Oregon (discretionary), Rhode Island, West Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (only the representative gets a copy).
241
 California, Louisiana and Oregon.
242 Michigan Department of Corrections, Procedures for Implementation of PA 140, 5
II.C.3 (1979).
242
 Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
244
	 Connecticut, Nebraska (the language, however, is vague), South Carolina,
Tennessee, Wisconsin.
245 462 F. Supp. 752 (N.D. W. Va. 1978).
246 Id. at 755.
247 Id.
248 96 Misc. 2d 937, 409 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1978).
248 Id. at 939, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
2" Id. at 938, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 939, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
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assistance of an inmate or staff representative where the accused is illiterate or
the issues complex. There is no clear test for determining whether the issues are
complex, however, although the Seventh Circuit has held that the accused's
pre-hearing segregation is a factor to be considered. Generally, the prisons are
more liberal than Wolff in allowing representation. With respect to providing
the accused with a copy of any investigative report or permitting him or his
representative to perform an investigation, the prisons are far less liberal.
D. The Right to Remain Silent
The final right to be considered is the right to remain silent. The fifth
amendment protects an individual from being involuntarily called as a witness
against himself in a criminal prosecution. 253 It also gives an individual the right
not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or
criminal, where the answers might be incriminating in future criminal pro-
ceedings. 254 Where a defendant exercises the right to remain silent in a
criminal case, Griffin U. California"' forbids the jury to draw an adverse in-
ference from the failure to testify. 256 Additionally, Miranda v. Arizona"' requires
that a criminally accused be informed of his right to remain silent. 258
The issue of how the fifth amendment applies to prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings breaks down into three questions: (1) Does an inmate have a right to
remain silent in the face of prison disciplinary charges where the alleged
misconduct might also constitute a criminal offense? (2) If so, may the
disciplinary board draw an adverse inference from the accused's exercise of
that right? (3) If there is a right to remain silent, do prison officials have a duty
to warn the inmate of that right?
Two years after the Wolff decision, the Supreme Court addressed these
first two questions in Baxter v. Palmigiano. 259 The Court held that inmates had
the right to remain silent, but that prison officials could draw adverse in-
ferences from such silence. 26° In Baxter, an inmate in the Rhode Island prison
system had been advised that he could remain silent at a disciplinary hearing,
but that his silence could be used against him."' The First Circuit, however,
held that the fifth amendment forbids drawing an adverse inference from a
prisoner's refusal to testify. 262 The Supreme Court reversed. The Court stated
that the fifth amendment protects an individual from involuntarily testifying
against himself in a criminal trial."' The amendment also protects a person
255
	 U.S. at 316.
254 Id.
255
	 U.S. 609 (1965).
256 Id. at 612.
" 7 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"' Id. at 467-68.
259 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
26° Id. at 320.
261 Id. at 316.
262 Id.
262 Id.
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from having to answer any question that might later be used against him in a
future criminal proceeding. 264 The Court noted, however, that in a non-
criminal context, such as a prison disciplinary hearing, there was no barrier to
drawing adverse inferences from a person's silence. 265 The Court stated:
[Tihe Fifth Amendment "not only protects the individual
against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a
criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official
questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, for-
mal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future
criminal proceedings." . . . Prison disciplinary hearings are not
criminal proceedings; but if inmates are compelled in those pro-
ceedings to furnish testimonial evidence that might incriminate them
in later criminal proceedings, they must be offered "whatever im-
munity is required to supplant the privilege" and may not be re-
quired to "waive such immunity. '266
Thus, while acknowledging that prisoners have a right to invoke the fifth
amendment privilege in disciplinary proceedings, 267 the Court held that the
disciplinary board can draw an adverse inference from the inmate's silence.'"
The Court justified its decision on two grounds. First, prison disciplinary hear-
ings are civil actions, not criminal, and the Court cited to "the prevailing rule
that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to
civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence of-
fered against them. . "269 Second, the Court pointed out that in Rhode
Island an inmate's silence in and of itself is insufficient to support an adverse
decision by the Disciplinary Board. " 270 If the Board had been authorized to
find the accused guilty solely on the basis of his silence, the Court indicated
that it would have held the practice to be an "invalid attempt by the State to
compel testimony without granting immunity or to penalize the exercise of the
privilege."'" Because the inmate's silence does not lead to an automatic find-
ing of guilt, however, the Court upheld the practice of drawing an adverse in-
ference.
The practical result of the Court's holding in some jurisdictions is that a
disciplinary committee can find an inmate guilty without taking any testimony
at the hearing. In at least seven jurisdictions, the disciplinary or investigatory
report is sufficient evidence alone to find an inmate guilty, 272 and in only fifteen
264 Id .
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268
 Id. at 320.
268 Id, at 318.
278
 Id. at 317.
271
 Id. at 318.
272 Alaska, Connecticut, Kentucky, Mississippi, Washington, West Virginia and the
Federal Bureau of Prisons specifically provide that the officer need not appear or that the report is
sufficient if the officer is unavailable.
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jurisdictions do the regulations provide either that the officer must appear at
the hearing, if he is available, or that the inmate has the right to request the of-
ficer's presence."' In at least some prisons, therefore, the adverse inference
drawn from an inmate's silence will be the only evidence at the hearing other
than the charging document.
In those cases where an inmate has a right to remain silent, there is the
question whether the prison has the duty to warn the inmate of that right. Bax-
ter did not specifically address this issue, but the District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee has held that a warning is not required. 274 The district
court's decision is a setback for inmates. Even though Baxter allowed an adverse
inference to be drawn from an inmate's silence at the hearing, the decision still
intended to provide protection of the accused's rights at subsequent criminal
proceedings. Since inmates are not constitutionally afforded the assistance of
counsel even where criminal charges are pending, 275 some form of Miranda
warning regarding the fifth amendment privilege would seem important. An
inmate cannot be presumed to know that he has such a right, but without
counsel or a warning no mechanism exists to inform him.
Although the courts do not require prison officials to read an inmate his
Miranda rights where a criminal prosecution may follow, some of the prison
handbooks have instituted that requirement. Eight jurisdictions provide the
right in all cases, 276 with five jurisdictions informing the inmate at all stages of
the proceedings"' and three only at the hearing. 278 Eight other states require
the Miranda warnings only where criminal charges may be pending, 279 with six
of those mandating it at the investigative stage of the proceedings.'a° Of the six-
273 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and the District of
Columbia.
27+ Tench v. Henderson, 430 F. Supp. 964, 968 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
[I]t is clear from the Court's opinion [in Baxter] that such action is not required by
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. Firstly, the Court specifically declined to ex-
tend the requirements of Miranda and Mathis, cases which dealt with what warn-
ings must be given to an individual in custody, to prison disciplinary proceedings.
Secondly, the Court held that an inmate is not entitled to be informed that he has a
right to counsel at his hearing. Thirdly, the proceedings involved are civil not
criminal. And finally, the Court held that if an inmate was compelled to give
testimony which might incriminate him, he was entitled to whatever use immunity
is required by the Constitution.
Id.
275 425 U.S. at 314.
" 6 Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Washington, the District
of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
" 7 Louisiana, Mississippi, Washington, the District of Columbia and the Federal
Bureau of Prisons.
2 " Colorado, Hawaii and Massachusetts.
279 Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Nevada, Rhode Island, Vermont and West
Virginia.
28° Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Nevada and Rhode Island. In Rhode Island the ac-
cused is advised to consult an attorney.
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teen jurisdictions in the survey which specify that disciplinary proceedings are
not to be suspended pending the outcome of the criminal charges,"' however,
only eight require that the inmate must be advised of his right to remain silent
prior to the hearing even though a criminal prosecution may follow.282
Prisoners charged with an institutional violation have a right to remain
silent, therefore, when the incident also may result in a criminal investigation.
The disciplinary board, however, may draw an adverse inference from the in-
mate's silence, and at least one court has held that the prison officials do not
have the duty to inform the accused of the right to remain silent. Thus, the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination is very limited in the context of
prison disciplinary hearings.
Indeed, a prisoner's pre-hearing rights in general are very limited. In
some jurisdictions an inmate may find himself in segregated detention,
generally unaware of the charges against him until the day before a hearing.
Additionally, the inmate may not be entitled to any assistance in preparing to
defend himself, and may be denied access to any investigatory reports. Finally,
if the inmate exercises his right to remain silent at the hearing, this silence may
be used against him, and in some jurisdictions, the inmate's silence in conjunc-
tion with the investigatory report may be sufficient to establish guilt.
V. THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS AT LORTON PRISON: A CASE STUDY
In order to aid in the understanding of the due process issues raised in
prison disciplinary proceedings, this section of the article will describe a typical
disciplinary hearing held at the Central Facility of the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (Lorton), a medium security institution."' It is not
contended that the disciplinary process at Lorton is, in every respect, typical of
proceedings throughout the country, but its description will give an illustration
of how the general process functions.
A copy of a handbook entitled Prison Disciplinary Procedures and Code of
Prison Offenses284
 is issued to every inmate upon his arrival at Lorton. 285
 As
the title indicates, the handbook lists the offenses for which an inmate may be
punished, the punishments which are applicable to each offense, and the pro-
le i Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland,
Nebraska, Nevada, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and
Wisconsin.
282
 Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and
West Virginia.
Rea
	 description of the disciplinary process at Lorton is the result of the author's
observations during two years as the supervisor of a law school clinical program which provides
student representatives for disciplinary hearings at Lorton.
2 B 4 Department of Corrections for the District of Columbia, December 7, 1973. A revised
edition of the handbook is scheduled to be put into use in 1981. It will result in some changes in
the disciplinary procedures described in this section.
"5 Prison Disciplinary Procedures and Code of Prison Offenses (Code), Rule 1 (1973).
1046	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 22:1009
cedures for implementing those punishments. Thus, the first step in the
disciplinary process, giving the inmate notice of prohibited conduct, takes
place when the inmate receives a copy of the handbook.
The offenses described in the handbook are divided into four classifica-
tions based on the seriousness of the violation. After the list of offenses in each
classification, the handbook lists the penalties which may be imposed. Class I
offenses constitute the most serious infringements and result in the harshest
penalties. Class IV offenses comprise the least serious violations, and the hand-
book gives the charging officer the discretion either to refer the matter to the
disciplinary board or to impose summarily a minor penalty. 286
For all violations other than Class IV, employees must report the alleged
misconduct to their shift supervisors.'" A disciplinary report (DR), which
identifies the rules alleged to have been violated and the facts constituting each
offense, must be filled out. 288
 The regulations require that the shift supervisor
investigate the charges.'" However, in practice, he merely interviews the in-
mate and gives him verbal notice of the possible disciplinary action.'" At that
time, the shift supervisor also asks the inmate whether he desires to have any
witnesses and advises him of his rights to remain silent and to obtain represen-
tation for the hearing."' At Lorton, area law students usually provide this
representation, although inmates are allowed to retain counsel."' The inmate
then is asked whether he wishes to make a statement.'" The majority of the in-
mates exercise the right to remain silent and do not make a statement to the
shift supervisor prior to the hearing.'"
Following his investigatiOn, the supervisor makes a determination
whether the DR will be destroyed or will be referred to the disciplinary
board.'" If the DR is referred to the board, the inmate receives a copy, along
with notice as to the time and place of the hearing.'" Hearings are held within
two working days after the inmate has received written notice.'" Despite the
requirement in Wolff of notice at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing,
the shift supervisor's investigation, the receipt of written notice, and the hear-
ing, occasionally, have occurred on the same day.'"
296
 Id. at 22.
287
	 2(a).
tea
	 2(c).
269
	 5(a).
290
	 an orientation session for the students, it was explained that the Department
did not have enough personnel to conduct a more thorough investigation.
291 Rule 5(b).
292 Ru le 7 .
293 Rule 5(c).
294
 The author is aware of only two cases handled by a student representative in which
the client had made a statement prior to the hearing.
2" Rule 2(b).
296 Rule 5(d).
2" Rule 5(e).
2" The author witnessed two cases where the twenty-four hour requirement was
violated.
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Pending the hearing, the inmate may be placed in pre-hearing, adminis-
trative segregation, if the shift supervisor determines that there is a clear and
present threat to the prisoner's safety, that the prisoner poses a clear and pres-
ent threat to the safety of others, or that the prisoner poses a definite escape
risk. 299
 The majority of inmates, however, are not placed in pre-hearing segre-
gation, and instead, are allowed to remain in the general prison population
prior to the hearing. Inmates not confined to pre-hearing segregation report to
the control building the morning of the day on which their hearing is scheduled.
The control building contains both the administrative and the punitive
segregation cells along with the disciplinary hearing room. Upon reporting to
the control building, the inmate is placed in an administrative segregation cell
until he is called for the hearing. The board convenes at 9 a.m. and conducts
hearings until all those scheduled for that day are completed. It is rare,
however, that hearings last after 3 p.m., and often all cases are disposed of by
noon.
Each morning the officer who serves as the clerk of the board prepares a
docket sheet, which lists the names of each inmate scheduled to be heard, the
alleged offenses committed, and whether the inmate desires representation by
an attorney or a law student. The inmate has the right to be represented by re-
tained counsel, but he bears the responsibility for making the arrangements. 30°
The appearance of such counsel is rare because the inmates generally cannot
afford attorneys, and because law students registered with the Department of
Corrections serve as volunteer counse1. 30 ' Typically, three days a week two or
three students remain in the control building and represent any inmate who re-
quests assistance. While the docket indicates whether representation has been
requested, the inmate is allowed to change his mind on the day of the hearing.
If the accused requests student representation on a day on which there are
no students at the institution, the inmate may ask the disciplinary board for a
continuance of the hearing to a later date. An accused has the right to one con-
tinuance, for any reason, for up to three days.'" All subsequent requests for a
continuance are within the discretion of the board. 303
 Usually, the board will
grant a continuance of the hearing to a day on which it knows that students will
be present. During times of the year, however, when students are on vacation
or taking final examinations, the inmate must proceed without representation.
If a student is available, a guard brings the inmate out of the ad-
ministrative segregation cell and handcuffs him. The student generally has
only fifteen minutes to interview the client, although the guards will allow more
time if a student requests it. The interview occurs in the same room where one
or two other interviews are being conducted and two correctional officers are
overseeing security. Thus, there is almost no privacy.
299
 Rule 4.
3°° Rule 5(h).
301 Rule 7(b).
Rule 5(g).
303 Id.
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If the client does not have his copy of the DR, the student may go into the
hearing room and request a copy from the clerk. At that time, or after inter-
viewing the client, the student is allowed to look at the DR and the client's in-
mate file, or jacket. The jacket contains copies of all prior DRs. Knowledge of
the client's inmate record is useful in the event that the inmate is found guilty
and the student must make a recommendation for sentence.
If the client has requested witnesses, the institution will have issued call-
out passes to those witnesses who are inmates, informing them of the date of
the hearing. There is no established procedure for informing potential
witnesses who are employees of the institution, and it generally is left to the ac-
cused to make such a request personally. With the exception of the charging of-
ficer, no requested witness is required to appear at the hearing, and those who
are employees almost always decline the request.'" If the witnesses have not
appeared and the student feels that they are essential to the client's defense, the
student can request a continuance to a later date. 305 If it is granted, new call-
out passes will be issued. The student, however, will not have the opportunity
to seek out these witnesses and can only hope that they will appear at the next
scheduled hearing.
If the witnesses have arrived, the student is allowed to interview them one
at a time while the client is taken back to his administrative segregation cell.
The guards permit about fifteen minutes for the interview of each witness.
After the student questions the witnesses, they are asked to wait outside and the
client is brought back to the interview room. When the student is ready to pro-
ceed to the hearing, he so indicates to one of the officers.
The board presiding at this hearing consists of three members. 306 The
chairman must be a correctional officer.'" An officer of the rank of lieutenant,
or higher, is appointed to the position for approximately six months. The other
two positions are filled on a rotating basis by staff members of either
psychological services or classification and parole (C and P). 305 Board members
must not have been involved in any way with the incident which led to the DR,
or with the investigation of the charges. 309 Therefore, the chairman frequently
must excuse himself from the board, either because he wrote the DR or
because he investigated it. The chairman does not have to excuse himself,
however, when he has received second-hand reports of an incident from his
fellow officers prior to the hearing. 310 The psychologists and C and P officers
3" Rule 8(d) states that "[e]mployees . . . may not be excused from giving testimony
before the board," but the usual technique used to avoid testifying is simply failing to appear.
The board cooperates in the hoax by granting a continuance each time until the inmate grows
tired of the process and agrees to proceed without the witness.
3°' Rule 5(g).
1" Rule 6(b).
107 Id.
"e Id.
s09
3 " After the completion of a hearing and the removal of the accused from the hearing
room, the chairman occasionally confides to the student representative that he has spoken to
other officers about the alleged incident for which the inmate was charged.
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almost never remove themselves from a hearing, even when the accused is a
part of their caseload. Whether this practice works to the detriment of the
prisoner depends on the relationship that the inmate has with his psychologist
or C and P officer.
Upon entering the hearing room, the student and the client sit at a table
directly opposite the board members. The client remains handcuffed and is re-
quired to sit in an oversized black wooden chair placed in front of the chair-
man. The tone established is adversarial. A tape recorder is turned on 3 " and
the chairman reads the charges against the inmate. 3 " He then asks the inmate
whether he desires witnesses, including the writer of the DR. 3 " If the accused
wants witnesses and they have not appeared, this is the appropriate time to re-
quest a continuance. 314 If the hearing is not continued, the chairman advises
the accused that he has a right to remain silent" and then asks him what he
has to say in response to the charges. 3 ' 6
At that time, the student makes whatever preliminary motions he has
prepared. Typically, these include either a motion for a continuance or a mo-
tion to dismiss a charge for failure to allege sufficient facts to constitute the of-
fense. 317
 For the latter, the student and client usually are asked to leave the
room while the board deliberates. When the two are brought back into the
room, they are informed of the board's decision. Unless all charges have been
dismissed, a rare event, the student then presents the client's defense.
The student representative has the option of questioning the client or
relating the defense in his own words. No one formally represents the prison,
or "the state," during the disciplinary hearing. When the student is finished
questioning the accused or presenting the arguments for the defense, however,
the board members may question the accused. Following the questioning of the
accused, the student calls the accused's witnesses and questions them. The
board, again, can ask its own questions. The degree of participation by the
members, other than the chairman, varies widely. Some appear disinterested
and never pose any questions. A few actually read newspapers and magazines
during the hearing." Others enjoy the legalistic nature of the proceedings and
take the opportunity to ask many questions, often dealing with information ir-
relevant to the charges. The chairman, being more familiar with the pro-
cedures and with the operation of the prison, is more apt to do the relevant
3 " Rule ID.
3 E 3 Rule 5(c).
3 ' 3 Rule 8(a) and (c).
314 Rule 5(g).
''s Rule 7(c).
316 Rule 5(c).
31  Because the reports often are poorly written, the latter is the most successful method
of defending against the charges.
348 The practice became so prevalent that one student wrote to the administrator of the
central Facility to complain. The administration informed the author that he would direct all
board members to discontinue such practices and indicated that the student could have obtained
the same results without sending a copy of the letter to the director of the Department of Correc-
tions and to the mayor of the District of Columbia.
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questioning. The disciplinary board, thus, assumes the positions of factfinder
and the administration's representative, roles which are conflicting.
By giving the inmate the right to call the writer of the DR, Lorton has
gone beyond the requirements of Woff, which does not provide the right of
confrontation. Most clients are advised, however, not to exercise their right
because the writer, more often than not, will only repeat the description of the
incident given in his report, from which he is allowed to read at the hearing.
After all of the evidence has been presented and the student has made a
summation, he and the inmate wait outside while the board deliberates the
issue of guilt or innocence:313 During that time, the student discusses with the
client what sentence they should recommend to the board in the event that it
finds the client guilty. If the board returns a guilty verdict, the student makes a
recommendation for appropriate punishment, 320 and then he and the client
again leave the room, while the board reviews the inmate's jacket for past
violations, evaluations, and the offense for which he was committed. 32 ' Finally,
the two return to the hearing room to be informed of the punishment. 322
Penalties at Lorton are not severe in comparison with other institutions. 323
Good time almost never is taken from the inmate. 324 The most severe penalty
imposed on inmates in central facility, a medium security unit, is a transfer to
the maximum security unit, and the most common form of punishment imposed
is punitive segregation, which means confinement in the punitive segregation
cellblock in the control building. 325 The maximum length of confinement is
fourteen days, during which the inmate is denied almost all privileges available
to the general prison population. 326 While the majority of penalties imposed are
for a period of segregation, the board often suspends imposition of penalty
from three to six months. 327 The inmate will have to serve that time in segrega-
tion only if found guilty of a subsequent DR within the suspension period.
The rules provide for automatic review of all hearings by an assistant ad-
ministrator, 328 and occasionally such review will result in the reversal of the
board's finding of guilt, or a reduction in the penalty. 323 In addition, the in-
mate has the right to appeal in writing to the administrator of the central facili-
ty within two working days, 33 ° and the inmate's representative will assist him if
316 Rule 9(a).
326
 Rule 9(c).
221
 Rule 9(b).
322 Rule 9(c).
323 The maximum length of segregation is fourteen days. Code at 17.
3 " In two years, none of the author's students handled a case in which good time was
taken.
3 " Code at 17.
326 Code at 28.
327 The regulations do not authorize suspended sentences, but it has become a common
practice.
328 Rule 11(a),
329 Students occasionally represent a client whose case already has been heard by the
board but which has been remanded for a new hearing following review.
430
 Rule 11(b) and (c).
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there are grounds for an appeal."' The administrator does not adhere strictly
to the two day limit and will accept late appeals. 332
 The rules provide that the
administrator must give the inmate a written decision within two working days
if he is in segregation, otherwise within three working days.'" The ad-
ministrator, however, does not adhere strictly to that time limit either, and
because penalties are not stayed pending appeal, often an inmate's sentence to
segregation will have been served before the administrator has made his deci-
s ion. 334
VI. THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING
This section deals with the issues raised by the events which occur at a
disciplinary hearing. The issues will be discussed under five main subsections,
dealing with when and where the hearing takes place; the composition of the
hearing body; the presentation of the prison's evidence; the presentation of the
accused's defense; and the preparation of a written statement.
A. When and Where does the Hearing Take Place?
If an inmate has been charged with a major violation which has not
resulted in criminal charges, and if he has not elected to proceed by waiver, he
has the right to a hearing. 335
 When and where that hearing takes place is im-
portant for a number of reasons. With respect to the timing of a hearing, an in-
mate's witnesses may no longer be available if the hearing is delayed too long.
An inmate-witness may be released, paroled, transferred to another institu-
tion, or placed in segregation; all of which would make him unavailable for a
disciplinary hearing. Additionally, if the accused is placed in pre-hearing
segregation, he naturally will want the hearing held as soon as possible. Regard-
ing the location of a hearing, an inmate at least has an interest in insuring that
the setting is impartial. Finally, a hearing should not be used as harassment,
and, therefore, should be held at a reasonable time of day.
The Supreme Court has not established either minimum or maximum
time periods in which a hearing must be held. In fact, very few courts have ad-
dressed this issue and their conclusions have varied widely. At one extreme, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, in Holt v.
Hutto336
 considered the constitutionality of the disciplinary procedures in the
Arkansas prisons and among other things held that disciplinary hearings
391
 That is the policy established in the clinic.
" 2
 Often it is impossible for students to meet the two-day requirement, yet during the
author's two years at the clinic, no appeal was ever denied for that reason.
3 " Rule 11(1).
"4
 This was a very common occurrence during the author's experience at the clinic.
" 5 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
"6 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Board of Cor-
rection, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
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generally must be held within seventy-two hours after the act of misconduct.'"
Limited extensions on the seventy-two hours requirement could be granted
only in exceptional cases. Unfortunately, the court did not define what it
meant by an "exceptional case." 338
 On appeal this limit was specifically en-
dorsed by the Eighth Circuit. 339
At the other end of the spectrum, Smith v. Oregon State Prison, Corrections
Division340
 held that a six week delay was reasonable. This case involved a
disciplinary hearing which was recessed six weeks by the board pending the
results of a police investigation which the board concluded would provide infor-
mation regarding a disputed issue in the case.'" Smith had been charged with
being in an unauthorized area at the same time that another inmate had been
sexually assaulted. 342
 The police were investigating the sexual assault, and the
board reasoned that the investigation might supply evidence concerning
whether Smith had been present in the unauthorized area. 343
 The court held
that the board had "the inherent authority to recess hearings for good cause
and for reasonable lengths of time." 344
 It found that waiting for the results of
the police investigation was good cause and that six weeks was not an
unreasonable length of time. 345
In the absence of clear guidance from the courts, the regulations dealing
with the timing of hearings tend to be vague. Some of the jurisdictions use stand-
ards such as "within a reasonable time" 346
 and "without undue delay." 347 As
illustrated in the Smith case, the Oregon court did not feel that six weeks was
33'
	 at 207. The court also held that all hearings must be held between the hours of six
a.m. and six p.m. Id.
338 Id.
"9
 Finney v. Arkansas Board of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 208 (8th Cir. 1974). After
the district court's decision and prior to the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Wolff The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding as to the timing of the hearing, while also
holding that the prisons must adopt the standards established in Wolff. Id.
Hopkins v. Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission, 391 A.2d 1213 (Md. App. 1978),
stands for the proposition that when the prison has established a time limit for when the hearing is
to occur, it must abide by that rule. In Hopkins a Maryland court reversed the disciplinary
board's decision because the hearing had been held one day after the seventy-two hour limit
established by the Maryland prison regulation. Id. at 1215-16. Hearings could be held later than
seventy-two hours after the violation where the prison could show that an earlier hearing was
prevented by exceptional circumstances. Id. at 1214. Stating that an administrative agency must
follow its own rules, the court held that an ordinary backlog of cases did not constitute an excep-
tional circumstance and that the hearing should have been held within seventy-two hours. Id. at
1215-16.
"° 18 Or. App. 668, 526 P.2d 642 (1974).
'4 ' Id. at 670, 526 P.2d at 642-43.
342 Id. at 669, 526 P.2d at 642.
34' Id. at 670, 526 P.2d at 643.
344 Id. at 671-72, 526 P.2d at 643-44.
343 Id. at 672, 526 P.2d at 643-44.
346 Massachusetts Code of Human Resources Regulations, tit. 3, ch. IV, S 430.11(c).
34 ' Nevada Department of Prisons, Code of Trial Discipline 9 (1978).
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"unreasonable." Therefore, it is not clear whether that standard is very
helpful
Equally as vague are regulations which provide for a hearing within a cer-
tain period of time after receipt of notice where the latter event is contingent
upon an indefinite date such as completion of the investigation. 349 Alaska's
regulation offers an illustration of that vagueness. While it requires that the
hearing must occur within six months of the alleged act of misconduct, 35 ° the
determination of when the hearing must be given within that six months is
quite uncertain. The regulations provide for a hearing within five days of
receipt of notice, 351 but it does not specify exactly when the accused receives
notice. The notice provision requires only that a copy be given to the accused
within twenty-four hours after the investigation, 352
 but it does not comment on
when the investigations take place. The date of the hearing, therefore, is con-
tingent upon the date of the completion of the investigation, so long as it is
completed within six months of the infraction. 353
A second issue regarding the disciplinary hearing is where it takes place.
While there is little expectation that the hearing would be held outside of the in-
stitution, it still is important that a relatively impartial atmosphere be main-
tained. In Daigle v. Helgemoe354
 the New Hampshire District Court reversed a
disciplinary decision in which the hearing had been held while the prisoner was
confined in a solitary cell and the board members sat outside the cell."' The
court held that no disciplinary hearings could be so conducted. 356 Even where a
security risk exists, the court stressed, the officials must hold the hearing in an
open room or wait until the inmate is released from solitary."' Further, the
court required that if the hearing is to be held in an unusual location because of
security problems, the determination that a security problem exists must be
made a part of the written record. 358
 In explaining its decision, the court stated:
To be constitutionally proper, a hearing should be fair in both
form and substance. .
	 . Prison officials should endeavor to create
98
 Where pre-hearing segregation is involved, at least two federal cases, LaGrande v.
Redman, 432 F. Supp. 1307, 1309 (D. Del. 1977), and Rompilla v. Nero, 448 F. Supp. 182, 184
(E.D. Pa. 1978), hold that the inmate must receive notice and a hearing as soon as the threat to
security subsides. That is a rather vague standard, and only thirteen jurisdictions in the survey
have established time limits applicable to pre-hearing segregation cases.
"8 See Section IV supra.
350
 ALASKA ADMINISTRA'T'IVE CODE, art. 6, § 425(a).
351
'" Id. at § 410(c).
3" Id. at § 425(a).
" 4 399 F. Supp. 416 (D.N.H. 1975).
8" Id. at 419.
356 Id. at 420.
357 ,rd .
358 Id.
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an atmosphere in which prisoners will feel that they have been
treated fairly and equally. It is highly doubtful that an inmate will
believe that he has been treated fairly when he views both his judges
and accusers through the steel bars of a solitary cell.
. . . [C]onducting a disciplinary hearing while an inmate is
confined to a solitary cell is antithetical to the due process criterion
that the hearing be held "in a meaningful manner." . . . A pro-
cedure which places the inmate in a grossly inferior position can only
reinforce feelings of persecution and injustice. 359
Other than the limitation established by Daigle, the site of a disciplinary
hearing is almost totally within the discretion of the prison authorities. For pur-
poses of administrative convenience, however, most hearings are held within
the institution in which the accused is confined. North Carolina is the only
state in the survey that has a different system. 36°
The standards for when and where a hearing must take place, therefore,
are still vague. Only the Eighth Circuit has established a definite time limit.
The majority of decisions and regulations, however, are not specific and use
such vague standards as "within a reasonable time." The only limitation placed
on the location of the hearing is that it cannot be held outside the prisoner's cell
while he is locked within the cell.
B. The Disciplinary Board
Wolff did little to establish what requirements the disciplinary factfinding
body had to meet to satisfy due process. It did not establish "specified criteria
for neutral and detached hearing officers." 36 ' The impartiality of the
disciplinary board is a critical issue. This section will analyze the judicial and
administrative determinations made subsequent to Wolff with respect to the
impartiality of the disciplinary board and of the individual members of the
board. In particular this section will focus on three issues: first, the extent to
which the board may serve both as prosecutor and adjudicator; second, the
propriety of board member involvement in the investigation; and third, the
makeup of the board. All of these issues affect the impartiality of the
disciplinary board.
In general, disciplinary boards, like all administrative bodies, need not
possess the same degree of detachment as is required of a judge. The Oregon
359
 Id. at 419.
'6° As will be discussed later in this section, North Carolina establishes Area
Disciplinary Committees (ADC) made up of employees from the different institutions in the
area. 5 N.C.A.C., § .0203(b) (1979). An inmate charged with a major act of misconduct is heard
by an ADC, and he must be transported to the institution at which the Committee is sitting. Id.
at S .0203(b)(3). Illinois provides that all hearings "shall be conducted in an area of the facility
that affords privacy . . and allows for the confidentiality of any evidence presented." Illinois
Department of Corrections, Administrative Regulations, 5 II.G.5. (1978).
36' Powell v. Ward, 392 F. Supp. 628, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), modyied, 542 F.2d 101 (2d
Cir. 1976).
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Court of Appeals distinguished the functions of a court of law from those of an
administrative hearing body in Fritz v. Oregon State Penitentiary, Corrections Divi-
sion. 362
 The court stated that in a judicial adjudication:
[T]here is a total separation of the judging function from the in-
vestigatorial and prosecutorial functions as constitutionally man-
dated under the doctrine of separation of powers.
In contrast, an administrator is usually selected because of
. . his commitment to the policy which he is charged to ad-
minister. The traditional justifications for administrative adjudica-
tions are those of administrative expertise and the avoidance of the
cumbersome machinery of a court trial. Both imply a degree of prior
knowledge and consequent prejudgment by administrative agencies,
not only on matters of policy but also on questions of fact. As regular
members of the prison staff, they are personally acquainted with the
inmates and other staff members and thus are in a position to make
tentative prejudgments on questions of credibility and appropriate
sanctions or treatment. Presumably they make those prejudgments.
Due process does not require an absence of these kinds of biases
that are inherent in the administrative process. Indeed, abstract
fairness may be better served through such a process. It would not
be unreasonable to expect more arbitrary results from a panel of
wholly disinterested, and thus unknowledgeable, persons who are
not intimately acquainted with the personalities and operation of the
prison . . In Wolff the Court stated that due process entitles the
inmate to notice and to be heard. The right to be heard implies a
corollary duty to listen and consider, but this does not mean that
they must listen with a total absence of prejudgment. 363
Unlike judicial proceedings, in administrative adjudication, the Fritz court
stated, there is no need to separate clearly the judging function from the inves-
tigatorial and prosecutorial functions. 364 In Fritz one member's investigation
prior to the hearing was held not to warrant disqualification. 365
 Furthermore,
complete impartiality was not required. In this regard the court reasoned that
almost all board members, because of their employment within the institution,
inevitably will have some knowledge of the incident or the accused prior to the
hearing. 366
As to the prosecutorial function, only three of the regulations surveyed
establish a position comparable to a prosecutor in a criminal trial. 367
 North
362 30 Or. App. 1117, 569 P.2d 654 (1977).
363 Id. at 1122-23, 569 P.2d at 657.
364 Id.
Id. at 1121, 569 P.2d at 657.
366 See Section V supra.
967 Arizona, New Hampshire and North Carolina. Also, Nevada provides that when the
accused is represented by retained counsel in a case where criminal charges are pending, a
member of the attorney general's office will attend the hearing.
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Carolina gives the Unit Superintendent the discretion to appoint a member of
his staff to present the case to the committee. 368 In New Hampshire, the officer
who investigates the incident also is charged with presenting the case against
the accused at the hearing. 369 Although the regulation is somewhat vague,
Arizona employs a Coordinator of Discipline who has the authority to request
the appearance of the charging officer, make motions, and question all
witnesses. 3"
In the remaining jurisdictions in the survey, there is no provision for a
prosecutor. Often the charging and the investigating officers do not even ap-
pear at the hearing."' What does appear are the officers' reports. Some juris-
dictions provide that either the board or the accused, or both, may request an
officer's appearance. 372 In those instances, however, the officer is called to
testify as a witness, not to present the institution's case. 373 The role of prosecu-
tor, therefore, if such a role exists in a prison disciplinary hearing, belongs to
the board. Thus, the roles of a disciplinary board are conflicting and the degree
of impartiality is limited.
In addition to prosecutorial functions, there also exists the issue whether
board members may participate in pre-hearing investigations. In Fritz, for ex-
ample, a board member had spoken with the charging employee prior to the
hearing and had agreed with her decision not to withdraw the report. 374 The in-
mate argued that as a result of this conversation the board member should have
been excluded from the panel for having "arrived at a degree of prejudgment
resulting from that investigation. "375 Citing two United States Supreme Court
cases dealing with agency hearings other than prison disciplinary hearings, 376
the Oregon court stated that "due process does not require a formal separation
of the investigative functions from the adjudicative or decision making func-
568 5 NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, § .0203(b)(4) (1979).
369 New Hampshire State Prison, Manual for the Guidance of Inmates, Disciplinary
Procedures, 3.B. (1978).
"° Arizona Department of Corrections, Rules of Discipline, 5 III.D-3, 9-10 (1980).
"' At least seven jurisdictions specifically provide that the officer need not appear or
that the report is sufficient if the officer is unavailable. Alaska, Mississippi, Connecticut,
Washington, West Virginia, Kentucky, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
372 Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina and the District of Columbia. See Section V, supra, however, which describes
how employees in the District of Columbia avoid appearing at a disciplinary hearing.
3" In most of the handbooks the issue of whether the officer will appear at the hearing is
discussed in connection with whether the accused will have an opportunity to cross-examine
adverse witnesses.
374 30 Or. App. at 1119, 569 P.2d at 655-56.
375 Id at 1121, 569 P.2d at 656.
376 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). The members of the Wisconsin Examining
Board conducted an investigation of a doctor and then scheduled a contested case hearing to
determine whether his license should be suspended. The Supreme Court held that the procedure
was not violative of the Due Process Clause. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683 (1947). The F.T.C. had made an investigation into the cement industry pricing
system and several members of the Commission had testified before Congress that they believed
the system was illegal. The F.T.C. then brought an antitrust case attacking the pricing system.
The Court held that the members need not disqualify themselves due to the prior investigation.
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tions of an administrative agency, nor does it preclude those who perform the
latter from participating in the investigative phase. " 377
While allowing pre-hearing investigations by a board member, the court
was concerned with the degree of prejudgment which the member had
developed. 378
 The test used by the court to determine whether the board
member was so prejudiced as to warrant disqualification from the board was
whether "his mind was closed from hearing what others might have to say." 379
Applying the test to the facts in the case, the court determined that the
member's agreement with the decision not to withdraw the charges did not
mean that his "mind was necessarily closed to [the inmate's] arguments." 38°
Thus, the board member was not "biased to a degree that is constitutionally
unacceptable.
Despite the justification in Fritz for allowing pre-hearing investigation by
board members, the majority view is to the contrary. 382 Myers v. Askew, 383 a
Florida case, provides a good summary of the reasons for exclusion from a
disciplinary committee. In that case, the court would not disqualify a board
member because he was a prison employee.'" The court, however, added the
following proviso:
[p]rovided that no member of the disciplinary team has participated
or will participate in the case as an investigating or reviewing officer,
or is a witness or has personal knowledge of material facts related to
the involvement of the accused, or is otherwise personally interested
in the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding. . . . 385
Other courts have specifically disqualified the charging officer386
 and the officer
who classifies the offense as a major or minor violation, along with those whose
judgment might be influenced by the classification officer.'"
The majority view certainly is the better view. The Oregon court would
allow pre-hearing investigation by a board member so long as "his mind was
[not] closed from hearing what others might have to say." That is a totally sub-
jective test which would have to be applied on a case-by-case basis, assuming
that it could be applied at all. The majority view, on the other hand, draws a
clear line by establishing a blanket prohibition on investigation. An objective
test such as that is much easier to apply and requires less frequent judicial
review. More importantly, the majority view requires a higher degree of im-
partiality.
37 7 30 Or. App. at 1121, 569 P.2d at 656.
378 Id. at 1124-25, 569 P.2d at 656-57.
379 Id. at 1124, 569 P.2d at 658.
386 Id.
381 Id.
382 See notes 387, 390, 391 infra.
383 338 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 1976).
384 Id. at 1130.
MO Id .
386 See, e.g. , Finney v. Arkansas Board of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 208 (8th Cir. 1974).
387
 See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 454 F. Supp. 579, 585 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
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Another important issue regarding the impartiality of the panel concerns
its composition. The Nebraska panel in Wolff was composed of three employees
of the prison. 388
 The Court found the board to be "sufficiently impartial to
satisfy the due process clause." 389
 A board made up entirely of employees of
the institution, therefore, is not, per se, lacking in impartiality. A related ques-
tion is whether the committee may be composed solely of correctional officers.
Prison employees generally fall into two categories: those charged with the
security of the institution, such as uniformed correctional officers, and those
who provide services, such as counsellors and work supervisors. Due to the
nature of a correctional officer's duties, inmates tend to have better relations
with non-uniformed, service employees and prefer the latter to be sitting on
disciplinary boards.'" The New Jersey court in Avant v. Chord 391
 held the
panel in that case to be sufficiently impartial, but ordered future boards to have
a composition weighted more toward non-uniformed employees:
The pervasive and understandable friction between correc-
tional officers and prisoners noted in Wolff ought not to be exacer-
bated by two of the three members of the "impartial tribunal" being
correctional personnel. Thus, from now on there must be no more
than one correctional officer on the Adjustment Committee.
We further think that when and if the single "hearing officer"
adjudicator technique is implemented, such officer . . should be
assigned from the central office staff instead of coming from within
the institution itself. 392
Two other instances of alleged failure to provide an impartial panel merit
comment. First, there is the question whether a witness to the alleged offense
may sit on the board. In Myers, one member of the board had witnessed the of-
fense and the court held that he should have been disqualified. 393 The Myers
court suggested, however, that direct knowledge of offenses committed by the
accused with which he is not currently charged is not grounds for disqualifica-
tion. In Myers the inmate also had argued that the chairman should have been
disqualified because the inmate had threatened him prior to the hearing. 394
Because the threats were unrelated to the pending charge, the court declined to
so hold. 395
3 " 418 U.S. at 571.
389 Id. at 570-71.
39° From the author's conversations with inmates in several jurisdictions, it is apparent
that the nature of the officers' duties, guarding inmates, often places them in conflict with the in-
mates. Services staff, on the other hand, are not used to maintain order and security and,
therefore, are not perceived in the same adversarial light by the inmates.
391 67 N.J. 496, 341 A.2d 629 (1975).
392 Id. at 527, 341 A.2d at 646.
3" 338 So.2d at 1130.
394 Id.
395 Id.
In some instances personal animosity and feeling between a prisoner and a par-
ticular prison official may require that the official involved be disqualified from
July 1981]
	 DUE PROCESS IN PRISON	 1059
The second issue is possible racial bias. In Douglas v. United Slates Attorney
General, 396
 the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dealt with
this issue. In that case a black prisoner complained of racial discrimination
because he had been found guilty by an all-white disciplinary board, but the
court held that no right to an integrated board existed. 397
 Two states, however,
have regulations which provide for minority membership on disciplinary
boards. 398
 In Illinois, a minority member is mandatory. 399 In Indiana, minori-
ty membership is not mandatory, but "[p]referably, one member should be a
minority group person., '400
With respect to all sources of bias discussed above, state regulations
generally provide no more protection than that required by the courts. A
review of the regulations indicates that most jurisdictions provide for the dis-
qualification of the charging and investigating officers."' Some of the hand-
books are silent on the issue, 402 and few provide for disqualification for reasons
not already stated in the case law. 403
 Furthermore, even where a basis for dis-
qualification exists, only two states have a procedure that allows an inmate to
challenge a member prior to the hearing. 404
serving on a disciplinary committee involving that prisoner. But to say that a
prison official is disqualified in every instance where a threat has been made
against him by a prisoner would place in the hands of the prisoner population a
method by which they could disqualify all prospective members of disciplinary
committees. In the absence of showing that [the chairman] was in fact prejudiced
by the alleged threat we hold that he was not disqualified.
Id.
396 404 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
397 Id. at 1315.
Since a defendant in a criminal trial has no right to a jury of a particular
makeup, Apodoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S. Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184
(1972), it may be doubted that the plaintiff has any constitutional right to have his
disciplinary committee composed in a certain way.
Id.
398
 Illinois and Indiana.
599
 Illinois Department of Correction Adult Division, Administrative Regulations, S
II.E.5 (1978)
One member of each committee shall be a minority staff member. If no such in-
dividual holding one of the above position classifications is physically available to
participate in committee hearings on a given day, any minority staff member may
be allOwed to serve as an adjustment committee member on said day.
Id. A footnote in the regulations indicates that the above provision was made "pursuant to a con-
sent decree in the case of the U.S. Department of justice I). the State of Illinois." Id.
4°° Indiana Department of Correction, Adult Authority Disciplinary Policy, § 4(c)
(1977)
401
 Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, the District of
Columbia and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. In addition, five states exclude anyone with direct
involvement in or knowledge of the incident.
402
 Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma and
South Carolina.
49 ' Alabama, Alaska, Florida, North Dakota and Oregon do not allow the party charged
with reviewing disciplinary appeals to sit on the panel.
404 Massachusetts and Michigan. It is ironic that Michigan, the only jurisdiction in the
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North Carolina and Michigan potentially provide for the most impartial
panels of the jurisdictions surveyed. For major violations in North Carolina, an
Area Disciplinary Committee (ADC) is formed, which is composed of employ-
ees from the different units in the area." 5
 No person in a position of direct
supervision of the inmate may sit on the board. 406
 Michigan provides an even
better alternative than North Carolina. Pursuant to Public Act 140, effective
February 1, 1980, the Michigan legislature created a hearings division within
the Department of Corrections. 407 The division is under the supervision of the
hearings administrator who is appointed by the director of the department, and
it is responsible for hearing all cases involving major violations. 408 Most impor-
tant, the hearing officers are under the direct supervision of the hearings divi-
sion, 4 D 9
 rather than the superintendents of the institutions, and each hearing of-
ficer hired after October 1, 1979, must be an attorney. 410 This arrangement
maximizes both impartiality and competence. 4 "
Thus, a disciplinary hearing body, by its very nature, combines the con-
flicting roles of factfinder and prosecutor, and to a lesser degree investigator.
Because of these conflicting roles, a disciplinary board does not maintain the
same level of impartiality as a court of law. There are requirements of impar-
tiality, however, for individual members of a panel. The majority view is that a
member must be excused if he has participated in the investigation of the inci-
dent or been a witness thereto. The major problem, however, is that the vast
majority of jurisdictions do not provide a remedy for inmates who object to
panel members on the basis of a lack of impartiality. The existence of due proc-
ess in those cases, therefore, is called into question.
survey with a separate hearings division, is one of only two states to provide inmates with a proc-
ess of objecting to the impartiality of the factfinder.
41" 5 NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, 5 .0203(b), .0206(b) (1979).
4" Perhaps due to the resulting lack of familiarity with the accused, the accused's unit
superintendent has the option of appointing a member of his staff to present the case to the ADC.
Id. at .0206(b)(4). North Carolina is one of the few jurisdictions which provides for a staff
member to serve a prosecutorial function. This probably is due to the panel's unfamiliarity with
the accused and the incident.
407 Section 51(1).
406 Section 51(1) and (2).
109 Section 51(3).
410 Id.
"' Even though procedures are provided to ensure impartiality in several states,
Massachusetts has one of the only specific provisions in the survey allowing the accused to chal-
lenge the impartiality of a member of the panel:
The inmate shall address his objection to the chairman and shall state his reasons
for believing the board member to be not impartial at the beginning of the hearing.
The chairman shall remove the member challenged where the chairman deter-
mines that the challenged member could not sit as an impartial member of the
disciplinary board.
Massachusetts Code of Human Resources Regulations, tit. 3, ch. IV, 430.13(b). An inmate
should not have to wait until the appeal procedure to be able to complain about the impartiality
of the board. If the accused cannot obtain a fair hearing before a particular panel, he should have
a remedy such as that used in Massachusetts. If a remedy does not exist, the inmate cannot
receive a fair hearing and his due process rights will be violated.
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C. The Case Against the Accused
The Massachusetts handbook states that the burden of proof in a disci-
plinary hearing is on the "proponent of the disciplinary report." 4 ' 2 Because
disciplinary hearings are administrative in nature, guilt need not be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.'" The prison must only prove the accused's guilt
by a "preponderance of the evidence' , 414 or by "substantial evidence. " 45 It is
necessary, however, that the officials produce sufficient facts to fulfill all of the
elements of the offense. 416 The prison's burden of proving guilt raises some
critical issues involving the kinds of evidence which can be introduced. First is
the question whether the prison may use hearsay evidence, and second, there
are questions regarding the production and admissibility of real or demonstra-
tive evidence.
None of the jurisdictions in the survey have adopted formal rules of
evidence, and no case law was found which requires the use of formal rules.
The only uniform restriction on the introduction of evidence found in the
survey is that the evidence be relevant and noncumulative. 417 Hearsay, gener-
ally, is not excluded unless the evidence is found to be irrelevant. 4 " The only
other restrictions found in the handbooks relating to the admission of hearsay
are that it be admitted within the bounds of "reason and fairness" 419 and that
it have "probative value. 420
Usually the only evidence produced against the inmate at a hearing is a
disciplinary report and an investigatory report. 42 ' Indeed, seven jurisdictions in
the survey have regulations which state specifically that the disciplinary and in-
vestigatory reports are sufficient evidence. 422 At least some prisons, therefore,
are satisfying their burden of proof through the reports filed by the charging
and investigating officers.
412 Massachusetts Code of Human Resources Regulations, tit. 3, ch. IV, § 430.13(b).
4 " See, e.g., Rusher v. Arnold, 550 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1977).
414 Several of the handbooks, including California, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, use this standard,
4'5 This standard is used by Hawaii, Nebraska, Oregon and Rhode Island. Twenty-
three jurisdictions in the survey do not specify what standard of guilt is used.
416 See, e.g., Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, Disciplinary Rules, Rule
5(5) (1978); Ross v. Oregon State Penitentiary, Corrections Division, 538 P.2d 90, 92 (Or. App.
1975).
417 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Loui-
siana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, the
District of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
4 ' 8 See, e.g., Massachusetts Code of Human Resources Regulations, tit. 3, ch. IV, SS
430.14(f), 430.15(c).
4 ' 9 Virginia Department of Corrections, Division of Adult Services Guideline, Inmate
Discipline, § VIII.A. (1977).
"° Colorado Department of Corrections, Code of Penal Discipline, § V.D.2.b.
421
	 text at notes 209-11 supra (5 lVp. 63).
122 Alaska, Connecticut, Kentucky, Mississippi, Washington, West Virginia and the
Federal Bureau of Prisons.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, in
Finney v. Mabry, 423 however, was not satisfied by that form of evidence. 424 In a
wide ranging review of the hearing procedures in the Arkansas prison system,
it held that complete reliance on investigatory reports was tantamount to
delegating the decision making to the investigating officer. 4" The court went
on to hold that a board may not make a determination of guilt "based on infor-
mation from witnesses without actually receiving into evidence and considering
such witnesses' testimony either in oral or written form. "426
Finney is the strongest statement against the use of hearsay, and specifical-
ly against reliance on officers' reports. Even in Finney, however, the emphasis
was not on eliminating hearsay but on providing corroboration so that the
board does not render a decision based solely on hearsay. The District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia in Flythe v. Davis4" was similarly concerned.
The court upheld the use of hearsay, stating that it "did not in this instance
work so as to deprive plaintiff of due process of law. " 428 The court, however,
pointed out that other evidence had been admitted and that the accused had
been given the opportunity to contradict the hearsay. 429
Aside from disciplinary and investigatory reports, the issue of the ad-
missibility of hearsay most often arises with regard to the use of information
from unidentified informants. 4" Because of the fear of retaliation, it is rare that
one inmate will testify against another, and prison officials are cognizant of
their duty to protect inmates from harm by other prisoners. 431 As a result, it is
general practice not to reveal to the accused the identity of inmates who provide
information against him. 432 This practice, however, raises questions as to the
credibility of the informant and the reliability of the information.
443 455 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
424 Id. at 770.
"' Id. at 768-69. The court held that there was:
]FIrequent	 . reliance by the disciplinary committee on secondary "reports" of
rule violations, with no primary evidence of guilt of any sort, in the form of witness
statements, oral or written, or physical evidence, being brought before the com-
mittee. The committee cannot rationally determine guilt in such instances except
by a blind acceptance of the "officer's statement," which is exactly what the
typical case involves, . . . The effect is to simply delegate the decision making to
the investigating officer.
.	 . [I]n other words, something that could legitimately be called "evidence"
must be presented to the hearing committee.
.	 . [T]he notion that a disciplinary committee may adopt, with no corroboration, a
non-witness officer's report and opinion concerning allegations of an inmate's
serious misconduct surely must be rejected out of hand. (emphasis added)
426 Id. at 770.
4" 407 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1976).
428 Id. at 138.
"9 Id.
"° An unidentified informant is an inmate who provides information to a correctional
officer regarding an alleged violation by another inmate. Such inmates are referred to as "snit-
ches" in prison terminology, and an inmate labelled a snitch is considered fair game within the
inmate population.
"I See, e.g., D.C. CODE S 24-442.
452 At Lorton, for example, it is the prison's practice to omit the name of any informant
from all reports which might come to the attention of the accused inmate.
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Finney addressed the issues of reliability and credibility and held that the
problems could be remedied by requiring that the informant's identity be
revealed to the hearing board and by providing the board the opportunity to in-
vestigate further if it desires. 433 Finney did not require, however, that the board
inform the accused of the contents of the informant's statement.
Other methods of ensuring reliability have been used short of revealing
the informant's identity. Prior to Wolff, for example, the First Circuit, in Gomes
v. Travisono , 434
 established a two-pronged test:
(1) the record must contain some underlying factual information
from which the Board can reasonably conclude that the informant
was credible or his information reliable; (2) the record must contain
the informant's statement in language that is factual rather than
conclusionary and must establish by its specifity [sic] that the in-
formant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained in
such statement. 435
After the decision in Wolff however, the First Circuit, , in McLaughlin v. Hal1, 136
abandoned the Gomes test on the grounds that Wolff left the "development of
specific procedural requirements" to the prison authorities."'
The response of the prison officials can be seen in the survey. Only fifteen
of the handbooks have specific provisions for the admission of information from
unidentified informants. 438
 The requirements, generally, are (1) that the infor-
mation be corroborated by other evidence, (2) that a finding be made that the
informant is credible, and (3) that a finding be made that the information is
reliable. 439
 At least one Oregon case has held that the board failed to make suf-
ficient findings as to the reliability of the information. 440
 In Allen v. Oregon State
Penitentiary, Corrections Division, 44 ' the disciplinary report contained information
from an informant who had given reliabile information in the past."'
4" 455 F. Supp. at 770.
If the disciplinary committee is to rely on informants' statements, it will have to
have before it at least the name and actual written statement of the informant, so
that the information or charge may be explored, if necessary, by the committee,
the informant questioned further, if necessary, and for some minimal assurance
that a determination of fact is not based on error or deception.
Id.
"4 510 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1974).
493
	 at 540.
436 520 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1975).
497 Id. at 385.
438 Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mon-
tana, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington and
Wisconsin. Wisconsin is the only state which requires that the informant give his information
under oath.
4" See, e.g., Louisiana Department of Corrections, Disciplinary Rules and Procedures
for Adult Prisoners, at 9-10 (1979). Ten jurisdictions use at least one or two of these tests, but
Rhode Island is the only other state which lists all three tests.
44°
 Allen v. Oregon State Penitentiary, Corrections Division, 33 Or. App. 427, 430, 576
P.2d 831, 833 (1978).
441 Id.
"2 Id. at 429, 596 P.2d at 832.
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However, on this occasion the officer did not appear at the hearing to cor-
roborate the report, and there was no indication in the report of the basis for
determining that the present information was reliable. 443
 Therefore, the court
vacated the board's finding of guilt. Massachusetts requires a finding that dis-
closure of the informant's identity would subject him to a risk of harm. 444
Where such a finding is made, nine states still give the accused a summary of
the information, provided it would not lead to disclosure of the informant's
identity."'
Hearsay testimony is excluded in court trials because the Anglo-American
tradition requires that a witness' credibility must be tested under three condi-
tions: the taking of an oath, personal presence at the trial, and cross-examina-
tion. 446
 If the witness is not present, the factfinders cannot view his demeanor,
have none of the assurance an oath brings and will not see the witness tested by
cross-examination. 447
 Further, mistakes can be made in the transmittal of hear-
say testimony. 448
 Witnesses at disciplinary hearings do not have to take an
oath, but the other justifications for the rule apply. Nevertheless, hearsay is ad-
mitted, and in most jurisdictions, the only restriction is that the testimony must
be relevant. Two courts require corroboration of hearsay, but at least some
jurisdictions in the survey allow a finding of guilt to rest on the officers' written
reports alone. With regard to testimony from unidentified informants, only ten
jurisdictions require a finding of credibility or reliability."' Thus, in most
jurisdictions inmates are not protected from the dangers of using hearsay evi-
dence and can be found guilty of a prison violation based completely on second
hand reports.
A second evidentiary issue involves the production of real evidence. The
question is whether the prison must produce physical evidence, where relevant,
in order to prove its case. For example, where an inmate has been accused of
possession of contraband and at the hearing he demands that the officials pro-
duce the item, the question whether the contraband must be presented arises.
In Finney the court stated that "if physical evidence in the possession of prison
officers is involved in, or crucial to, the determination, such as weapons or con-
443 Id.
444
 Massachusetts Code of Human Resources Regulations, tit. 3, ch. IV,
S 430.13(a)(1). Oregon had a similar regulation, and the Oregon Court of Appeals held in Still-
ing v. Oregon State Prison, Corrections Division, 33 Or. App. 3, 514 P.2d 352 (1978), that the
information could not be used because the board did not have good cause to believe that reveal-
ing the informant's name would subject him to harm. Id. at 6-7, 574 P.2d at 353. Since that time,
however, the regulation has been omitted from the amended Oregon handbook.
"' Alabama, California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, South Carolina and Wisconsin.
446 C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE 581 (2d ed. 1972).
447 R, LEMPERT AND S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 335
(1977).
446 Id. at 336.
4" See note 439 supra.
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traband, then that evidence should be presented to and considered by the com-
mittee.'' 45° Consistent with that holding is Hignite v. Oregon Slate Penitentiary,
Corrections Division,"' in which the court ruled that an inmate charged with
drug abuse had a right to demand production of the results of his urine test. 452
The board had failed to produce the results, and the court reversed the board's
finding of guilt."'
Only two of the reviewed regulations, however, require the prison either
to produce physical evidence or a reasonable facsimile thereof. The West
Virginia regulation provides that, where the inmate has been accused of pos-
session of contraband, it must be produced at the hearing, 454 and in Tennessee
the regulation states that the inmate will be "confronted with the physical evi-
dence, if any, or a sample thereof." 455 Thus, while some case law supports the
view that the prisons must produce physical evidence which is involved in the
determination of guilt, 456
 the regulations indicate that almost none of the
prisons have adopted that practice. Indeed, as this section has shown, in many
jurisdictions an inmate can be found guilty of possession of a weapon even
though the only evidence is an officer's report stating that the inmate possessed
a weapon.
D. The Case for the Accused
After the prison officials have presented the evidence against the accused
inmate, he has the opportunity to respond to the charges. 457
 The prisoner's
right to be assisted in presenting evidence to the board is discussed in Section
IV and need not be repeated here. What remains to be discussed is the accused's
right to present evidence in the form of witnesses and documentary evidence,
and the right to confrontation and cross-examination.
450
 455 F. Supp. at 769.
431
 33 Or. App. 305, 576 P.2d 798 (1978).
4" Id. at 307, 576 P.2d at 799.
4" Id.
454 If it has been destroyed or stolen, the employee with the best knowledge of the
destruction or stealing may testify as to that fact. West Virginia Department of Corrections,
Rules and Regulations Governing Inmates of the West Virginia Penitentiary, 10(c) (1980).
45 ' Tennessee Department of Correction, 5 4.601.4(a). Wisconsin is the only other state
which has addressed the issue, and its regulation places the production of physical evidence
within the discretion of the board.
456
 In a recent case, Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1981), the Seventh Circuit
held that the prison also must disclose to the accused inmates prior to the hearing any exculpatory
evidence which is material to the issue of guilt. Id. at 1285-86. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963). Chavis was accused of assaulting an officer. 643 F.2d at 1283. The investigatory
report prepared by the prison contained the results of a polygraph examination given to another
inmate. The test indicated that the inmate was telling the truth when he identified a third
prisoner as having assaulted the officer. Id. at 1284. Although the disciplinary committee was
given a copy of the report, the court held that "Chavis was deprived of his ability to make his own
use of this exculpatory evidence before it was given to the fact-finders." Id. at 1286.
437
 In Walker v. Hughes, 386 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich. 1974), modified, 558 F.2d 1247
(6th Cir. 1977), the court stated that the inmate "must also be entitled to make a statement in his
own behalf." Id. at 41.
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In Wolff the Supreme Court declared that inmates must be afforded the
right to call witnesses and present evidence, provided it will not jeopardize
prison security or interfere with correctional goals."'
Thus the constitutional right to call witnesses and introduce evidence in a
disciplinary hearing is a limited right. The Supreme Court referred to it as such
in Baxter v. Palmigiano. 459
 Just where the limits lie, however, is something of an
open question. Some of the issues which have been raised in this area include
whether any courts have gone beyond Wolff in guaranteeing inmates the exer-
cise of that limited right; the reasons used for excluding witnesses from disci-
plinary hearings; the kind of documentary evidence that is admissible; whether
prisoners may obtain written statements from witnesses in lieu of their ap-
pearance at the hearing; and, whether disciplinary boards must provide in-
mates with written reasons for the exclusion of witnesses.
A very important question left somewhat open by Wolff is what reasons
can be used for excluding witnesses from testifying. Wolff established that wit-
nesses may be excluded if their presence at the hearing would be "unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. "460 Wolff went on to
describe "irrelevance, lack of necessity or the hazards presented in individual
cases" as reasons for the denial of witnesses."'
With the possible exception of irrelevance, the above standards are vague,
giving prison officials a great deal of discretion. Furthermore, there has not
been a significant amount of judicial interpretation of the standard. In Green v.
Nelson, 462
 the court reversed a disciplinary board's denial of three employee
eyewitnesses on the basis that their testimony was merely cumulative. 463
 The
court found it doubtful that the incident report and the inmate's testimony
"alone constituted a sufficient basis for the committee's finding of" guilt. 464
Stating that the test for determining whether a witness is "necessary" is
whether he "may offer testimony that will influence the decision of the disci-
plinary committee," the court held that the employees' testimony was cor-
436
	 U.S. at 566. Wolff stated that:
[T]he inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so
will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. . . .
[T]he unrestricted right to call witnesses from the prison population carries ob-
vious potential for disruption and for interference with the swift punishment that
in individual cases may be essential to carrying out the correctional program of the
institution. . . Prison officials must have the necessity 'sic] discretion to keep
the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may create
a risk of reprisal or undermine authority as well as to limit access to other inmates
to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence.
Id.
439
 425 U.S. 308, 321 (1976).
466 418 U.S. at 566.
46' Id.
462
 442 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Conn. 1977).
463 Id. at 1056.
464 Id. at 1057.
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roborative and not merely cumulative."' This test, however, is not substantial-
ly less vague than the standard from which it is derived. As to whether a
witness is unduly hazardous to institutional safety, the district court in Baxter v.
Lewis466 upheld a disciplinary board's denial of a witness who was in solitary
confinement."' The reason given by the board for the denial was the security
of the institution, and the court deferred to the discretion of the board in deter-
mining that the witness posed a threat to security.'"
The survey reveals that prison regulations are no more definite than the
case law. The three main reasons allowed for the denial of an inmate's
witnesses are lack of relevance, the testimony would be repetitious or cumula-
tive, and the safety and security of the witness or institution may be
threatened. 469 These reasons match very closely the reasons suggested in Woff:
irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in individual cases.
These standards are vague, and they give prison officials wide discretion in de-
nying witnesses.
Although courts have been reluctant to define the scope of an inmate's
right to call witnesses, there has been some case law subsequent to Wolff which
has helped to guarantee the inmate's right where it is deemed to exist. In Powell
v. Ward47° the Southern District of New York held that prison officials "have
an obligation to inform inmates that they are entitled to call witnesses" at
disciplinary hearings."'" Additionally, two other district courts, in Green v.
Nelson472 and Finney v. Mabry, 473 have held that prison officials must obtain af-
fidavits from witnesses whom the officials should know will be unable to attend
the hearing. 474 Such a practice safeguards an accused whose witnesses may be
released or transferred prior to the hearing. In Murphy v. Wheaton, 475 however,
another district court expressed concern that the prison might be abusing the
option of taking witnesses' statements when the witnesses were in fact available
for the hearings. 476 It held that the officials' discretion to interview the
accused's witnesses rather than allow them to appear at the hearing "should
only be used in exceptional circumstances. "477
4" Id.
466 421 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. W. Va. 1976).
467 Id. at 507.
468 Id.
469 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, the District of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons.
4" 392 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 542 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1976).
17 ' Id. at 632.
472 442 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Conn. 1977).
473 455 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
4" See Section VI.0 supra.
475
	
F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
476
	
at 1256-57.
477 Id. at 1257. The court was citing from Adams v. Carlson, 375 F. Supp. 1228,
1238-39 (E.D. Ill. 1974).
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A final consideration in protecting the accused's right to call witnesses is
preventing reprisals against inmates who testify. A prisoner who fears reprisals
by prison officials, naturally, will not appear as a witness for another inmate.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in Lamb v. Hutto, 478
 held
that the officials do not have the right to punish an inmate-witness after the
witness has testified. 47g Lamb filed a civil rights complaint alleging, inter alia,
that he had been transferred to another institution for refusing to retract his
statement on behalf of another inmate. 480
 On motion for summary judgment,
the court found that Lamb had stated an actionable first amendment claim."'
The burden then shifted to the state to prove that Lamb had been transferred
for constitutionally permissible reasons. 482
 The state alleged that Lamb's
'transfer was the result of his participation in a subsequent prison disturbance,
and because the allegation was not rebutted by Lamb, summary judgment was
granted. 483
 This case illustrates the reason for reluctance of inmates to testify at
disciplinary hearings. It would be small consolation to a prisoner to know that
if reprisals are taken, he can file a federal civil rights complaint alleging viola-
tion of his first amendment rights.
Wolff placed the same vague restrictions on the introduction of documen-
tary evidence as it placed on the testimony of witnesses. As a result, similar
questions are raised regarding the types of documentary evidence that are ad-
missible. 484
 There is a scarcity of case law on the issue of the admissibility of
documentary evidence, and logically different rules should apply to different
types of evidence. Therefore, it is difficult to determine what tests are applied.
A form of documentary evidence which is common and very important to
prisoners is the written affidavit of a witness. In the preceding subsection, the
duty of prison officials to obtain written statements from witnesses who would
not be available at the hearing was discussed. 483
 A related question is whether
affidavits obtained by the accused, rather than the officials, are admissible.
Wolff addressed the question of inmate-obtained affidavits in part by stating
that "prison officials must have the necessity [sic] discretion . . . to limit ac-
cess to other inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary
evidence. " 486
 The extent of official discretion, however, remained open.
478 467 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Va. 1979).
47°
 Id, at 565.
48° Id. at 564.
48 ' Id. at 565.
487 Id.
"3
 Id. at 565-66.
484
 An example of the type of documentary evidence offered at a disciplinary hearing is a
call-out pass. An inmate may be charged with not reporting to his work assignment on time. The
inmate may have had a valid reason for not reporting, such as an appointment with his classifica-
tion officer. If the prisoner has a call-out pass signed by the classification officer, that pass may be
presented to the disciplinary board as evidence that the accused had a valid reason for not report-
ing for work.
"5 Green v. Nelson, 442 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Conn. 1977) and Finney v. Mabry, 455 F.
Supp. 756 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
406 418 U.S. at 566.
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The main reason for concern by officials is the fear that the accused will
obtain the affidavits by intimidation and threats of reprisal.'" An example is a
situation in which one inmate has been charged with assaulting a second in-
mate. Officials are concerned that the first inmate will try to extort from the
victim an affidavit which exonerates the first inmate. This problem was ad-
dressed in Chochrek v. Oregon State Penitentiary, Corrections Division. 488
 The board
had disallowed the admission of personally solicited affidavits, although there
was no rule prohibiting such USC. 4" The court reversed, holding that "[t]here
may have been valid factual reasons for viewing with distrust the affidavits
presented by the [inmate], but the fact remains that the committee's finding
was predicated on a nonexistent rule." 49° It is unclear from the opinion, but
the implication is that the court would have affirmed the board's decision if it
had stated in the record "valid factual reasons" for the exclusion. Unfor-
tunately, the court did not state what it would consider to be a valid reason.
Even if the court had described what constitutes a valid reason for exclusion,
however, its applicability probably could not have been extended beyond the
unique circumstances of inmate-obtained affidavits.
In a series of cases, the Oregon courts dealt with a somewhat more
unusual evidentiary issue — whether polygraph examination results are ad-
missible. The courts have found four valid reasons for the denial by the prison
of a request for a polygraph examination, but these reasons cannot be carried
over to other types of evidence. The reasons accepted by the courts are that
polygraph test results are not generally accepted as accurate; there are not
enough polygraph operators to provide tests for every inmate who has a hear-
ing; 491
 the equipment is unavailable; and the time and expense of administer-
ing a test is disproportionate to the probative value of the results. 492
 These fac-
tors were then considered by the court "in conjunction with the necessity of a
polygraph examination to resolve issues presented in the hearing." 493
Only eleven of the jurisdictions surveyed allow the admission of written
statements in lieu of the witnesses' appearance, 494
 with six states limiting the
option to instances when the witness is unavailable. 495
 It is unclear from the
487
 Statement made to the writer by a correctional officer at the Lorton Correctional
Complex,
488
 21 Or, App. 406, 534 P.2d 1175 (1975).
"9 Id. at 407, 534 P.2d at 1176.
"8 Id.
"' Sandlin v. Oregon Women's Correctional Center, Corrections Division, 28 Or.
App. 519, 522, 559 P.2d 1308, 1310 (1977).
492 Bishop v. Oregon State Prison, Corrections Division, 35 Or. App. 315, 318, 581
P.2d 122, 124 (1978).
493 Id.
194
 Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. In addition,
Maryland has a provision for a conference call to obtain testimony from witnesses otherwise
unavailable.
495 Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, Wisconsin and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons.
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regulations, however, whether the statement is taken by an official or by the ac-
cused. On the other hand, two states allow the prison to use unavailability as a
reason for denial of a requested witness, without specifically allowing a written
statement from the witness. 496 The survey indicates, therefore, that the prisons
generally do not allow inmate-obtained affidavits to be used as evidence. Only
one state in the survey has a regulation regarding polygraph tests. In South
Carolina, the board may request that the inmate submit to an examination.
However, the test results cannot be the sole evidence of guilt, and if the inmate
refuses to take the test, no adverse inference is permitted. 497
The final issue is whether the disciplinary committee must provide written
reasons for the exclusion of witnesses. Wolff suggested that it "would be useful
for the Committee to state its reason for refusing to call a witness," 4" although
the Court would not make it a requirement. The Court maintained that posi-
tion in Baxter . 499 The District Court for New Hampshire, however, in Daigle v.
Helgemoe,"° required that the board enter an explanation for its denial into the
record and make it available to the prisoner,'" and in McGinnes v. Stevens , 5°2 the
Alaska Supreme Court, basing its conclusion on the Alaska Constitution, held
that disciplinary panels in that state must make the reasons for their denial of
witnesses a part of the record."' The Seventh Circuit established a middle
ground between requiring a written statement of the reasons and allowing
complete discretion. In Hayes v. Walker,'" the court expressed its concern
regarding the lack of information in the record indicating whether the board
even had reviewed the request for witnesses before denying it." For the pur-
poses of judicial review of the board's decisions, therefore, the court required
that there be some support in the record for a board's decisions, although the
court explicitly declared that a statement of reasons was unnecessary. 506
The prison systems for the most part do not require written reasons. Of
the jurisdictions in the survey, only fourteen require written reasons for the
denial of witnesses."' Two other states encourage such a procedure without
496 Alabama and Vermont.
497 South Carolina Department of Corrections, Inmate Guide, 5 3.7(c) (1977).
498 418 U.S. at 566.
499 425 U.S. at 322.
500 399 F. Supp. 416 (D.N.H. 1975).
591 Id. at 421.
502 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975).
503 Id. at 1231.
504 555 F.2d at 625 (7th Cir. 1977).
505 Id. at 630.
506 Id.
We are not requiring that a statement of reasons be given to support the denial of a
request for witnesses. We hold only that some support for the denial of a request
for witnesses appear in the record. This will enable a court to make limited inquiry
into whether the broad discretion of prison officials has been arbitrarily exercised.
Prison officials should look at each proposed witness and determine whether or not
he should be allowed to testify.
Id.
605 Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, the District of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons.
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making it mandatory."' The result, therefore, is that most prisons still have
the power arbitrarily to deny requests for witnesses with no written record
available for either administrative or judicial review. This practice raises one of
the most serious impediments to due process in disciplinary proceedings.
In sum, the standards for determining what evidence a prisoner may pre-
sent at a disciplinary hearing are not very much clearer than they were im-
mediately following the Wolff decision. There have been some decisions which
have helped to protect the right to call witnesses but the reasons for which the
prisons may refuse to allow a witness to testify are still vague, leaving the com-
mittees with too much discretion. Furthermore, very little law exists on the
question of the admissibility of documentary evidence. With respect to inmate-
obtained affidavits, however, the prisons in the survey generally do not admit
them into evidence. Finally, the majority of prisons still do not require written
reasons for the denial of witnesses, thereby insuring that arbitrary denials can-
not be reviewed.
2. Confrontation and Cross-Examination
Wolff held that inmates do not have a constitutional right to confrontation
and cross-examination in disciplinary hearings:
If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence
against the inmate were to be allowed as a matter of course, as in
criminal trials, there would be considerable potential for havoc in-
side prison walls. Proceedings would inevitably be longer and tend
to unmanageability. . [I]t does not appear that confrontation
and cross-examination are generally required in this context. We
think that the Constitution should not be read to impose the pro-
cedure at the present time and that adequate bases for decision in
prison disciplinary cases can be arrived at without cross-
examination.
. . The better course at this time, in a period where prison prac-
tices are diverse and somewhat experimental, is to leave these mat-
ters to the sound discretion of the officials of state prisons." 9
This decision, however, has been sharply criticized. After the holding in Wolff,
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Murphy o. Wheason51 °
strongly disagreed with the Supreme Court's decision to disallow confrontation
and cross-examination:
While we are bound by these decisions, we are constrained to
observe that the reasons given for denying the traditional right of an
accused to confront and cross-examine his accusers are something
less than overwhelmingly persuasive. . . . [S]taff or inmate
witnesses may be in error as to their recollection of past events
"8 Florida and Hawaii.
5 ° 8
 418 U.S. at 567-69.
5 " 381 F. Sup!). 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
1072	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:1009
whether inadvertently or deliberately. Since the possible punish-
ment . . may be severe . . . it is no less important to seek to
ascertain the truth in disciplinary proceedings than it is in criminal
trials.
No experienced penologist or inmate would seriously contend
that the identity of a staff or inmate witness is likely to remain a
secret from the accused for very long. The circumstances of any inci-
dent giving rise to disciplinary proceedings necessarily limits the
potential witnesses to those present. In addition, prison "grape-
vines" are much too effective to achieve that degree of secrecy in
most instances. Protection against possible retaliation requires more
than non-confrontation while its denial may well result in
injustice.'"
In addition to this stinging attack on Wolff, the Alaska Supreme Court jabbed
at the decision. In McGinnes v. Stevens, 512 it held that its state constitution re-
quires confrontation and cross-examination in disciplinary hearings, unless
there are "compelling reasons" to deny it.'"
Subsequent to Murphy and McGinnes the United States Supreme Court
again considered the issue of confrontation and cross-examination in disci-
plinary hearings in Baxter v. Palmigiano. 514 There, the Court maintained the
position it had taken in Woff.'" The lower court in Baxter had required written
reasons for the denial of the privilege to confront and cross-examine
witnesses.'" If the reasons did not relate to at least one of the concerns express-
ly mentioned in Wolff, the denial would be deemed an abuse of discretion.'"
The lower court in Baxter also had required that the board base its decision sole-
ly on the evidence presented at the hearing, reasoning that, otherwise, confron-
tation and cross-examination would be meaningless.'" The Supreme Court,
however, reversed, stating that the lower court's holding was "inconsistent
with Wolff  " 5 " The Court reasoned that a requirement of written reasons for
the denial of the privilege had the effect of "[m]andating confrontation and
cross-examination, except where prison officials can justify their denial on one
or more grounds that appeal to judges, effectively preempt[ing] the area that
Wolff left to the sound discretion of prison officials." 52° Additionally, because it
had held that no right to confrontation and cross-examination exists in disci-
plinary hearings, the Court held that the Board may consider information that
5 " Id. at 1258.
5 ' 2 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975).
5 " Id. at 1231.
51 + 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
5 ' 5 425 U.S. at 322.
Id.
Id.
518 Id. at n.5.
7'9 Id. at 322.
320 Id.
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was not brought up at the hearing when deciding the case. 521 Thus, in Wolff
and Baxter, the Supreme Court has made it clear that prison authorities do not
have to permit confrontation and cross-examination, do not have to give writ-
ten reasons for the denial thereof, and may consider facts which come to light
after the hearing.
Nevertheless, the grumblings of rebellion have continued in the lower
courts. Subsequent to Baxter, Green v. Nelsons" upheld an earlier Second Cir-
cuit case which gave an accused prisoner the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses "if the factfinder cannot otherwise rationally deter-
mine the facts." 523 Additionally, in Daigle v. Hal1, 524 the Federal District Court
in Massachusetts held that where testimony is not given directly by the
witnesses, such as confidential informants, the testimony "nevertheless must
be revealed to the inmate with sufficient detail to permit the inmate to rebut it
intelligently. "525
As for state regulations, the survey indicates that thirty jurisdictions allow
the accused or his representative to question either all witnesses who appear at
the hearing, or at least the charging officer. 526 Two other states allow the accused
to submit questions to the board to be asked of adverse witnesses prior to the
hearing. 527 In those jurisdictions where the inmate is permitted to cross-
examine all witnesses who appear at the hearing, however, the officials still
have the discretion to accept written statements from confidential informants
rather than having the person testify at the hearing. 528 In some of these juris-
dictions, furthermore, the charging officer is not required to appear because his
written report is deemed sufficient. 529 Most disciplinary reports are written
because the charging officer saw the incident or because information was
received from a confidential informant. Where the report is submitted to the
board in lieu of testimony, therefore, allowing the accused the right to cross-
52 ' Id.
Due to the peculiar environment of the prison setting, it may be that certain facts
relevant to the disciplinary determination do not come to light until after the for-
mal hearing. It would be unduly restrictive to require that such facts be excluded
from consideration, inasmuch as they may provide valuable information with
respect to the incident in question and may assist prison officials in tailoring
penalties to enhance correctional goals.
Id.
522 442 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Conn. 1977).
323 Id. at 1057.
524 387 F. Supp. 652 (D. Mass. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 564 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1975).
525 Id. at 660.
526 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho (only when criminal charges are pending), Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia.
S 27 Illinois and Michigan. Colorado and Georgia provide for written questions when
having the charging officer appear at the hearing is impractical.
528 See text and notes at notes 426-49 supra.
528 See text and notes at notes 271-73, 371-74, 421-25 supra.
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examine all witnesses who appear at the hearing is a meaningless concession in
most cases. Thus, prisons can be liberal in allowing cross-examination in their
rules because they have the discretion to accept written reports and statements
in lieu of requiring adverse witnesses to appear at the hearing.
If, however, prison officials in a jurisdiction that allows cross-examination
want to deny a prisoner that right, generally they are free to do so without ex-
planation. Only five of the jurisdictions in the survey which permit confronta-
tion and cross-examination require written reasons for its denial. 53° Another
state encourages the practice but does not make it mandatory."' Permissible
reasons for denying cross-examination in these states are the same as the
reasons used for denying witnesses — irrelevance, lack of necessity and need
for security. Here, however, safety and security are more heavily
emphasized. 532
Finally, while the Supreme Court has given the prisons the authority to
consider facts which come to light after the disciplinary hearing, fourteen juris-
dictions in the survey restrict the board to considering only evidence which is
produced at the hearing. 533 This also is a minor concession inasmuch as the
standard of guilt and the allowance of written reports would eliminate the
necessity in most cases of further information to find the accused guilty. Never-
theless, twenty-eight jurisdictions in the survey have not restricted the panel to
considering only that evidence produced at the hearing. 534
In sum, an accused inmate has few tools with which to mount a defense.
The Supreme Court has not required confrontation and cross-examination and
has left the development of that aspect of disciplinary hearings to the discretion
of the prison systems. Some lower courts have disagreed with the Supreme
Court's decision and many prisons now allow cross-examination, but because
those same prisons do not require the appearance of confidential informants
and often the officers' reports are sufficient, the right to cross-examine is mean-
ingless. The majority of the jurisdictions which allow cross-examination, fur-
thermore, do not require written reasons for its refusal. Finally, in conform-
"° Alaska, California, Indiana, Massachusetts (the regulation requires written reasons
for denial of a request for the appearance of the charging officer which, in effect, serves as a
denial of cross-examination), and the District of Columbia.
531 Hawaii.
"' E.g., the Alabama regulations provide that the chairman of the disciplinary board is
responsible for ensuring that the accused is advised of his right "to question • . . accuser(s)
unless personal safety of witness or prison security is threatened." Section III.4.d(c). Another
subsection provides that "[q]uestions may be asked of any person called to the hearing. The
chairman will exercise control of all questioning to prevent lack of relevance, harassment, abuse,
or repetitiveness." III.4.d.(6)(e).
5" Alaska, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana,
Mississippi, Nevada, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia.
"4 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
West Virginia, Vermont and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Colorado, Georgia and Hawaii
specifically allow the board to seek evidence after the hearing.
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ante with Baxter, most prisons do not restrict the boards to consideration of only
that evidence obtained at the hearing.
E. Written Statement
A procedural right provided by Wolff is the right to a "written statement
of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disci-
plinary action taken." 535
 In establishing this right, the Court was concerned
with providing an accurate factual record for administrative and judicial
review purposes. 536
Some of the issues which have arisen with regard to written statements in-
clude whether the inmate has a right to a copy of the statement; what must be
included in the statement; if the inmate has a right to a copy, how soon after
the hearing must it be received; and whether a tape recording may satisfy the
written statement requirement.
Wolff does not specifically state that a copy of the written statement must
be given to the inmate. It does, however, imply that an inmate is entitled to a
copy. First, the decision states that "[w]ithout written records, the inmate will
be at a severe disadvantage in propounding his own cause to or defending
himself from others." 537
 It is logical that an inmate would need a copy of the
statement for it to be useful in helping the inmate to propound his cause or to
defend himself. Second, the Court went on to provide that certain items of
evidence could be excluded from the statement when personal or institutional
safety is implicated. 538
 The Court would not have been concerned with per-
sonal or institutional safety if only the prison administration were to see the
written statement. The implication is clear, therefore, that the inmate is sup-
posed to receive a copy of the statement, and for that reason, certain items of
evidence, such as an informant's identity, may be excluded.
535
 418 U.S. at 563.
"6 Id. at 565.
Although Nebraska does not seem to provide administrative review of the action
taken by the Adjustment Committee, the actions taken at such proceedings may
involve review by other bodies. They might furnish the basis of a decision by the
Director of Corrections to transfer an inmate to another institution . . and are
certainly likely to be considered by the state parole authorities in making parole
decisions. Written records of proceedings will thus protect the inmate against col-
lateral consequences based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the original
proceeding. Further, as to the disciplinary action itself, the provision for a written
record helps to insure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state of-
ficials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental constitu-
tional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly.
Id. The right to a written statement was not an issue in Baxter. The Court, however, did hold that
a disciplinary committee may consider evidence which comes to light after the hearing. 425 U.S.
at 322 n.5. As a result of that holding, the Court found it was necessary to clarify that such a
holding did not, in any way, diminish the right to a written statement. Id.
537 Id.
"e Id.
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The District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee is in accord with
this interpretation of Wolff. In Bills v. Henderson, 539 the court held that "the
written record cannot satisfy due process requirements unless it is certain that
the inmate has complete and full access to it. Such access is assured only if the
record is in fact furnished to him. ',SC)
There has been no case law holding that inmates do not have a right to a
copy of the written statement. Four of the states surveyed, however, do not
specifically provide for a copy to be given to the prisoner."' One of the above
four states, Florida, does make a specific provision for an oral statement to the
prisoner. 542 Additionally, in Lightfoot v. Wainwright, 543 a Florida appellate court
held that inmates have the right to a copy of the written statement. 544
As to the contents of the statement, Finney v. Mably545 is one of many cases
which have held that it must be more than a mere "rote recitation of shorthand
phrases. " 546 Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections 547 held that it must "be
reported in such a manner that a reviewing authority could determine what
had transpired.' '548 In Greyer v. Oregon State Correctional Institution, Corrections Di-
vision, 549 an Oregon court required that the statement reflect a finding on each
charge."° The inmate had been found guilty on one charge, and the board
stated that it had made no finding on the second charge. The court found this
too ambiguous and stated that the record should clearly indicate the disposition
of all charges."'
A problem arises, however, when the board's decision is based, at least in
part, on information from a confidential informant. Bills held that "it is not
constitutionally required that such a statement contain the names of all
witnesses, especially when the security of the institution mandates
otherwise. 1552 To avoid that problem, the court gave the board the authority to
prepare separate written records, one for the prisoner and one for the prison of-
ficials, with the names of confidential informants deleted from the inmate's
copy."' Where information is excluded, that fact should be indicated in the
statement554 so that the inmate is not misled in preparing any possible appeal.
339 446 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
"° Id. at 976.
54 ' Arkansas, Florida, Rhode Island and Tennessee. The Indiana regulations do not
provide for a copy to the inmate, but the form used for preparing the statement has a place for the
inmate to sign, indicating that he received his copy.
5" Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation, Rules, ch. 33, 5 3.08(13)(1) (1977).
343 369 So.2d 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
544 Id at III.
5" 455 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
346
	 at 776. See also Green v. Nelson, 442 F. Supp, 1047, 1058 (D. Conn. 1977) and
Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 633 (7th Cir. 1977).
5 " 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
"' Id: at 208.
549 28 Or. App. 829, 561 P.2d 669 (1977).
55° Id. at 835-36, 561 P.2d at 673.
55"
"2 446 F. Supp. at 976.
s" Id.
334 418 U.S. at 565.
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A related issue is when the inmate is entitled to receive the statement. If
the statement's purpose is to assist in reviewing the board's action, it would
seem reasonable that the copy should be received prior to any review or appeal.
A Maine case, Carlson u. Oliuer, 5" offers an illustration of the purpose of the
written statement. The prisoner alleged procedural violations at his disci-
plinary hearing, including failure of the institution to provide him with a copy
of the statement. 556 The court denied the claim because the prisoner had filed
his appeal immediately after the board's decision without waiting for the writ-
ten statement. 557 One of the purposes of the statement is to assist the inmate in
preparing an appeal of the board's decision. By immediately filing his appeal
without waiting for the written statement, the inmate indicated that he did not
need it. None of the regulations in the survey, however, specifically states that
the statement must be received prior to any review or appeal, but twelve states
have established a time limit, varying from one to five days.'" Five jurisdic-
tions require receipt "immediately" or "as soon as possible," 559 and two states
provide for a copy as soon as it is prepared. 56°
One method of simplifying the requirement of drafting a written state-
ment would be to tape record the proceedings. Nine jurisdictions in the survey
provide that the hearings be tape recorded. 56 ' Three states allow the prisoner to
tape the hearing. 562 Five of the jurisdictions specify the length of time the tapes
are to be kept. 563 Of those jurisdictions in which the prison, not the inmate,
tapes the proceedings, only two jurisdictions require that the inmate is to have
access to the tape to assist in preparing an appeal.'"
Case law indicates that at least two other states provide for taping of disci-
plinary hearings. First, Hurley u. Ward 665 involved a disciplinary hearing in
New York, a state that did not participate in the survey. There the court was
unable to properly review the hearing because the attempt to record it had been
" 5 372 A.2d 226 (Me. 1977).
"6 Id. at 230.
557 Id. The opinion also implies that the inmate received a written statement subsequent
to the filing of the appeal.
5 " Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississip-
pi, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington.
559 Arizona, Kentucky, Michigan, Virginia and the District of Columbia.
560 Idaho and New Hampshire.
561 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia and
the District of Columbia. The Alaska regulation requiring tape recordings was mandated by the
Alaska Supreme Court in McGinnes v. Stevens, 534 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975):
A verbatim record of the proceedings will furnish a more complete and accurate
source of information than the " written statement" requirement of Wolff, will
assist in facilitating a more intelligent review of the disciplinary proceeding, and
moreover, the use of cassettes . . . may well prove less burdensome than the writ-
ten statement requirement.
Id. at 1236.
562 Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Washington. In all three states, the prison takes
possession of the tape with access to the inmate only for preparation of an appeal.
563 Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Nevada and the District of Columbia.
564 Nevada and the District of Columbia.
565 61 A.D.2d 881, 402 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1978).
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inadequate. Coupled with other procedural errors, the faulty recording caused
the court to void the decision of the disciplinary board.'" Second, while Arkan-
sas is part of the survey, its regulations do not specify a tape recording. In Fin-
ney v. Mabry, 567
 however, the court sanctioned its use, specifying that the tapes
"be carefully kept, filed, and maintained. "568
Although many states allow tape recording, it is not clear that a recording
can serve as a substitute for a written statement. Dean v. Oregon State Correctional
Institution, Corrections Division569
 raised the question whether a tape recording, or
a transcript of the recording, is sufficient to satisfy the written statement re-
quirement. The record on appeal in that case included a transcript of the hear-
ing. The Oregon court held that the inclusion of the transcript made a written
statement of the evidence relied upon by the board unnecessary."° The court
also held, however, that the transcript did not alter the requirement of a writ-
ten statement of the board's reasons for its decision. 57 '
The use of a tape recording is beneficial to inmates because it facilitates a
more intelligent review of the proceeding. A recording thus prevents a hearing
board from acting arbitrarily and in violation of the inmate's rights. To insure
its value, however, two measures must be taken. First, the prisons must be re-
quired to keep the tapes for a specific period of time so that they will be
available for review. As already pointed out, only five prisons in the survey
have such a requirement. Second, if the recordings are going to replace the
written statements, the inmates must have access to the tapes. In the survey, as
already seen, three states allow the inmate to tape the hearing and only two
jurisdictions require that the inmate have access to the prison's tape.
It is clear, therefore, that inmates do have the right to a copy of the written
statement. While the statement need not contain the names of informants, it
must be more than a mere "rote recitation of shorthand phrases." Because the
purpose of the statement is to assist in reviewing the board's action, it is logical
that the inmate should receive his copy prior to review. Only eight states in the
survey, however, have established time limits for receipt of the statement.
Finally, some states now provide for the tape recording of hearings, and some
courts have held that a tape satisfies the statement requirement. Most jurisdic-
tions are unclear, however, as to whether the prisoner has access to the record-
ing prior to review or appeal of the proceedings.
VII. PENALTIES
The Supreme Court held in Wolff that minimum due process applies to
disciplinary proceedings in which the inmate, if found guilty, could be punished
by such major penalties as loss of good time or by solitary confinement. 572
5" Id. at 881, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
" 7 455 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
569 Id. at 776. The court delayed until a later date a decision as to how long the tapes
must be kept and required that until such time they must be kept indefinitely. Id.
569 533 P.2d 191 (Or. App. 1975).
"0 Id. at 192.
"' Id.
"2 418 U.S. at 539, 557-58, 571 n.19.
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While other lesser penalties such as loss of privileges did not, in the Wolff
Court's view, require these procedural protections, a majority of lower courts
have extended due process to all forms of disciplinary segregation. There are
questions, however, regarding penalties. This section will address the issues
whether an inmate has a right to prior notice of the penalties that may be ap-
plied for a specific violation; what information the board may consider before
imposing punishment; and whether a court will review a penalty imposed by a
disciplinary board and, if so, what the standard of review is.
As pointed out above, due process requires advance notice to the inmates
of what behavior constitutes misconduct."' There is some indication that ad-
vance notice of possible penalties also is required. In Collins v. Vitek, 574 for in-
stance, the inmates alleged in the Federal District Court for New Hampshire
that the failure to establish "written standards for the punishment to be in-
flicted for specific offenses" 575 was a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Even though the court dismissed that cause of action, it indicated by the follow-
ing dictum that some standards should be established. Specifically, the court
stated: "Although sentencing has traditionally been an area given much
discretion, even judges are limited by statutory standards. Prisoners have a
right to know the scope of punishment possible for infractions. Moreover, writ-
ten guidelines may well serve to eliminate the equal protection problems in-
herent in a standardless sentencing procedure." 576 In Newkirk v. Butler577 the
District Court for the Southern District of New York went beyond this dictum
and held that prisons must inform the inmates of the penalties which can be im-
posed. 578 Newkirk involved an action by inmates for relief from unconstitutional
punishment. 579 The court held that the prisoners have a right to know what the
institution's rules are and that "[t]hey are entitled to know the general range of
sanctions that may be imposed for given offenses. " 58° The precise penalty, of
course, depends upon factors such as the circumstances of the violation and the
inmate's past record.
Just as a sentencing judge takes into consideration a defendant's past
record, it is common practice for disciplinary panels to review an inmate's file
prior to imposing punishment."' In Penrod v. Oregon State Prison, Corrections Divi-
"3 See Section I supra.
5 " 375 F. Supp. 856 (D.N.H. 1974).
"' Id. at 859.
'" Id. at 862.
977 364 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"6 Id. at 503.
"9 Id. at 499.
'3° Id. at 503. Where rules are established stipulating the type of penalties to be applied,
Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 341 A.2d 629 (1975), held that no punishment may be meted out
other than what is prescribed by the rules. Some of the regulations in the survey did not include
the offenses and penalties, but contained only the rules of procedure. Of those available, there
are two basic formats. One approach is to place all offenses into two or more classifications and
give a range of penalties which may be imposed for each class. The other format is to list the
minimum and maximum penalty for each offense.
"' See, e.g., Section V supra.
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sion,'" the court found implicit authority in one of the prison regulations for the
board to review the file in determining the proper penalty."' Some jurisdic-
tions implicitly require the board to review the file by providing stiffer penalties
for repeat offenders. 581
 To avoid prejudice to the inmate, the panels generally
are prevented from reviewing the file prior to the determination of guilt,
although there is no case law on that point. Some jurisdictions have specific
provisions to that effect, 585
 while in others there is a regulation permitting the
board to consider only that evidence produced at the hearing. 586
 Some institu-
tions are silent on the issue. Whatever the rule, however, board members
almost always work in the institution where the accused is incarcerated,'" and
therefore there is a good possibility that the board members will be aware of the
inmate's record without looking at the file.
If an inmate receives a penalty within the standards promulgated by the
prison, a further question is whether a court will review such a penalty. The
courts, on occasion, have used the eighth amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishment to vacate penalties imposed by prison disciplinary com-
mittees. This approach has been approved by the United States Supreme
Court, which in Hutto v. Finney, 588
 held that "[c]onfinement in . • . an isola-
tion cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under eighth amendment
standards." 589
 In Hutto, the Supreme Court upheld a district court's ban on in-
determinate sentences."° The Supreme Court made it clear, however, that
both its decision and that of the lower court were based on the totality of the
conditions in the segregation cells. 591
 The Court stated that indeterminate
sentences to punitive confinement do not, per se, constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. 592
Other courts have taken a similar approach. In Hardwick v. Au1t593 the
Middle District of Georgia stated two tests for establishing cruel and unusual
5°' 35 Or. App. 391, 581 P.2d 124 (1978).
' 83 Id. at 321-22, 581 P.2d at 125.
"4
 Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and the District of
Columbia.
" 5
 Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin
and the District of Columbia.
586
 Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Mississippi,
Nevada, Virginia, Washington and the District of Columbia.
387 See Section V supra. Only Michigan and North Carolina provide for factfinders from
outside the institution.
588 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
589
 Id. at 685.
59° Id. at 687. The lower court had imposed a thirty-day limit on preventive segregation.
Id. at 685.
591
 Id. at 685-87.
592
 Id. at 686. Of the handbooks in the survey which specify the maximum amount of
time which may be spent in segregation, none allow indefinite periods of confinement. Indiana
and Nebraska have three year maximums, although Nebraska provides for a review of the in-
mate's status every fifteen days and Indiana every thirty days. South Carolina recently added a
habitual offender provision which can add three years onto the existing two year maximum.
593
 447 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Ga. 1978).
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punishment with regard to disciplinary penalties. First, the court considered
whether the penalty was disproportionate to the offense, and second, whether it
had been capriciously inflicted without purpose. 594
 In answering either test, the
district court direct that the totality of the circumstances, not just the abstract
offense, must be weighed. 595 Applying the tests to the facts in that case, the
court found the punishment to be both disproportionate and capriciously in-
flicted. 596
 The inmate had been found guilty of openly advocating insubordina-
tion and given an indeterminate sentence in segregated confinement. The
court concluded that an indeterminate sentence with no clear criteria for
release was disproportionate because the offense "does not call for several
months or years of harsh confinement . " and because "the idea of an in-
definite duration of confinement shocks the conscience."'" The court also
found the punishment to be capricious in that it was extremely harsh, was not
related to a legitimate penal purpose, and required many inmates to remain in
segregation for months after a classification team had recommended their
transfer because the department found it difficult to place them in any of the
other already overcrowded institutions in the state. 596
In Covington v. Sielaff, 599
 another eighth amendment case, the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois indicated that in determining
whether a penalty is proportionate to the offense courts should take into con-
sideration the misconduct involved, the prisoner's disciplinary record, and the
offense for which he was convicted. 690
 In Covington the punishment involved
loss of six months good time, placement in segregation, and a two-level reduc-
tion in classification. 60 ' The state moved to dismiss on the ground that the
eighth amendment proportionality test applied only to the imposition of segre-
gation."' The court denied the motion, holding that loss of good time also may
be disproportionate."'
Not all courts, however, are as willing to intervene in the area of
disciplinary punishment. The Oregon courts have held that so long as the
penalty is constitutional and lawful and supported by substantial evidence, the
court will not inquire into the extent of the sanction. 604
 There is no indication,
however, of what test the court applies to determine constitutionality, and
some rather severe penalties have been upheld. In Grever v. Oregon State Correc-
tional Institution, Corrections Division, 605
 the inmate was found guilty of con-
594 Id. at 125.
595 Id.
596 Id. at 125-26.
597 Id. at 125.
598 Id.
599 430 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. III. 1977).
600
 Id. at 565.
601 Id. at 563-64.
699 Id. at 565-66.
603 Id. at 565.
604 Melton v. Oregon State Correctional Institution, Corrections Division, 34 Or. App.
951, 954, 580 P.2d 572, 573 (1978).
"5 28 Or. App. 829, 561 P.2d 669 (1977).
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spiracy to commit disruptive behavior after attempting to organize a sitdown
strike. 606
 The board ordered him to spend one year and sixty days in segrega-
tion and took away 608 days of good time. The Oregon Court of Appeals
upheld this penalty."' Thus, a wide variation in the application of the eighth
amendment exists from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
From the foregoing, it is clear that just as inmates have the right to be in-
formed of the prison's rules of conduct, they also have the right to know what
penalties they will be subject to for violation of those rules. Rather than one
penalty for each violation, however, a range of penalties may be specified so
that disciplinary boards can take into consideration variables such as an in-
mate's past disciplinary record in determining a penalty. Additionally, the
courts have made it clear that they will review a disciplinary penalty to deter-
mine whether it violates the eighth amendment, although some courts have
upheld rather severe penalties. 6"
606 Id. at 831, 561 P.2d at 670-71.
6" Id. at 836, 561 P.2d at 672. The same court upheld a co-conspirator's loss of 608 days
of good time and two years and ninety days in segregation. Wimberly v. Oregon State Correc-
tional Institution, Corrections Division, 28 Or. App. 837, 839, 561 P.2d 673, 674 (1977). Of the
handbooks in the survey which indicate the amount of good time that may be taken for violation
of a prison rule, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, South Carolina, Virginia, District of Columbia, Oregon, Vermont and the federal
government permit the loss of all earned good time; West Virginia has a two year maximum; Il-
linois, Minnesota and New Hampshire have a one year maximum; and California, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Maine, North Carolina and Wisconsin have maximums of ninety days or less.
Finally, there is the question of whether prison disciplinary boards have the authority to
order an inmate found guilty of destruction of state property to pay restitution. In most prisons,
currency is classified as contraband. As a result, inmate accounts are established at the prisons
and any amount of money received by the inmates must be placed in their accounts. Prison of-
ficials control the accounts, and therefore, they are in a position to withdraw money from an in-
mate's account if the board were to order restitution.
In Sells v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1977), the board ordered restitution. The
Eighth Circuit held that "an administrative agency has no right without underlying statutory
authority to prescribe and enforce forfeitures of property as punitive measures for violation of ad-
ministrative rules and regulations, and . when an agency does so it violates the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 759. At least two state courts, however, have found
the requisite statutory authority to prescribe and enforce forfeitures in those statutes which em-
power the commissioner or director of the department of corrections to provide such measures as
he may deem necessary for the safety and security of the institutions. Baker v. Wilmot, 410
N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (A.D. 1978), and Curtis v. Oregon State Correctional Institution, Correc-
tions Division, 20 Or. App. 530, 532 P.2d 798, 799 (1975). In other words, the New York and
Oregon courts have granted the prison administrators wide discretion based on a general enabl-
ing statute, restricted only by judicial review.
606 One other sentencing practice worth noting is that twenty-three jurisdictions in the
survey provide for suspended sentences. They are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Col-
orado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, the District of Columbia (the administrator, not the board, may suspend
punishment) and the federal government. This is a practice analogous to placing a criminal
defendant on probation. As long as the inmate commits no further violations during the period of
suspension, the penalty will not be imposed.
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VIII. REVIEW
Courts, of course, are not limited in their review of disciplinary action to
penalties. As was discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Wolff required that a
written statement be prepared after each disciplinary hearing. 609
 The state-
ment must include a description of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for
the disciplinary action taken. The main reason given by the Court for requiring
such a statement was that the disciplinary committee's actions would be
reviewed by other bodies."' A written statement would provide an accurate
record of the disciplinary proceedings and would assist the inmate in "pro-
pounding his own cause to or defending himself from others. " 61
Since the Wolff Court anticipated that disciplinary decisions would be sub-
ject to some form of scrutiny, this section will discuss the availability of ad-
ministrative and judicial review. The available judicial review will be discussed
under the categories of the state and federal Administrative Procedures Acts
(APA), state law other than the APAs and federal law other than the APA.
A. Administrative Review
While recognizing that the disciplinary proceedings might be reviewed by
other bodies, the Wolff Court did not discuss the process in any detail. Wolff did
not even establish whether administrative review should be required. The
courts might be expected to establish administrative review as a due process
requirement as a means of reducing the number of cases filed alleging due proc-
ess violations in disciplinary proceedings. However, there is no case law since
Wolff which has required administrative review. The major reason is that the
prison administrations have acted without waiting for a judicial declaration.
Despite the Supreme Court's silence on the issue, forty-one of the prison
systems in the survey have adopted some form of administrative review of
disciplinary proceedings. 6 " As a result, the issue rarely is raised.
There are two basic forms of review: those which require the inmate to ini-
tiate an appeal, and those which provide for automatic review of the proceed-
ings. Nineteen of the prison systems provide both forms of review. 6 " In these
systems, an administrator automatically reviews all disciplinary hearings, and
if a prisoner is not satisfied with the decision, he can file a written appeal argu-
ing his grounds for reversal. In some jurisdictions, the written appeal goes to
660
 418 U.S. at 564.
610
 Id. at 565.
611
612
 The one exception is Michigan. Under Public Act 140, effective February 1, 1980,
the inmate does have the right to request a rehearing, 5 54, and he has the right to petition for
judicial review, 5 55.
610 California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Ten-
nessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and the District of Columbia.
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the same person who conducted the automatic review. 614
 Thirty-nine of the
jurisdictions in the survey have a system of inmate-initiated appeals. 6 " Four-
teen of those prison systems provide for more than one level of appeal, 616 with
Arkansas, Idaho and South Carolina giving inmates four opportunities for ad-
ministrative review.
While there is no case law holding that prisons must establish ad-
ministrative appeal procedures, Hale v. Oregon State Penitentiary, Corrections Divi-
sion"' held that once those procedures are established the prison authorities
must abide by them. Hale had been found guilty and had received both loss of
good-time and punitive segregation, with segregation imposed immediately
after the hearing. 6 ' 8 He appealed to the superintendent, who under the institu-
tion's appeal procedures had nineteen days in which to render a decision. 619
The superintendent modified the punishment to include only loss of good-time,
but the decision came after the nineteen day deadline had elapsed. 62° Because
Hale had been in segregation continuously since the hearing and the ad-
ministrator's decisions had been late, the Oregon court ordered that the disci-
plinary board's decision as to loss of good-time must also be reversed, limiting
Hale's punishment to time served in segregation. 621
Apart from requiring that a prison follow its own rules, the Hale case
highlights a problem often encountered in the appeal process. If the penalty im-
posed by the disciplinary board is loss of good-time, and the panel's decision is
reversed on appeal, the prisoner's time can be reinstated. Where the penalty is
punitive segregation imposed immediately after the hearing, however, the in-
mate may already have served several days in confinement before the board's
decision is reviewed. A solution to this problem would be to stay punishment
pending an appeal. Unfortunately, only fourteen jurisdictions in the survey
provide for suspension of the penalty, 622 and of those fourteen only ten states
make suspension mandatory, 623
 while the remaining four states leave the deci-
sion to the discretion of the hearing board. 624
614 Maine, Maryland and Oregon.
615 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois (a petition for reduction of segregation time), Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, the District of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
616 Alaska, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, North Dakota, South
Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, the District of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons.
617 33 Or. App. 529, 577 P.2d 531 (1978).
616 Id. at 531, 577 P.2d at 531.
613 Id.
6" Id. at 531, 577 P.2d at 531-32.
621 Id. at 532, 577 P.2d at 532.
622 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada (only when the inmate is referred for prosecution), North Carolina, North
Dakota, Rhode Island and Washington.
623 Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada (only when the
inmate is referred for prosecution), North Carolina, Rhode Island and Washington.
624 Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota and North Dakota.
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Thus, while the courts have not established a right to an administrative ap-
peal, the prison systems uniformly have created some form of review. An
inmate-initiated procedure, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, generally is
preferable because the inmates have the opportunity to file written appeals em-
phasizing their arguments for reversal. With an automatic review, on the other
hand, prisoners do not necessarily have the opportunity to prepare written
arguments and must hope that the reviewer detects the errors in the case. It is
analogous to an appellate court reviewing every criminal trial in its jurisdiction
without the benefit of written briefs or oral argument. Automatic review,
however, has the advantage of protecting the rights of those inmates who are
unable for whatever means, to file their own appeals. If the administrators are
providing meaningful review rather than just rubber stamping the hearing
board's decisions, this is one area in which prisoners' due process rights have
progressed since Wol To insure meaningful administrative review, however,
judicial review of the administrators' decisions must be available.
B. Judicial Review
An inmate seeking judicial review of a disciplinary action generally has
more than one option, depending on the jurisdiction in which he is confined.
First, some states consider their administrative procedure acts applicable to
prison disciplinary actions. Thus, the judicial review provisions of these
statutes may be used by inmates. Second, some states have alternate review
procedures specifically for disciplinary hearings. Perhaps the most common of
these alternatives .
 is a writ of habeas corpus. Finally, inmates may often seek
federal review of their disciplinary action under either 42 U.S.C. section 1983
or the federal habeas corpus statute. Under each of the above actions the scope
of review and the remedies available are slightly different. The various options
and their individual ramifications are discussed below.
1. Judicial Review Under Administrative Procedure Acts
In Section\ JI of this article, the federal Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) was discussed with regard to rule-making procedures. 625 Ranter v. Sax-
be 626
 held that the Federal Bureau of Prisons is an agency within the meaning
of the APA and that its rulemaking is subject to the requirements of the Act. 627
The APA, however, applies not only to an agency's rule-making procedures,
but also to its adjudicatory procedures. 628 A government body which comes
within the definition of "agency," and which has not been exempted from the
Act's provisions, must provide procedural rights at adjudicatory proceedings
which go beyond Wolff, including the right to judicial review. 629 In light of
625
	 note 62 supra.
626
	 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
627
	 at 697. The plaintiffs in Ranter were concerned with receiving notice of prohibited
conduct and of the rules of procedure. Id. at 698-99.
626 5 U.S.C. §S 554-557.
629 Id.
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Ramer, the issue became whether the Federal Bureau of Prisons must apply the
APA procedural standards to disciplinary hearings, just as it must to rule-
making procedures.
The Ninth Circuit, in Clardy v. Levi, 630 held that it did not. The court
reasoned that "[t]he formality envisioned by [the APA] [is] not suited for
various reasons to disciplinary proceedings of the Bureau of Prisons. "631 The
court then pointed out that, following court holdings that deportation pro-
ceedings and the Parole Commission functions come within the APA, Con-
gress changed the law and exempted deportation proceedings and all functions
of the Parole Commission except rule-making. 632 Looking to the legislative
history of the APA, the court concluded "that the APA countenanced unex-
pressed exemptions of agencies as well as authority to apply its terms to
selected functions of agencies. "633
The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that both Wolff and Baxter as well as
subsequent decisions have fashioned procedural safeguards specifically for
prison disciplinary proceedings which, unlike the procedures provided in the
APA, would not unduly inhibit prison management. 634 Further, the court
stressed that Congress had made no attempt specifically to bring the Bureau of
Prisons within the APA. 635 Based on these reasons, the court held that the APA
is not applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings, and thus allowed the "con-
tinuation of the evolution that currently is taking place in the federal
courts. , ,636
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's construction of the federal administrative
act, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that it was compelled to interpret its
state act as encompassing disciplinary hearings within state prisons. In
Lawrence v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 637 the court first found the Depart-
ment of Corrections to be an "agency" within the Act's definition. 638
 The
Michigan APA provides that, unless expressly exempted, all agency pro-
ceedings are governed by the Act, 639 and, therefore, a party to an agency pro-
ceeding which qualifies as a "contested case" is entitled to certain procedural
safeguards provided by the Act, including judicial review. 640 Since disciplinary
proceedings are not expressly exempt from the Michigan Act, the court held
that disciplinary hearings come within the requirement of being a "contested
case." 641 Based on this construction, therefore, the court reasoned that it had
63° 545 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1976).
631 Id. at 1244.
634 at 1245.
6" Id. The House report stated that "manifestly the bill does not unduly encroach upon
the needs of any legitimate government operation, although it is of course operative according to
its terms even if it should cause some administrative inconvenience or changes in procedure." Id.
634 Id. at 1245-46.
635
 Id, at 1245.
636 Id. at 1246.
637
	 Mich. App. 167, 276 N.W.2d 554 (1979).
636 Id. at 170, 276 N.W.2d at 555.
639 Id. at 170, 276 N.W.2d at 556.
646 Id.
641 Id. at 171, 276 N.W.2d at 557.
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no choice under the law but to hold that prison disciplinary hearings are
governed by the APA. 642
The determination that Michigan's prison hearings must comply with
that state's administrative procedure act has several direct consequences on the
rights of inmates. First, this holding means that the accused has a right to
cross-examination and a right to call witnesses without qualification. 643
 Addi-
tionally, an official record of the evidence introduced at the hearing and all pro-
ceedings must be recorded and available for transcription. 644
 Finally, the ac-
cused has a right to judicial review of the proceedings. 645
Despite the holding in Lawrence, and perhaps because of these additional
procedures, the Michigan court expressed concern that its decision, while
legally required, was not sound policy. It urged the legislature, therefore, to
consider the effect on prison management that the holding would have and to
grant the Department of Corrections an exemption from the Act. 646
 The
legislature granted the exemption, but it also enacted Public Law 140 which
created a separate hearings division within the Department"' and which pro-
vided for judicial review under the APA. 648
The issue of exemption from a state APA arose also in Florida. In Florida
Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. jeny,649
 an administrative hearing ex-
aminer found the Department's disciplinary rules to be invalid for failure to
meet the procedural guidelines of the Florida APA. 65° On appeal, however, the
state court reversed, holding that Jerry did not have standing because he did
not lose good time and he no longer was in segregation at the time his petition
for administrative relief was filed. 65 ' Following Jerry the Administration Com-
mission, comprised of the Governor and the Cabinet, then granted the Depart-
ment a temporary exemption from the APA, and later the state legislature
granted a permanent exemption from the formal hearings requirement of the
Act. 552
 However, as a state court of appeals held in Brown v. Florida, 653
 inmates
still may seek judicial review pursuant to the APA. 654
In State ex rel. Armistead v. Phelps, 655
 a Louisiana inmate filed a state habeas
corpus petition seeking review of the disciplinary board's finding of guilt. 656
The district court denied the writ on the merits, but the Louisiana Supreme
642 Id. at 172, 276 N.W.2d at 556-57.
643 Id. at 169 n.1, 276 N.W.2d at 555 n.l.
644 Id.
645 Id. at 170, 276 N.W.2d at 556.
646 Id. at 173, 276 N.W.2d at 557.
647 Section 51.
646 Section 55.
649 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
653 Id. at 1231.
651
 Id. at 1235.
652 FLA, STAT. § 120.52(10). The Department still is required to abide by the rulemak-
ing procedures of the Act.
"' 375 So.2d 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
654 Id. at 67.
"s 365 So.2d 468 (La. 1978).
656 Id. at 468.
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Court granted the writ to clarify the proper procedure for obtaining judicial
review in such cases. 657 The court held that habeas corpus was not the proper
remedy and that the judicial review procedures of the state APA applied to
prison disciplinary proceedings because the statute did not expressly exempt
the department of corrections. 658 The statute provides that final agency action
is subject to review by petition in the state district court within thirty days, and
that judicial review is confined to the record except for alleged procedural ir-
regularities. 659 Additionally, inmates have the right to appeal the final judg-
ment of the district court to the court of appeals. 66°
In Oregon, judicial review pursuant to the state APA is available in any
disciplinary case in which an inmate has been sentenced to segregation for
more than seven days or forfeiture of any amount of good-time. 661 Oregon is
unique, however, by providing notice to the inmates in the disciplinary regula-
tions that judicial review is available and that they have thirty days in which to
file an appeal."'
In a state which has an Administrative Procedures Act, therefore, inmates
have a right to judicial review under the Act unless the legislature has granted
the corrections department an exemption from the entire Act. Assuming that
such review is available, the next question is what standard of review will the
court apply. In Phelps, the Louisiana Supreme Court enunciated the scope of
review under that state's act which is representative of administrative pro-
cedure acts.
The district court may reverse or modify the disciplinary board's decision
if substantial rights have been prejudiced and the decision is (1) in violation of
constitutional or statutory authority, (2) in excess of the statutory authority of
the agency, (3) made upon unlawful procedure, (4) affected by other error of
law, (5) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion, or (6)
manifestly erroneous in view of reliable, probative and substantial evidence on
the whole record. 663 The next issue is whether state court review is available
under any other procedure.
2. Judicial Review Under State Law Other Than the Administrative
Procedure Acts
The state•Administrative Procedure Acts, as pointed out, have become a
relatively common method of judicial review of disciplinary hearings. Not all
states have APAs, however, and inmates must seek other methods of review.
The other avenue most often pursued in state courts is the writ of habeas cor-
pus.
6" Id.
"a Id. at 469.
659 Id. at 469-70.
66°
 Id. at 470.
661 OR. REV. STAT. § 421.195.
66$
	
Department of Human Resources, Corrections Division, Rule Governing
Inmate Conduct, and Procedures for Processing Disciplinary Actions, VI.G.11.b. (1980).
663 365 So.2d at 469-70.
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All states authorize writs of habeas corpus, and it is a common procedure
for challenging disciplinary decisions. The writ is available to anyone who is
being illegally detained, and an inmate who is punished by placement in segre-
gation or loss of good time without due process is being illegally detained."'
Habeas is available to anyone placed in segregation without due process
because segregation is a stricter form of confinement than originally ordered by
the sentencing court. Similarly, loss of good-time is reviewable by habeas cor-
pus because it affects the duration of confinement. For example, if an inmate
loses ninety days of good-time, he must serve that additional ninety days before
being released from prison. If the inmate's due process rights were violated
during the proceedings which resulted in segregation or the loss of good-time,
the stricter or additional imprisonment would constitute illegal detention.
The scope of review in habeas corpus is not unlike that under Ad-
ministrative Procedure Acts. In Bagley v. Brierlon, 665 for example, the Florida
Court of Appeals reversed a lower court denial of a habeas corpus petition
because the petition had stated "specific allegations regarding the disciplinary
proceedings which, if true, would establish that the Department of Corrections
failed to comply with its own rules and with the procedural requirements of
Wo/ff." 668 In fact, in Brown v. Florida, 66 ' the state court of appeals held that an
inmate who alleges constitutional violations may seek habeas corpus relief even
though he failed to pursue his remedy under the APA. 668 Finally, in Sanchez v.
Hunt669 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "[a] reviewing court must not
disturb an order of the agency charged with the administration of a prison
unless . . . its order is clearly arbitrary or capricious." 6" Thus, the scope of
review under habeas corpus includes whether the inmate's constitutional rights
were violated, whether the state complied with its own rules, and whether the
state acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 67 '
3. Judicial Review Under Federal Law Other Than the Administrative
Procedure Act
Aside from each jurisdiction's statutory review provisions, two federal
statutes exist that provide for federal judicial review of certain disciplinary
practices. Under federal law state prisoners have two vehicles for challenging
disciplinary proceedings: a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A section
664 See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 487, 499 (1973).
665 362 So.2d 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App, 1978).
666 Id. at 1049.
667 375 So.2d 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
669 Id. at 67.
669 329 So.2d 691 (La. 1976).
67' Id. at 692.
67'
	
disciplinary decision is reversed on appeal, the remaining issue becomes whether
the courts will order expungement of the disciplinary proceedings from an inmate's file. Upon
reversal, the obvious remedies available to inmates are reinstatement of good time and release
from segregation. Expungement, however, may be just as important because an inmate's file is
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1983 civil rights complaint must allege a violation of a constitutional right by
state action. Thus, a complaint alleging deprivation of due process in a disci-
plinary proceeding states a claim upon which relief can be granted under sec-
tion 1983. 672 Alternatively, as stressed in Willis v. Ciccone, 673 "it is generally
acknowledged that habeas corpus is a proper vehicle for any prisoner to
challenge unconstitutional actions of prison officials.' '674
State inmates, therefore, have an option as to which federal procedure
they want to pursue. There are advantages and disadvantages to both actions.
First, the remedies under each action are different. The Supreme Court, in
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 675
 held that if an inmate is seeking the restoration of good-
time, his only federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. 676 The Court reasoned
that good-time affects the duration of confinement, and if an inmate is seeking
a speedier release, a habeas petition is the only remedy. The Court reached this
result by determining that the State has such a strong interest in the ad-
ministration of its prisons that considerations of comity require that the state
not be bypassed when the relief sought lies at the "core of habeas corpus." 677
Conversely, if the inmate is seeking damages, the proper vehicle is a civil rights
complaint. 678 Thus, if an inmate wants to obtain both damages and the restora-
tion of good-time, he will have to file two separate actions. 679 A second dif-
ference between the two actions is that before filing a federal habeas petition a
state prisoner must exhaust all effective state court remedies, 6" while under sec-
tion 1983, 681 however, exhaustion is not required. Thus section 1983 offers a
speedier remedy.
reviewed for many purposes, including consideration for parole and reclassification. The ex-
istence of the record of the disciplinary proceedings in the file, even if the court's reversal is noted,
can negatively affect the decision of a parole board or classification team. Despite the importance
of this question, New York is the only state which deals with the expungement question. In both
Hurley v. Ward, 61 A.D.2d 881, 402 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1978), and Ortez v. Ward, 87 Misc.2d 307,
384 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1976), the two New York courts ordered expungement after holding that the
board's decisions must be reversed. Twenty-five jurisdictions in the survey provide for expunge-
ment of the disciplinary record from an inmate's file following a finding of not guilty either at the
hearing or on appeal.
672 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Beaubouef, 581 F.2d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 1978); Grillo v. Sielaff,
414 F. Supp. 272, 276 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Because a 5 1983 complaint requires deprivation of an
individual's constitutional rights by state action, this vehicle is unavailable to federal prisoners.
673
	 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1974).
674 Id, at 1014.
6" 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
676 Id. at 500.
677 Id. at 489-92.
"a Id. at 494, 498-99. Where the inmate is seeking money damages, prison officials have
a qualified immunity defense. The defense is not available, however, if the inmate can show (1)
that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct, that the
officials knew or should have known of the right, and that they knew or should have known that
their conduct violated the right; or (2) that the officials acted with malicious intention to deprive
the prisoner of the right or to cause him other injury. Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22, 25 (7th
Cir. 1978).
679
	 e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 554-55.
680 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(b).
6" See, e.g., Mitchell v. Beaubouef, 581 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1978).
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The scope of review exercised by federal courts under both types of actions
is comparable to that exercised in state courts. With respect to state prisoners,
Carter v. Cuyler682
 held that the details of a state's "prison disciplinary proce-
dures are not under the direction of the federal courts," 683
 but that a federal
court will intervene where federal constitutional or statutory rights are in-
volved. 68* Federal rights, however, are not strictly procedural rights.
The federal rights referred to in Carter, of course, were due process rights,
which while primarily procedural in nature, do possess some substantive
elements. As for procedural due process in disciplinary hearings, the Sixth Cir-
cuit, in Walker v. Hughes, 685
 stated that both Wolff and the "constitutional pro-
tection of liberty and property require[s] that the final judgment regarding the
procedural safeguards be invested in the judiciary." 686
 As to substantive due
process, judicial power is more limited. The courts will not review the sufficien-
cy of evidence, or the credibility of the witnesses. 687
 The federal courts will ex-
amine, however, whether there is basis in fact to support the action taken. 688
 As
stated in Covington v. Sielaff, 689
 "if the decision finding plaintiff guilty was not
arbitrary and capricious, the decision did not deprive him of substantive due
process ."680
68' 415 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
68' Id, at 856.
684 Id. When the plaintiff is a federal prisoner, the Second Circuit, in Ron v. Wilkerson,
565 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1977), held that the court's power is somewhat broader. It declared that a
district court judge "also has at least pendent jurisdiction to enforce" the procedural rules of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 1258. Procedurally, it also would be proper for a federal court to
assert pendent jurisdiction to enforce state law. However, the policy expressed in Carter reflects
the general approach of federal courts in all matters dealing with the administration of state
prisons. It is a vestige of the hands-off policy discussed earlier in this article.
685
 558 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977).
686 Id. at 1254.
687
 Russell v. Division of Corrections, Commonwealth of Virginia, 392 F. Supp. 476,
477 (W.D. Vir. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1975).
688 See, e.g., Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1974). The Eighth Circuit, in
Willis, stated that:
[The role of the district court is not to afford a de novo review of the disciplinary
board's factual findings. The district court should simply.
 .determine whether the
decision was supported by some facts. The sole and only issue of constitutional
substance is whether there exists any evidence at all, that is, whether there is any
basis in fact to support the action taken by the prison officials.
Id. at 1018.
666 430 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
696
	 at 564-65. Finally, as discussed in the previous section, even though the remedy of
expungement is important to inmates, only the New York courts have ordered the remedy. Two
federal cases which have addressed the question are Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22 (7th Cir.
1978), and Gates v. Collier, 454 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Miss. 1978). In Chapman the Seventh Cir-
cuit remanded the case with instructions to address the issue of the "expurgation of the record of
his punishment." 586 F.2d at 25. It is not known, however, how the district court dealt with the
issue because an opinion was not published. In Gases, the district court found that expungement
was not supported by the facts in the record. 454 F. Supp. at 585. The Court also stated,
however, that it was "inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Wolff" id., indicating that
it may not be an available remedy.
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It is clear, therefore, that federal court review is available to both state and
federal inmates where federal rights allegedly have been violated. Federal in-
mates can file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. State prisoners can pursue
either a habeas petition or a civil rights action. These actions are not identical,
however. Habeas corpus is the only remedy available for restoration of good-
time, and an inmate seeking monetary damages must file a section 1983 com-
plaint. Furthermore, a state inmate must exhaust state court remedies before
filing for a writ of habeas corpus.
In sum, the Wolff Court anticipated that the decision of disciplinary
boards would be subject to some type of review, and as has been discussed, in-
mates have access to various forms of both administrative and judicial review.
Despite the lack of a judicial mandate, almost every jurisdiction in the survey
has responded by providing for either automatic review of board decisions or
inmate-initiated appeals. Some jurisdictions, in fact, provide both forms of
review. At the judicial level, both state and federal court review is available.
Many states allow judicial appeals pursuant to an Administrative Procedure
Act, while in others inmates may petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The
`scope of review under either procedure includes whether the prisoner's con-
stitutional rights were violated, whether the state complied with its own rules,
and whether the state acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The federal APA has
been held not to be available to federal inmates. However, federal habeas cor-
pus is available to all prisoners, and state inmates alleging a denial of constitu-
tional rights by state action may file a section 1983 civil rights complaint.
However, if a state inmate is seeking restoration of good-time, he must file a
habeas petition, which requires the exhaustion of state remedies. On the other
hand, damages are cognizable only under section 1983. The scope of review
under both procedures is comparable to that exercised by the state courts. The
review includes whether federal constitutional or statutory rights were violated
and whether the state acted arbitrarily or capriciously. If the plaintiff is a
federal inmate, the courts also will decide whether the procedural rules of the
Bureau have been violated.
The disciplinary process now has been examined from the issue of whether
the institutions must promulgate rules of conduct to whether inmates have ac-
cess to review of disciplinary decisions. The one remaining issue is whether
prison officials have the means of imposing some form of major sanctions on in-
mates without the necessity of complying with the Wolff standards.
IX. PUNISHMENT BY ANY OTHER NAME:
CIRCUMVENTING DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
An inmate may not lose good-time or be placed in disciplinary confine-
ment without due process. This is the holding in Wolff. Wolffleft open the ques-
tion whether inmates have a right to due process where lesser penalties, such as
loss of privileges, are involved. 69 ' There are, however, other methods of pun-
6" 418 U.S. at 571 n.19.
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ishing inmates, such as placement in administrative segregation and transfer to
another institution. Subsequent to Wolf f, it has been possible for prison officials
to avoid the procedural requirements of that case by labelling an inmate's
segregation as administrative, rather than punitive, or by transferring the in-
mate to a more restrictive institution. Both forms of punishment have been
challenged on due process grounds.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court decided two cases dealing with
prison transfers. In Meachum v. Fano, 692
 the inmates challenged the procedures
used for all inter-prison transfers within the Massachusetts prison system. 693
The Supreme Court used a two-pronged test to determine whether transfers
violated the due process clause. Initially, the Court asked "whether the
transfer . . . infringed or implicated a 'liberty' interest . . . within the mean-
ing of the Due Process Clause. " 694 If so, then the Court asked whether the
hearings in that case were adequate to protect that liberty interest. 695
The Court did not reach the second issue because it held that not all
transfers infringe a liberty interest within the meaning of the due process
clause. 696
 Looking to the "nature of the interest involved rather than its
weight," 697
 the Court found that state law "conferred no right on the prisoner
to remain in the prison to which he was initially assigned, defeasible only upon
proof of specific acts of misconduct." 698 The Court went on to state that
"Ew]hatever expectation the prisoner may have in remaining at a particular
prison so long as he behaves himself, it is too ephemeral and insubstantial to
trigger procedural due process protections as long as prison officials have
discretion to transfer him whatever reason or for no reason at all. "699
While Meachum involved a challenge to prison transfers in general, Mon-
tanye v. Hc2yme.s 70° dealt only with transfers within the New York State prison
system which were made for disciplinary reasons."' In Montanye, the lower
court held that due process applies to such transfers,'" but the Supreme Court
reversed, restating its holding in Meachum that no liberty interest of an inmate
is infringed "absent some right or justifiable expectation rooted in state law
that he will not be transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of
other specified events. "703
The Meachum and Montanye test has been carried over to cases involving
administrative segregation. The result, however, has been somewhat different.
692 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
693 Id. at 222.
694
	 at 223-24.
695 Id. at 223.
696 Id. at 224-25.
697 Id. at 224.
694 Id. at 226.
699 Id. at 228.
m° 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
7°' Id. at 242.
7 ° 2 Id.
743
 Id.
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In Wright v. Enomoto, 704
 California inmates challenged the procedures for plac-
ing an inmate in administrative segregation. 705
 The District Court for the Nor-
thern District of California held that in California inmates have a liberty in-
terest in not being placed in maximum security segregation for administrative
reasons:706
 The United States Supreme Court affirmed this decision without an
opinion. 707
In Wright, the district court applied the same two part test used in Meachum
and Montanye, but distinguished Wright from these two cases on two grounds.
First, the court found that when an inmate is transferred from the general
prison population to maximum security, whether it is disciplinary or ad-
ministrative, "there is a severe impairment of the residuum of liberty which he
retains as a prisoner."'" Second, the district court found that state law had
limited the discretion of prison officials in placing inmates in administrative
confinement.'" Statewide regulations provided that inmates could be
segregated only after finding that "they are a menace to themselves and others
or a threat to the security of the institution.' ' 7 " Thus, in Wright the first part of
the test was met; a liberty interest in not being transferred existed. The district
court then looked to the second part of the test covering what procedures are re-
quired. The court held that inmates subject to administrative segregation pur-
suant to the California regulation are entitled to the same minimum due proc-
ess that Wolff established for prison disciplinary proceedings.'"
The issue of whether due process applies to transfers or to placement in
administrative segregation, therefore, is determined by whether state law has
established criteria for when an inmate can be transferred or confined to
segregation. If under state law an inmate may be transferred or segregated for
any reason or no reason at all, there is no protected liberty interest involved,
and due process is not required. In those instances, the state is able to punish
an inmate by transfer to a more secure institution or by confinement in ad-
ministrative segregation and totally avoid the Wolff standards.
In a jurisdiction where prison officials have complete discretion with
regard to transfers and segregation, therefore, there is the potential for
significantly undermining the impact of Wolff There are practical restrictions,
however, even in jurisdictions with total discretion. Overcrowding is a problem
in almost every prison system. As a result, it would not be possible to transfer
an inmate to another institution every time a major act of misconduct allegedly
104 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
1°' Id. at 398-99.
1°6 Id. at 402.
70 ' Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U.S. 1052 (1976).
7 °8 462 F. Supp. at 402. In the transfer cases, the Supreme Court had stated specifically
that the inmates had not been placed in segregation. 427 U.S. at 222; 427 U.S. at 238.
7°s
	 at 402-03.
710 Id. at 403.
7l'
	 The question whether more procedural protections are required was not reached
by the district court because of the inadequacy of the record. Id.
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is committed. The same restrictions would apply to administrative segregation
because of the limited number of cells available for that purpose. Furthermore,
the trend appears to be away from total discretion. Seventeen jurisdictions in
the survey include transfers as a punishment in their disciplinary
regulations, 712 thus invoking the Wolff standards, and application of due proc-
ess standards to administrative segregation is still a new and developing area of
the law. 713
 However, the fact remains that in some jurisdictions prison officials
still possess complete discretion with regard to transfers, segregation, or both,
and in selected cases they are able to use one of those sanctions as punishment
without the necessity of providing the inmate with either notice or a hearing.
X. CONCLUSION
The quote at the beginning of this article illustrates the arbitrariness in
punishing prison inmates which existed prior to Wolff v. McDonnell. The 1974
Supreme Court decision did a great deal to restrict the absolute discretion of
prison guards in administering punishment. The Court held that the loss of
good-time and confinement in disciplinary segregation involve liberty interests
and that those interests cannot be deprived without due process. The Court,
however, was reluctant to mandate strict procedures, and after weighing the
interests of the prisoners against those of the state, it established limited pro-
cedural safeguards. The better course, the Court reasoned, was to leave further
development of the procedures to the discretion of prison administrators.
Wolff left many questions unanswered in the belief that the prisons should
be allowed to develop their own standards. The purpose of the survey was to
find out how the prison systems have responded. Case law subsequent to Wolff
was studied to determine how the courts have responded to the procedures
which the prisons have adopted, or failed to adopt. The results show that some
advances have been made. For example, almost every prison system has in-
stituted some form of internal administrative appeal, many allow the assistance
of a representative in situations not required by Wolff and some provide for the
tape recording of the hearings.
The overall result of the survey, however, is a clear indication that most of
the questions left unanswered by Wolff either remain unanswered or have been
answered to the detriment of prisoners. Few institutions, for example, allow
the inmate or his representative to investigate the changes prior to the hearing,
thus limiting the ability to prepare a defense. In forty of the forty-two jurisdic-
tions in the survey, the disciplinary board is composed entirely of employees
from the same institution in which the accused is incarcerated. Such a composi-
tion is inimical to impartiality. Some jurisdictions allow a finding of guilt to be
712 California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Nebraska, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, the
District of Columbia and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
7 " Because the Supreme Court affirmed Wright without an opinion, it did not have the
immediate impact that Wolff did.
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based solely on the written reports of the officers with no corroboration.
Because of vague standards and no requirement of written reasons, the boards
have almost complete discretion to deny requested witnesses. A final example
is confrontation and cross-examination. While many jurisdictions allow cross-
examination, the exclusion of informants from testifying and the reliance on
written reports leaves no one to cross-examine.
Wolff took the discretion to impose major penalties away from the charg-
ing officers and gave it to the disciplinary boards and hearing officers. In the
seven years since Wolff, however, that discretion has not been limited to a
significant degree, and the due process accorded prisoners at disciplinary hear-
ings remains minimal.
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